

*ROSTISLAV
ULYANOVSKY*

**PRESENT-DAY
PROBLEMS
IN ASIA AND AFRICA**

THEORY. POLITICS. PERSONALITIES



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Translated from the Russian by *Barry Costello-Jones* and *Angus Roxburgh*
Designed by *Vladimir Yurchikov*

Р. А. Ульяновский

СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ АЗИИ И АФРИКИ
Вопросы теории. Политика. Лидеры

На английском языке

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THEORY. POLITICS

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

The 20th century will go down in history as an era of change—change hitherto unprecedented in scale and depth. It is an era which has seen the revolutionary process acquire truly global proportions, an era which has witnessed tremendous victories for socialism, an era of international socialist revolution against imperialism. It began a little over six decades ago with the most important event of the century, the Great October Socialist Revolution, when the heroic working class of Russia under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party with Lenin at its head broke the chain of imperialism and for the first time the struggle of the working people against exploitation and social and national oppression was crowned with a decisive victory that radically changed the whole course of human history.

Lenin pointed out that socialist revolution should never be considered as a single battle on a single front: socialism versus imperialism. 'This revolution,' he wrote in one of the drafts for an article entitled 'The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination', 'will be a whole epoch of acute class struggle and social upheaval, a whole series of battles on many fronts as the results of the most diverse economic and political transformations which will have matured and be calling for a radical break with the past.'¹

These transformations, which constitute an integral part of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, Fifth Russian Edition, Vol. 54, Politizdat, Moscow, 1965, p. 464.

world social revolution, include the far-reaching changes that have taken place in the countries that were once exploited by imperialism, particularly those which lie on the continents of Asia and Africa, which have become one of the most important fronts in the worldwide confrontation between socialism and imperialism.

To his great credit it was Lenin who first elucidated the role and place of the struggle of the oppressed peoples in the world revolutionary process and revealed their tremendous anti-imperialist potential. He predicted that the downtrodden peoples of the world would one day become allies of the revolutionary proletariat in its struggle for social emancipation.

Lenin believed one of the most important means for drawing the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries into a common front against imperialism was the slogan which declared the right of nations to self-determination.¹ Lenin upheld this slogan firmly and consistently, from the class position of the international proletariat, in polemics with both right and 'left' opportunists. Proceeding from the law of uneven economic and political development of countries in the epoch of imperialism, he showed the socialist revolution would first take place in one individual country. This revolution would be victorious under the leadership of a working class party. As a result of this victory, the major elements of the world revolutionary movement—the international working class and the peoples fighting imperialism for their liberation—would receive powerful support and a focus for their solidarity.

History has borne out Lenin's predictions which were based on an all-round analysis of the patterns of socio-economic development and the correlation of the main political forces. The Soviet Union is now that focus, around which the liberation movements of the proletariat in the West and the oppressed peoples in the East are concentrated. The alliance of these movements, which now has the common support of the world's first country where the proletariat were victorious, is one of the most important factors determining the course of the world revolutionary process. Lenin laid particular stress on the necessity to strengthen this alliance and on the impermissibility of isolating any of the component parts of the international anti-imperialist movement

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Moscow, 1977, p. 316. Here and further the references are to the English edition of Lenin's works brought out by Progress Publishers unless otherwise indicated.

and particularly opposing one to the other. He advanced the idea of a world anti-imperialist front on which the strategy of the international communist movement was to be based, particularly in its policy towards the East. At the same time Lenin proposed and substantiated a guideline aimed at creating a united front of all anti-imperialist forces in the countries fighting for liberation from colonial and semi-colonial oppression. He showed that the capitalist stage of development was not obligatory for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and that with the support of the victorious working class and the expansion of their own political activity, these peoples could achieve socialism without first going through the capitalist stage of development.

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which brought about a radical change in the correlation of world forces, provided the foundation for the implementation of Lenin's great plan for struggle against imperialism. Today the influence of this tremendous event on the course of the liberation struggle in Africa and Asia has been shown to be truly colossal. Let us consider a few of its effects.

The scale and character of the revolutionary process in the Asian and African countries have changed fundamentally under the influence of the October Socialist Revolution. These changes are an integral part of the shifts that have occurred in the socio-political and economic structure of the world, and which were conditioned by the objective laws of social development as revealed by Marx, Engels and Lenin. It must of course be stressed that the founders of Marxism-Leninism never treated the transition of mankind to socialism as something automatic and divorced from conscious human activity. On the contrary, by way of their profound scientific analysis they showed that mankind is moving towards socialism by virtue of objective historical laws, and for this reason they attached exceptionally great importance to the influence of the masses on the course of their own history. Their conviction that socialism would be the future of mankind, a conviction based on the conclusions of scientific socialism, has made the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin a great source of historical optimism.

Scientific socialism has also shown the ways to achieve the aims of the liberation movement. Marx, Engels and Lenin believed that the most important condition for the effective influence of the working masses on the course of history was the realisation by the

proletariat of its historic mission as the vanguard in the struggle for liberation from all types of exploitation. Lenin showed conclusively that this mission can only be achieved when the proletariat is led by its most advanced detachment, the communist party, which bases itself on the theory, strategy, tactics and organisational requirements of scientific socialism.

Over the years that have elapsed since the October Socialist Revolution colossal changes have taken place in the world. The world socialist system has arisen and grown stronger, and none of the many attempts by the forces of internal and external reaction to restore capitalism have brought its enemies success. The international communist movement has become an influential political force in the world today. With the support of the socialist community the oppressed peoples have achieved liberation from colonial slavery and in place of the former colonies dozens of politically independent states have appeared. A hard but successful struggle is being waged for the elimination of the last remnants of colonialism in Africa. In the industrial capitalist countries the positions of the working class are growing ever stronger and the socialisation of production has now gone so far that capitalism as a system based on private ownership of the means of production has become an economic anachronism. These countries are increasingly seeing the influence of political forces that advocate the socialist reconstruction of society. In international relations detente has become an important factor. Initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which has consistently worked to make it more extensive in scope and irreversible in character, detente provides conditions in which the balance of forces in the confrontation between socialism and imperialism is increasingly changing in favour of the former.

The liberation movement of the oppressed peoples has acquired a fundamentally new scale and character. In the first place it has gained unprecedented power. The direct influence of the revolution in Russia has given a universal impetus to liberation. At the same time the appearance and strengthening of existing socialism—first in one country and then in a large group of countries—has forced imperialism to concentrate its forces on the main thrust of its attack against the anti-imperialist forces—the confrontation with world socialism. Help from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the national liberation movements has grown rapidly to include political, economic and military aid. The example provided by existing socialism, the USSR above all, has been of enormous significance in all aspects of social and

political life, and especially in relation to the national question.

The years immediately following the October Socialist Revolution in Russia saw a distinct change in the struggle of the oppressed peoples of the world for liberation. Pressure on imperialism from its colonial and semi-colonial fringe began to acquire global proportions as hundreds of millions of people awoke to the prospect of liberation. Looking back over those years we see the rise of the liberation movement in India, the gaining of independence by Afghanistan, the victory of the people's revolution in Mongolia, the revolution of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty in Iran, numerous uprisings among the Arabs, increasing insurgency in Indonesia culminating in the armed uprising of 1926-1927, and an anti-imperialist revolution in China (1925-1927), all of which took place during the first decade after the October Revolution.

As the years passed the anti-imperialist struggle grew in intensity but, what is particularly important, its success became directly proportional to the successes of world socialism. After the Second World War the anti-imperialist movement literally exploded in the East and in the new situation that had arisen after the defeat of the Axis powers, when the USSR together with all peace-loving peoples played a decisive role in saving the world from fascist domination, world socialism began to exert an increasing influence on international politics and its support for the peoples fighting for liberation in the colonial and semi-colonial countries became more powerful.

After the oppressed peoples of many countries had actively participated in the war against the Axis powers, after the bourgeois-democratic countries had been compelled to turn to the colonial peoples for support against the Axis, after the power and invincibility of the Soviet Union became clearly apparent and its prestige and influence in international affairs rose sharply, and finally after the people's democratic revolutions had been victorious in a number of countries, the national liberation movement entered a new stage. In the preceding period victory for the national liberation movement had been the exception rather than the rule. The peoples that rose against imperialism in the twenties and thirties more often than not failed to achieve national independence. Today, however, the greatly increased influence of socialism on international affairs has meant that the oppressed peoples of the East have entered an epoch of forming independent states, an epoch which the European peoples went through a century earlier.

History has borne out Lenin's prediction that the peoples of the East would be faced with a similar struggle for the creation of their national states as that which took place in Europe. On this issue as on others Lenin upheld the universality of the fundamental propositions of scientific socialism; while pointing to the specificity of the East and attaching great importance to it, he, nevertheless, believed that this specificity does not nullify the laws which are of a universal nature and which operate both in the West and in the East.

The formation of independent national states in the East was an irresistible process. In 1947 India declared national independence; the fires of national liberation were kindled in Southeast Asia; in China the civil war, in which the national liberation armies led by the Communist Party launched an offensive against the Kuomintang and its imperialist allies, was still in progress. Africa during this period, however, remained almost totally enslaved. But by the mid-1970s all that was left of the colonial system of imperialism were a few 'islets'. Building up the colonial system took centuries; its collapse took no more than 25-30 years. It is profoundly natural that the independent states that rose in the lands of the last, Portuguese colonial empire were consolidated on the basis of revolutionary-democratic power with the direct help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Similarly effective was socialist community help to the people of Vietnam, who did away with the pro-American puppet regime in the south and formed a united socialist state.

Lenin pointed out that gigantic battles with imperialism faced the peoples of the oppressed countries and stressed the importance of solidarity among these peoples, as among all anti-imperialist forces, behind the world's first country of a victorious proletariat. The very existence of the Soviet Union and the extension of its political influence and that of the other socialist countries has enormously accelerated the revolutionary process in the East. For its part, the liberation movements among the oppressed peoples have made a great contribution to the world anti-imperialist movement by striking blow after blow at the forces of imperialism.

Not one bourgeois politician or ideologist could have imagined at the turn of the century that within six or seven decades dozens of new states would have been formed, that the industrial capitalist countries would have to take account of the aspirations and policies of the liberated countries and that the colonial peoples whom they had treated negligently or at best patronisingly would

themselves have become an important factor in world politics. The colonial and semi-colonial fringe had always been regarded by the imperialists as a suitable object for exploitation, which could be relied upon for centuries. Individual uprisings and 'disorders' that could occasionally break out they planned to put down by armed force without expecting to meet any serious resistance from the oppressed peoples, or a rebuff on the part of some powerful international political forces.

But circumstances changed radically and the imperialists have rapidly lost what was once theirs. Account now has to be taken of the former colonial peoples and their influence on world politics is becoming more and more important. This has been achieved by the heroic struggle of these peoples, their working class, their peasantry and other anti-imperialist classes and strata. And of course no one can deny the great positive role played by world socialism. Without the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, without the rise of the greatest socialist power, the Soviet Union, and the socialist community, the situation in the world today, particularly in Africa and Asia, would have been fundamentally different: for the peoples of the East would have still been held under the sway of imperialism and their destinies subject to its will.

Before the October Revolution the national liberation struggle both in Europe and on the oppressed continents could only see as its objective the formation of bourgeois-national states with socialist revolution in perspective, a hope, furthermore, whose fulfilment depended on the intensity and 'freedom' of capitalist development, a process that is measured in decades or even centuries. However long and far-reaching the revolutionary struggle for national self-determination among oppressed peoples, it inevitably ended in the formation of a bourgeois state, if indeed it was victorious at all. From the social point of view the movement for national independence was democratic, anti-feudal. After the victory of the October Socialist Revolution Lenin's prediction that the movement of the oppressed peoples, which was originally directed against imperialism, would eventually become anti-capitalist, was completely fulfilled. Once the oppressed peoples were able to rely on aid from the victorious proletariat, the anti-capitalist aspirations of the revolutionary and national-democratic forces being powerfully influenced by socialist ideology, became realistic. In other words, there was now an alternative to capitalist development, and this was an alternative that previously had not existed. How is it to be explained?

The possibility of avoiding or interrupting the capitalist stage of

development was, it must be stressed, given thorough scientific grounding by Lenin and has nothing in common with the idea that a nation may only adopt the non-capitalist path on the basis of its negative attitude to capitalism. Such a conception is characteristic of Populist ideology which holds to the belief that capitalism can be by-passed by virtue of the particular qualities possessed by a certain people, the characteristics that distinguish it from other peoples, or the traditional strength of pre-capitalist forms of being and consciousness. In the view of old and new Populists, capitalism is bad and if the capitalist formation does not yet exist in a given country or has not yet absorbed all the other formations, then consequently there is the possibility of 'choosing' a pre-capitalist formation and 'bringing' it to socialism (i. e., socialism as the Populists understood it). The fact that capitalism is 'alien' to the consciousness of this or that people is, according to them, sufficient to guarantee the success of such a venture. This kind of thinking is as unscientific now as it was in the last century. Marxist-Leninist acceptance of the possibility of by-passing or interrupting the capitalist stage of development rests on premises that are totally different.

Populism does not take into account the fact that the specificity of the East in itself does not yet determine in any way the possibility of a non-capitalist path of development, or socialist orientation.

But in the West too capitalism was once only one of the modes of production, and there too it was alien to traditional being and consciousness. The rapid development of capitalist relations there also gave rise to resistance and was considered as something abnormal, contradicting the national consciousness and traditional values. That was exactly the case in England, the country of classical capitalism, where the final establishment of that formation (in the early 19th century) was received by the masses of the people as a great misfortune, a national catastrophe and a social tragedy. There has not been a nation in the world that welcomed capitalism with open arms, choosing it as its own path of development. The history of capitalism is the history of the popular masses' struggle against a new form of exploitation, which was even harsher than what went before. And this has been the case wherever capitalism has become the dominant social formation. But despite capitalism's opposition to tradition, to the previous forms of economic, political and ideological being and to all which was taken as national specificity, it has 'devoured' and 'digested' all the other economic structures; and this is precisely

why Western Europe has taken the capitalist path. Thus the possibility of non-capitalist development, i. e. socialist orientation is not determined by desires and aspirations, however just, or by the specific characteristics of a given nation.

Populism in Russia (Narodism¹ as it was known) was theoretically refuted by Lenin. Narodniks claimed that since capitalism in Russia had not yet been firmly established and that the popular masses treated it as something alien to them, capitalist development could be halted. Importantly, in recognising the possibility of non-capitalist development for colonial and semi-colonial peoples after the victory of the October Revolution Lenin proceeded from the same principles of scientific socialism that he had used in his ideological struggle against the Narodniks.

The Marxist-Leninist idea of non-capitalist development is based on the premise that capitalism can be by-passed or interrupted at a certain level of the development of world capitalism; it proceeds from the characterisation of capitalism as a world system (such a characterisation was given by Lenin as a result of his analysis of the imperialist stage of capitalism); it is based on the attitude to the revolutionary process as a process of world significance. As a result of the uneven development of states, a law whose operation can fully and on a global scale be seen at the imperialist stage of capitalism, the countries of the East find themselves to be the oppressed periphery of the world capitalist system, but still part of this system. This same law (the intensification of political and economic unevenness in the development of countries during the imperialist era) creates the conditions for the victory of socialism first in one country and then in a group of countries; world socialism has become a force to be reckoned with; relying on its all-round support, the political organisations of the working people in the oppressed countries are enabled to undertake such measures as the nationalisation and socialisation of production, and the abolition of private ownership of the basic means of production, in fact they are able to take the socialist path even before capitalism has had a chance to develop as a socio-economic formation on a national level. In other words, the Leninist theory of non-capitalist development concludes that such development is possible when world capitalism has reached the

¹ Narodism was the ideology and political movement of the non-noble and middle-class intelligentsia in the mid-19th century. Its views were a contradictory mixture of utopian socialism and the real demands of the peasantry.—Ed.

stage where socialist revolution and the creation of real socialism are possible.

Attention then should be focused on the political preconditions for the liberated countries' entry on the path of socialist orientation. The most important international political precondition for this is the growth of the influence of world socialism and the strengthening of the power of the socialist community, above all the Soviet Union. When the working class of Russia was carrying out its socialist revolution, when it upheld its gains in fierce combat with internal and external reaction, when it built socialism together with the working peasants, it created at the same time and thereby the necessary conditions for the peoples of the East to enter the path that ultimately leads to socialism without going through the stage of capitalism. Russia thus became not only the first country in the world to cast off the chains of capitalism without going through the difficult period of the firm establishment of capitalism as a socio-economic formation, it also became the country that offered the peoples of the world who live in conditions where capitalism has not yet completely matured the opportunity of entering on the road to socialism.

Realisation of the possibility of by-passing or interrupting capitalist development to a large extent depends on the nature of the political force which governs the liberated country. If the national bourgeoisie comes to power, then, while it remains at the helm of the state, non-capitalist development will continue to be an unfulfilled possibility. If, on the other hand, the country is ruled by revolutionary-democratic anti-capitalist forces, then there arises the political possibility for the country to take the non-capitalist path of development. If the communist party comes to power, then the transition from capitalist to socialist development is effected by way of socialist transformations. Experience has shown that economically backward states, in which capitalism has already become the most influential mode of production, also can enter the path of socialist orientation. But, of course, there have never been and never will be situations arising in which the transition to socialist orientation can be effected under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.

It is worth emphasising at this point that non-capitalist development, or what amounts to the same thing, socialist orientation, must be sharply distinguished from the building of socialism, insofar as the former is only a transitional stage on the road to the latter. In using the term 'socialist orientation' or 'non-capitalist path' we wish to stress the specifics of this form of transition to

socialism, which is quite different from socialism as it exists in the socialist countries. Failure to draw a clear distinction between the socialist-orientated countries, on the one hand, and the countries that are developing along capitalist lines, on the other, would mean ignoring the fact that in the socialist-orientated countries a wide offensive is in progress against private property in the decisive economic spheres, that serious limitations are being imposed upon the bourgeoisie and that the dominant role in their economies belongs to the state sector.

It would be a serious mistake to identify the processes taking place in the socialist-orientated countries with those in the socialist countries. That would mean disregarding such important factors of principle as the power of the working class and the peasantry, the guiding role of the Marxist-Leninist party, the ousting and complete elimination of capitalist relations and the irreversibility of such changes. None of these circumstances, which are decisive in ensuring the building of socialism, as yet exist in the socialist-orientated states. Hence a turn to capitalism is always possible as shown by the example of a number of states which initially entered the path of non-capitalist development. But the fact that a revolutionary-democratic force might turn to capitalism (which of necessity implies that it will cease to be a revolutionary-democratic force) does not in any way mean that socialist orientation under the leadership of revolutionary democracy is in principle impossible. On the contrary, it only goes to stress the specifics of non-capitalist development and the difference between it and the socialist transformation of society carried out under the working class and a proletarian party.

It should be noted that political leadership in the liberated countries belongs to the force which played the dominant role in the liberation struggle and which was capable of ousting its rivals after the achievement of independence. At any rate, the political possibility for non-capitalist development, the forms of its implementation and the length of transition required for such a development are largely determined by the correlation of class forces during the period of struggle for independence. And in this connection the influence of the October Socialist Revolution must be considered a factor of decisive significance, for it was its victory that led to the radicalisation of the national liberation movement among the oppressed peoples, to the formation in its ranks of left, revolutionary-democratic and anti-capitalist currents and to the adoption by the entire complex of anti-imperialist forces of more consistent positions.

Soon after the October Revolution the Mongolian People's Republic entered the path of non-capitalist development and for several decades it remained the only country in the world to do so. It should be stressed that non-capitalist development could only manifest itself in full, first, given a strong world socialist system, and secondly, in a period when the formation of independent states in the East was no longer a rare phenomenon, when the East as a whole had immediately entered the epoch of formation of independent states. By expanding the scale and might of the national liberation movement and by radicalising its programme demands the October Socialist Revolution thereby contributed to events that took place several decades later and, in particular, made it possible for a large group of countries in Asia and Africa to enter the path of socialist orientation.

The decision as to which path of social development a given country is to choose depends on that country, but it does not depend on it alone. There exists the tremendous force of the world-historic struggle against imperialism, for the establishment of socialism, and this force is beginning to direct and determine the destinies of those countries in which national self-determination, i. e., the formation of independent states, has taken place several centuries later than it did in Europe.

The achievement of national independence and the formation of an independent state in the era that was ushered in by the October Revolution are not the end of the national liberation struggle. On the contrary, they are only the beginning of a new stage—the transition from the struggle for national self-determination to the struggle for social liberation and in the final analysis the struggle for socialism. There is now in progress a powerful and highly attractive movement of hundreds of millions of working people in the East towards world socialism—something which before the October Socialist Revolution could not have happened. If capitalism were, as before, dominant in the world, the transition of one or another country to national independence would at best result in the establishment of a national-bourgeois system subordinate to a handful of omnipotent imperialist powers.

The great efforts of the working class of Russia, which had carried out the socialist revolution in the country under the leadership of the party headed by Lenin, thereby opened up before the majority of mankind that had once been held under the yoke of colonial domination new prospects for development. Previously only one possibility was open to them—introduction to capitalism, whereas today a second choice is avail-

able—detachment from capitalism and gradual transition to socialism. This prospect of breaking away from capitalism opens up the possibility of social and economic progress in favour of the broad popular masses, real political independence, removal of neo-colonialist and pro-imperialist elements and the forces of reaction and capitalism, and gradual rise in the living standards of the working people on this basis.

As history shows, capitalist development in the countries of Asia and Africa is unable to provide high rates of growth and dooms the popular masses to further suffering and prolonged neo-colonial dependence on imperialism.

The October Socialist Revolution has tremendous significance for the social destinies of the peoples oppressed by imperialism and now free from its domination. The October Revolution gave tremendous expansion to the scale of the national liberation movement and marked the beginning of its victories over the forces of imperialism and colonialism, victories which were no longer to be the exception, but the rule. It brought about a situation in the world, whereby the successes of the national liberation movement became permanent. Finally, the October Socialist Revolution and the achievements of world socialism opened up before the peoples of the East the possibility of establishing a just social system without all the humiliation and suffering that capitalism brings with it.

It would be incorrect, we must stress, to treat the October Revolution as if it were just an event of colossal *immediate* importance. Its influence on the world revolutionary process, on the course of history has been so great that it created a new situation which fully meets the interests of the working people. Furthermore, this event which happened more than sixty years ago in Russia continues to exert a tremendous influence on the course of historical development. The Soviet Union and the world socialist community, which were born of that revolution, have become a constant factor of colossal historical significance.

The October Socialist Revolution was the most important milestone on the road to the formation of alliance between the international working class and the national liberation movement. It was no accident that Lenin upheld in principle the right of nations to self-determination against those who advanced the slogan of 'the right of the *working people* to self-determination'. Had the party headed by him and the international communist move-

ment followed the path recommended by the advocates of this seemingly revolutionary slogan, it would have meant that the vanguard of the world proletariat was ready to enter into allied relations with proletarian and peasant organisations alone, and not with organisations headed by the patriotic, anti-imperialist and national-bourgeois forces. Meanwhile, these latter still had a rather significant anti-imperialist potential, opposed imperialism to different degrees in different countries, and fought for the political independence of their own countries. For this reason the Leninist party and the international communist movement also considered it essential to form an alliance with such circles in the oppressed countries of the East as were not in favour of social change and who did not hold anti-capitalist positions, but who were nevertheless a significant factor in the struggle against imperialism.

Thus the slogan 'the right of nations to self-determination' which was a major means for bringing the masses of the former Russian Empire up to the socialist stage of the revolution is now being used on a world scale. Whereas previously it helped the formation of an alliance between the working class of Russia and the working people in the outlying non-Russian areas of the country, now, after the formation of the world's first socialist state, this slogan has drawn hundreds of millions of people in the oppressed countries of Asia and Africa into alliance with the world proletariat and the Soviet Union. The solution of the national question in the USSR has always been regarded as a model by the peoples of the whole world. Importantly, the very path to the victory of the October Revolution, which lay, in particular, through the effort to bring the oppressed nations of the Russian Empire over to the side of the working class, remains an example for all peoples of the world. The thesis of Lenin's party on its alliance with the oppressed peoples is of equal importance to the communist parties of East and West alike.

If we look at the history of the struggle for a united front between the international proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the East we will find that Lenin's party and the international communist movement have tried, on the basis of Lenin's instructions, to achieve alliances with all the anti-imperialist forces, including those that are national-bourgeois in character, on the one condition that the independence of the working class and communist movement is maintained even in its most embryonic form. Here mention could be made of the policy of the international communist movement towards the Indian National Cong-

ress, the Kuomintang in China, the Sarekat Islam in Indonesia and a number of other broad anti-imperialist organisations in the East. Communists frequently offered to form an alliance with them in the struggle against imperialism, and in a number of cases this was effectively concluded. Communists have insisted on radicalising the slogans of the national liberation movement. In particular, they have continually shown that the slogan of full national independence is in the interests of their peoples as a whole and can and must be put forward by anti-imperialist non-proletarian parties and organisations. History has shown that in this respect Communists were right and that the rallying of the masses around such a slogan was an essential task at a time when the bourgeois-national forces were hesitating to advance it and limiting themselves to such aims as self-government, dominion status, autonomy, and so on.

In holding to these realistic positions the international communist movement based itself on the fact that the masses in the colonial and semi-colonial countries tend, as a rule, to support, in the initial stage of the anti-imperialist struggle, the forces which are national-bourgeois in character. But the international communist movement has never regarded alliance with these latter as an end in itself. It is considered primarily as a means of getting through to the broad masses of the workers and peasants which are still under the influence of the national bourgeoisie. On the basis of Leninist theory and its own experience the international communist movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries orientated itself on the masses of the working people and built its strategy on a scientifically grounded orientation on the transition from national liberation to social revolution, the type and length of which cannot be established by voluntaristic means.

A major motive force behind, and frequently the vanguard of, the revolutionary liberation movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was the working class, just as it stands today for the strengthening of national and economic independence and for far-reaching social transformations in the new national states. The October Socialist Revolution gave visible demonstration to Communists in the colonial and semi-colonial countries that it is only the working class that is genuinely socialist and that it and it alone is capable of consistent struggle for complete liberation. Of course, the proletariat in the oppressed countries during the period of the struggle for national independence was still at the earliest stage of its development. Historically, it was only after the First World War that capitalism began its mass encroachments

into the Afro-Asian countries where hitherto pre-capitalist relations—feudal, semi-feudal and patriarchal—had been dominant. Consequently, the proletariat in the Afro-Asian countries had a long way to go before it could become a leading political force capable of fulfilling its historical mission of liberating the working people from capitalist exploitation. Leftist attempts to get the international communist movement to advance the slogan of immediate socialist revolution in the East, therefore, met with a resolute rebuff by Marxists-Leninists. But already in those days the international communist movement fully appreciated the prospects for the proletariat in the African and Asian countries playing an increasingly greater role.

Marxists-Leninists believed that the communist movement in the East could only be built around a firm proletarian nucleus and that this nucleus would have an outstanding role to play in the further development of the communist movement. They paid particular attention to the necessity of upholding the independence of the proletarian movement and opposing any attempt to 'paint' the non-communist bourgeois-democratic movement in communist hues. Marxists-Leninists concentrated on preparing the proletariat for the coming struggles. Treating the proletariat in the countries of the East as potentially the most powerful liberative force in these countries has been and is the only scientific approach to the matter. And this approach is rooted in an understanding of the universal significance and general applicability of the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist theory both in the West and the East.

The October Socialist Revolution showed the correctness of Lenin's conclusion regarding the colossal revolutionary potential of the working peasantry, the necessity for its alliance with the working class and the invincibility of this revolutionary alliance. The working class of Russia won power only thanks to a correct and scientifically grounded policy directed at creating a stable alliance between the workers and the peasants. Lenin's party made considerable efforts to rally the peasantry behind the working class, while the support of the peasants, for its part, ensured not only the victory of the proletariat, but the successful upholding of the gains of the socialist revolution.

When in 1919 Lenin made an address to the Communists of the East he pointed out that they were faced with a task of gigantic proportions, a task which consisted in rallying the vast mass of the peasantry behind the victorious proletariat. He emphasised the importance for Communists of developing and implementing a correct policy vis-à-vis the peasants, of working

among peasant organisations and of politically educating the peasantry; he thereby directly tied in the possibility of a transition to socialism in the East, without the intervening stage of capitalism, with the task of developing the political activity and revolutionary energy of the peasant masses. In this connection of particular importance was the organisation of the exploited masses, and the setting up of non-party organisations and working people's organisations which in the East can primarily be made up of peasants. Many of the countries of Africa and Asia are only today approaching the stage of economic and social development, which the most developed colonial and semi-colonial countries were at during the period immediately following the October Revolution, and some are a long way from having reached even that, so that by far the largest social force in the East is the peasantry. Consequently, what Lenin had to say about the need for Communists in the East to work among the organisations of the working people and form such organisations where they were lacking is of the utmost relevance. Strengthening and broadening communist influence not only does not exclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the setting up of non-party (i. e., non-communist) organisations among the working people, above all the peasantry, and influencing their policy with a view to switching them to an anti-capitalist footing.

Communist policy aimed at turning the working peasantry of the East into an ally of the proletariat of the oppressed countries and the world proletariat, with the working class in the countries of victorious socialism at its head, is one of the most important strategical guidelines of Leninism. It was a strategy with which the communist movement armed itself in the very beginning and it is one which Marxists-Leninists still pursue today. The peasantry is the most powerful force in the national liberation movements that have come into being since the October Revolution and brought about the collapse of imperialism's colonial system. Already in those days the peasantry waged the struggle not only for national liberation but also for the reconstruction of agrarian relations and for land, against domination by the feudal lords and big landowners.

Today the peasant movement with its anti-feudal and, in the lower strata, anti-capitalist aspirations is a factor which to a great extent determines the agrarian-reformist positions of the ruling circles in the liberated countries, though this is naturally dependent on the social and economic orientation of these circles and their class character. The programmes of the revolutionary demo-

crats largely reflect the anti-feudal interests and aspirations of the peasantry. Considerable controversy surrounds the question of the extent to which anti-imperialist interests among the poor peasantry should be reflected in the plans and policy of the revolutionary democrats. The larger national-bourgeois groups that are linked up with the landowners and therefore more interested in the development of capitalism pursue anti-feudal agrarian reform in a naturally less radical manner than is the case in those countries where revolutionary democrats are in power. In the final analysis, of course, these reforms lead to further stratification among the peasantry and the formation of an agricultural proletariat, on the one hand, and a capitalist farmer class, on the other. To a certain extent such stratification must also take place in those countries that are developing along the non-capitalist path; so long as capitalist relations exist the peasantry is bound to split among itself; reliance on the lower, poorer strata of the peasantry with their anti-capitalist aspirations (for it is these strata which constitute the majority of the peasantry in the East) is a most important condition for genuine socialist orientation.

But only the power of the working class radically reorganising society along socialist lines can bring genuine socialism to the countryside, and oust 'shoots' of capitalism rising in conditions of individual small- and large-scale farming. As for the reactionary dictatorships that have been established in a number of Afro-Asian countries and which support the interests of the landowners and the bourgeoisie, they must be regarded as an anti-peasant force. In many cases these classes and strata resort to military dictatorship so as to suppress the revolutionary energies of the peasantry. Working among the peasantry and developing its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist potential is of the highest importance in achieving progressive transformations in the countries of Asia and Africa.

The question of the role of the peasantry in the revolutionary process that is taking place in Asia and Africa is not seen by Marxists-Leninists to consist in a choice between the proletariat and the peasantry. It is rather a question of considering the possibilities of each of these classes, a question of their rapprochement, cohesion and alliance. Such an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is not only possible but in many countries already exists. This alliance in the Afro-Asian countries lies at the centre of a more general problem—the problem of bringing all patriotic, anti-imperialist forces into a united national-democratic front. The struggle for the full independence

of the young national states will be doomed to failure if it does not unite all the anti-imperialist and patriotic forces of the nation under its flag. A policy of anti-imperialism and support for political and economic independence and the progressive transformations that are being carried out by the patriotic ruling classes in Asian and African countries, and a policy of anti-colonialism and support for the political forces that champion it stem directly from what Lenin saw as a fundamental requirement—the need for a united anti-imperialist front, which he advanced consistently after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution.

The unification of all anti-imperialist forces is a term with a very broad meaning. Its content changes as the revolutionary process develops from stage to stage. In Asia and Africa today there are at least four variants of the united front: (1) the national bourgeoisie that is still capable of leading the struggle against imperialism and feudalism and participates in a united anti-imperialist front; (2) the revolutionary democrats who are in complete control of the workers, the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie; (3) the revolutionary democrats and Communists who are the main forces of a united front; (4) the Communists who lead a conglomeration of forces in the liberation movement and who then come to power. The last three variants arise in conditions where the national bourgeoisie is no longer capable of playing a significant role in the united front since the process of social transformations runs counter to its class interests.

As has been already mentioned, Lenin stated the need for a united front of all anti-imperialist forces not only in individual colonial or semi-colonial countries, but on an international scale, and his intention was that the proletariat and the national liberation movements of the world should unite behind the world's first state of the working class.

Lenin believed one of the most important ideas in his 'Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions' was that within the imperialist system there were two separate and unequal groups of nations—the oppressors and the oppressed, the latter being subject to the merciless exploitation of imperialism. The 'Lefts', taking this idea out of context, made it something absolute and claimed that the interests of the working people of the West were in direct opposition to those of the peoples of the East and in this way tried to oppose the working people in the developed capitalist countries to the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa. Such an approach is a crude distortion of Lenin's theory, for in pointing out that there were two groups of nations

within the imperialist system, Lenin frequently emphasised the community of interests between the world proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the East. Furthermore he pointed to this contradiction in order to give scientific grounding to the conclusion that an end could only be put to the centuries-old oppression in the East through the alliance of its peoples with the world proletariat, by way of rallying around the victorious working class. In other words, in this as in everything else, Lenin adopted a consistently internationalist position.

Attempts to replace internationalism by nationalism and oppose the national liberation movement, one of the most important revolutionary forces of the present-day world, to its other forces, was resolutely rebuffed by Lenin. Hence his reply that Manabendra Nath Roy, the Indian revolutionary, was going too far when he claimed that the main role in the world revolutionary process had now passed over to the East. Lenin considered it impermissible to set the national liberation movement in the East in opposition to the interests of the proletariat in the West. Yet attempts of this kind still continue today. The leaders of the Communist Party of China are still conducting a wide campaign of slander and misinformation insisting that the interests of the oppressed peoples are in direct opposition to those of the proletariat in the West. Furthermore they slander the victorious working class in the socialist countries, inflame nationalist passions and in this way do serious damage to a united anti-imperialist front.

The fundamental conclusions which Lenin drew on the national liberation movement and the anti-imperialist struggle soon after the October Revolution have lost none of their relevance today. They may be summarised as follows: the need for unity among all anti-imperialist forces on a world scale; the policy of a united anti-imperialist front in each of the Afro-Asian countries; the decisive role to be played by the working class in the liberated countries in the international socialist revolution against imperialism; the enormous revolutionary potential of the peasantry in these countries; the possibility of avoiding or interrupting the capitalist stage of development; and the need for the all-round strengthening and upholding of the independence of the communist movement even in its most embryonic form.

The revolutions against imperialism, which began at the turn of the century, saw the participation of diverse social and political forces. They were made up of a conglomeration of classes, class groups and social strata which altogether spanned a number of

historical stages of development of both the pre-capitalist formation and those accompanying the development of capitalism. But one common characteristic united these forces—anti-imperialism, which has developed and expanded as capitalism itself developed into its highest and final stage—the stage of imperialism.

The majority of the anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa is comprised of the petty-bourgeois strata, particularly the peasantry. Although the peasantry of the East was (and to a considerable extent still is) mainly at the pre-capitalist stage or at a transitional stage to capitalism, Lenin was nevertheless fully justified in considering the peasantry in the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries to be chiefly petty-bourgeois.

By the early 20th century, and especially by the end of the First World War, capitalism had taken an important place in the economy of a number of Asian countries, and once it had emerged, it soon extended its influence throughout the whole spectrum of social relations. This process took decades and in many Oriental countries is still not complete. In certain poorly developed countries it has only just begun. But the overall and irreversible (in the sense of the impossibility of a return to pre-capitalist relations) trend had begun by the early 20th century.

But it was not just for this reason that Lenin characterised the peasantry of the East as petty-bourgeois. Another important factor was taken into consideration. Irrespective of the stage of development of capitalism in any particular country, all the countries of the East and the whole of the oppressed world had become the periphery of world imperialism and were therefore a part of the international capitalist market, linked to it by millions of closely woven threads, but reliably fulfilling one common function—the exploitation of millions of working people in the interests of international monopoly capital.

The petty-bourgeois masses were not the only anti-imperialist factor. The whole complex and contradictory conglomeration of forces in the East was also anti-imperialist in character. They comprised the national bourgeoisie, in so far as its social and political interests were in opposition to those of imperialism. Obviously the sharpness of this contradiction would not be as great as that between the interests of the working people and those of imperialism. But even so contradictions between the national bourgeoisie in the oppressed countries and imperialism did exist and have increased, in so far as foreign monopoly capital has retarded the economic development of these countries, held back their industrialisation, prevented any kind of social progress

and impeded the establishment of the national bourgeoisie as the dominant economic and political force. In other words, imperialism has prevented the national bourgeoisie of the East from taking the same place in their own countries as the Western bourgeoisie have assumed in theirs.

The national bourgeoisie and the intermediate strata attached to it (formed from the ever growing stratum of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals), though not themselves subjected to the same direct and merciless exploitation as the poorer strata of society, have nevertheless felt keenly their own inequality and subordinate position. But at the same time they possessed much greater possibilities for organisation than the downtrodden and illiterate masses.

A special and increasingly influential role in the anti-imperialist front has been played by the emergent working class. While pre-capitalist relations or relations transitional to capitalism were dominant, it was naturally very small in numbers and closely linked in the social and psychological terms with the archaic structures, being under the influence of centuries-old ethnic, religious and caste tradition. But now it has gathered strength, as is particularly noticeable in the countries which have seen a concentration of foreign capital pumped there by the monopoly bourgeoisie from the metropolises.

But in general it has been the national bourgeoisie that has led those Eastern countries which have risen against imperialism. Being better organised and better educated, it had a deeper understanding of its class tasks, possessed considerable material resources and held traditional positions of influence, everything, in fact, which has been unavailable to the working people.

This at least was the situation in many individual countries in the East. But it must be remembered that these countries had already formed together with the developed capitalist countries a single economic system that was governed by imperialism. By the early 20th century the working class in the citadels of imperialism was already a powerful, organised force with its own political parties and considerable experience of struggle against the bourgeoisie. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the struggle of the oppressed peoples for political independence and sovereignty acquired hitherto unseen proportions. The peoples gained a powerful support in their struggle for freedom and independence, their achievements in that struggle became irreversible and as real socialism expanded and strengthened, the movement against the colonial system became more and more

effective. Since the turn of the century this system has suffered a crisis and during the period of 25-30 years after World War II, and after the world socialist system emerged, it collapsed.

The desire for political independence produced an anti-imperialist front that was united to a certain extent. We say 'to a certain extent' because in each country it was characterised by deep social contradictions and each class acted in accordance with its own social and political interests. But the movement for self-determination and national independence served to cement unity among anti-imperialist forces. However, the achievement of political independence and the collapse of the colonial system changed this situation. Although a certain differentiation in the anti-imperialist front was noticeable earlier, more extensive polarisation began to take place after the achievement of political independence and the collapse of the colonial empires.

In certain countries, where the united anti-imperialist front was led by the Communists, socialist revolutions did take place with the local bourgeoisie adopting a conciliatory position and largely joining forces with reaction and imperialism. This was the case in Vietnam, Cuba and a number of other countries. In many countries the leading role in the struggle for independence was played by radical national-revolutionary elements, who adopted certain of the fundamental principles of scientific socialism in accord with the development of the anti-imperialist and class struggle in their individual countries. In some countries, particularly in Africa and the Arab East, such political groupings came to power during the struggle for independence and in others, after the declaration of sovereignty, in the process of separating themselves from the national-bourgeois forces. In this way a group of socialist-orientated countries was formed under the leadership of the national democrats, and this is a fundamentally new phenomenon. Naturally these countries receive the support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

It is of course an anti-imperialist and, to a certain extent, a class alliance. The alliance of the proletariat and the national liberation movement, when the latter was directed chiefly to the achievement of national independence, was also an anti-imperialist and, to a certain extent, a class alliance. But then it was a matter of alliance between the working class and a relatively united group of anti-imperialist class strata, that were diverse and contradictory in their social composition but brought together by anti-imperialist aspirations and leading the struggle against colonialism, the bulwark of world capitalism. This situation has not

changed today in those countries of the East where the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist national-bourgeois forces are in power that are still capable of leading the struggle against economic and political colonialism, racism and inequality in international relations.

But the class alliance between world socialism and the national-democratic regimes, i.e., the countries whose domestic and foreign policies are those of socialist orientation, is of a different kind. History has shown that national democracy, which is in power in nearly 15 countries in Asia and Africa, expresses the interests of the masses of non-proletarian working people, particularly the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeois strata. Therefore an alliance between world socialism and national democracy is primarily an alliance between the victorious working class and the masses of the working people, whose interests are represented by national democracy.

These interests are not identical. The petty bourgeoisie has at all times been characterised by duality. Both in the East and the West it has functioned as both worker and owner, and even when the course of history has 'eroded' petty-bourgeois property, the petty bourgeois has for a long time remained unchanged in his duplicity for he still has the desire for the property he has lost or is about to lose. But there is no doubt that national democracy, particularly its left revolutionary-democratic wing—and this has been shown by the experience gained in struggle and in the far-reaching social and economic changes that have been carried out—represents at the present stage of historical development not only the present, but also the future of the peoples of Asia and Africa and to a certain extent of some of those of Latin America.

The alliance between world socialism and national democracy has taken various forms. The socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, have given enormous help to national democracy in those cases where it has had to offer political, economic and military resistance to imperialism. In this connection it is worth noting that national democracy cannot expect aid of this kind from anywhere else. International social-reformism has spoken much in recent years of the 'injustices' done, for example, to the peoples of Southern Africa. But, as usual with right-wing social-democratic leaders, their words do not accord with their deeds. Genuine help—political, economic, diplomatic or any other—is coming only from the socialist community.

The countries that have chosen the path of socialist orientation also receive all-round aid from real socialism in their struggle for

economic independence from imperialism. Many of the economic principles that lead in the direction of socialism and have been tested by time are being put into practice by these countries. These include nationalisation of the basic industries, expansion and strengthening of the state sector, the introduction of agrarian reforms that favour the peasantry and gradual industrialisation. The revolutionary-democratic wing of national democracy in a number of countries is also keen to draw closer to scientific socialism. This of course has nothing in common with the attempts of the voluntarists to dress the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement into socialist garb, a tendency which Lenin frequently warned against, yet which makes its appearance from time to time in a number of Afro-Asian countries under the flag of a narrow, isolated 'national' or 'democratic' socialism.

National democracy, a phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s, remains revolutionary democracy only in so far as it adopts an anti-imperialist position and implements (by its own methods, naturally) socialist orientation. Now, after the collapse of the colonial empires and the achievement of political independence by the countries of the East, Lenin's conclusion that it is impossible to be a revolutionary democrat without taking steps in the direction of socialism, fully applies to the situation that exists in the national-democratic countries of Asia and Africa, which have chosen the path of socialist orientation. Where nationalism and chauvinism flourish without rebuff and anti-imperialist and therefore also anti-capitalist tendencies are artificially restrained, the struggle against reaction and for social progress is in the final analysis severely hampered. National democracy of this kind gradually becomes what Lenin called 'reactionary democracy' and eventually, after developing into a pro-imperialist and pro-capitalist force, loses all influence over the masses and even the inherent characteristic of democracy itself. The last 10-15 years have seen developments of this kind, as for example in the evolution that has taken place in Egypt.

'The fighters for freedom,' said Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 'have no easy way before them. They have to work hard to lay the foundations of the public economy required for socialism. Tough battles with the exploiting elements and their foreign patrons are inevitable. From time to time these result in zigzags in the policies of the young states and sometimes even lead to retreats. But the overall trend of development is incontestable. The will of millions of working

people who have come to know what they are striving for and their place in life is a sure guarantee that national independence will be strengthened and that the social system free from exploitation and oppression will ultimately be victorious.¹

Thus 'breakdowns' of various kinds are possible within the framework of the national liberation revolution directed against imperialism, and not only from the bourgeois-democratic regimes, but from the national-democrats too. Of course, they are carefully prepared by the forces of international and internal reaction and immediately exploited by monopoly capital. Playing on chauvinism and national prejudices, falsely setting anti-imperialism and alliance with the socialist states in opposition to a misguided understanding of patriotism and exploiting state corruption, the imperialists do all in their power to make use of these 'breakdowns' in national democracy and deprive it of its revolutionary and democratic character. It can almost be considered a law of development that the departure of a given national-democratic regime from a policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is an important sign that such a 'breakdown' either has taken place or is about to take place in the near future. Experience shows that the worsening of relations with the socialist world is immediately followed by a policy of the gradual restoration of foreign and local capitalism accompanied by pandering to reactionary elements and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and a pro-colonialist, conciliatory stand with regard to imperialism in foreign policy.

But do these individual 'breakdowns' in national democracy mean that its political force in the future will lose all revolutionary potential and become 'reactionary democracy' and a neo-colonialist force? By no means. In the first place practical experience is against such a conclusion. Despite the degeneration of certain national-democratic regimes national democracy as a whole has considerably expanded in Asia and Africa. We only have to consider, for example, the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. For all the differences between them and for all the pressure exerted on them by the West, they chose the road of progressive social transformation. Secondly, the duplicity and instability of the non-proletarian strata of working people, which has been theoretically proved by Marxism-Leninism and shown by experience, is not something fatal and the balance of trends within this duplicity has not been established once and for all.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Great October Revolution and Mankind's Progress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, p. 22.

It should not be forgotten, and this is most important, that the future of the petty-bourgeois masses of the East does not lie in the stabilisation of their petty-bourgeois nature, but in the dynamic development and predominance of what we have termed their 'function as a worker' over their 'function as an owner'. And this means that national democracy and its left wing, revolutionary democracy, have a broad social base and that its alliance with real socialism on a world scale will strengthen.

Of course, it would also be a mistake to consider a 'breakdown' in national democracy as something purely superficial and of no real political significance. We repeat that such 'breakdowns' are conditioned by the duplicity of the non-proletarian working masses and that this duplicity cannot be overcome in a short period. 'Breakdowns' damage the common struggle of real socialism and national democracy against imperialism and logically draw the leaders of the countries that developed along the path of socialist orientation before that and subsequently turned away from it, to the adoption of policies against the national interest which arouse the indignation and anger of the genuinely revolutionary-democratic forces, the masses of the people and all anti-imperialist circles. A 'breakdown' in national democracy leads, in the final analysis, to conciliation with imperialism, which is tantamount to national betrayal. The only answer to such a move is closer solidarity between the forces of world socialism and revolutionary democracy.

An objective historical development is moving in this direction. Real socialism has increased its aid to the socialist-orientated countries and all the anti-imperialist countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The struggle of these forces against imperialism and for economic emancipation, progressive social changes and for a new and more just economic order in the world has made a great contribution to the task of achieving full and complete national and social liberation for the oppressed peoples and consequently to the world revolutionary process.

Lenin's idea for an alliance between the USSR and the national liberation movement is one of the unshakeable foundations of the policy of the CPSU. The enormous importance of this principle was noted by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, when he said: 'The socialist countries, where social and national oppression has been done away with once and for all, and the new states which have recently entered the path of national independence and progressive orientation have a community of purpose in their approach to

the vital issues of present-day international affairs. We are united by the struggle against imperialism and akin in our devotion to the ideals of social progress.¹ 'We are in full agreement with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that the last vestiges of colonialism should be wiped from the face of the earth.'² The CPSU bases itself on the firm and long-term community of interests between the Afro-Asian peoples and the peoples of the socialist countries and this objective community of interests has provided a reliable base for the indissoluble friendship and unity between the two great forces of the present day—the socialist world and the countries that have been liberated from the colonial yoke and are now entering the path of independent progressive development. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev drew attention to the great importance of unity of action between world socialism and the national liberation movement, which he characterised as natural allies in the struggle for liberation and independence, for equal cooperation between all states and for peace throughout the world. The democratic forces of Africa and Asia today are faced with the task of achieving genuine independence and the main obstacle on this path continues to be the involvement of the former colonial countries in the world capitalist economic system in which the exploited nations participate on vastly unequal terms. Whereas once the new states were convinced of the impossibility of independent struggle for economic equality, they are now planning to change the world economic system through joint action. This struggle for a new economic order has become prominent in tackling the problem of eradicating neo-colonialist exploitation and has the full support of the socialist community. Furthermore it owes its origins and present strength to the experience gained by the socialist countries in economic cooperation among themselves and in economic ties with the liberated states.

The efforts of the CPSU to achieve detente in international relations implies the total fulfilment of its internationalist duty to provide aid for the revolutionary movements in the form of economic, political, organisational and military support. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev noted: 'Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for conces-

sions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions.'¹

The foreign policy of the Soviet state provides reliable support for the liberation processes in the Afro-Asian countries, as the experience of many countries bears witness. Take Angola, for example, which received all-round aid from the USSR and other socialist states when the imperialists tried to prevent the setting up of a revolutionary-democratic regime there, or the countries of the Middle East fighting against Israeli aggression supported by US imperialism, or the countries of Indochina, which have broken the bonds of neo-colonialism and are building a socialist society. The fact that more and more of the liberated countries are turning to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for help is not to the liking of the imperialists. But such is the logic of history and such is the natural result of the Leninist policy of alliance with the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples.

Lenin frequently drew attention to the variety of methods by which imperialist domination is exerted. He showed that imperialism needs to exploit economically backward countries and make them peripheral to its economic system, and in this the rich and the compradore bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the landowning class and the reactionary military in the Afro-Asian countries themselves act as its allies. Nor are they its only source of support. Social and economic backwardness and the concomitant weakness of the working class in the vast majority of Afro-Asian countries, centuries-old traditions which divide the people by tribe, by religion and by caste (the vitality of which is frequently exaggerated, for they exist alongside social and economic differentiation in the industrial centres), general distrust of the oppressor nations, including the proletariat, in such countries as the result of centuries of oppression, the existence of vast lumpen-proletarian strata in the urban centres due to appalling agrarian overpopulation and the absence of experience in political democracy—all play into the hands of imperialism in its desire to maintain influence in these countries. This influence cannot be crased quickly, nor will it disappear automatically just because one country or another has left the imperialist orbit. Overcoming it is one of the most important tasks for the socialist transformation of the world. But when we look at the distance the people of

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, p. 35 (in Russian).

² L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State*, Moscow, 1975, p. 9 (in Russian).

¹ *Documents and Resolutions, XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 16.

the East have travelled since the October Socialist Revolution, we realise that never before have the regions of Africa and Asia, whose population accounts for the greater part of the human race, witnessed so many radical changes in such a short space of time. These are the result of an alliance between socialism and the national liberation movement which is in their mutual interest.

Today we can see clearer than ever before the universality of Marxism-Leninism, which has revealed the laws of the class struggle and social development, the growing dialectical interconnection between the national and social aspects of the anti-imperialist movement, the appearance in it of new forms, the establishment of a community of purpose between socialism and the anti-imperialist struggle of the oppressed nations and the fulfilment of Lenin's idea for transition to socialism avoiding or cutting short the capitalist stage of development.

History has shown the scientific character and justice of Lenin's predictions, when he said that all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among other peoples oppressed by imperialism would unite behind the Soviet Union. For indeed today the peoples of Asia and Africa in the most recent stage of their struggle have found in the USSR, the entire socialist community a powerful support for and guarantee of the liberation they have won. Lenin showed the objective necessity for unity among the anti-imperialist forces of the world and for implacable struggle with those who from narrowly nationalist positions try to destroy it. He stressed the need to maintain and uphold the independence of the communist and workers' movement in the East even in its most embryonic form and drew attention to the historical importance of the broad non-communist, anti-imperialist organisations, which include the working masses. Lenin showed that the anti-imperialist movement in Asia and Africa would gradually develop into an anti-capitalist movement. Today the countries with a total population of over 150 million have embarked on the road of socialist orientation. He stressed the tremendous role that is to be played by the peasantry of the oppressed countries in the subsequent phases of the world revolutionary process. Today it is clear that the peasantry constitute the largest participating class in the national liberation movements and the armed uprising and revolutions that have taken place over the years, and that bringing the peasantry over to the side of the working class (on an international scale and on a national scale in individual Eastern countries) is a major problem of the near future.

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

The Great October Socialist Revolution provided new opportunities for the development of the national liberation struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. No other revolution in history, no other country in the world has ever given so much systematic and all-round support for the national liberation movement as has the Soviet Union.

From the earliest days of the October Revolution a firm friendship and a deep mutual understanding grew up between the Soviet people and the oppressed peoples of the East. For more than 60 years the Soviet state has been building its relations with the liberated peoples on the principles of peace, freedom, equality, friendship and mutual assistance. In the history of relations between the Soviet state and the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America there has never been a single instance of the former making any attempt to gain the lands or wealth of the latter, to enslave them. The Soviet Union has never tried to create 'vacuums' in the East for the setting up of its own military bases or the organisation of an aggressive bloc.

Lenin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have always drawn the attention of the Soviet people to the need to provide all-round help for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggle for liberation and in their attempts to transform society, reconstruct their national economies and take the place they deserve in international affairs.

Two thirds of the territory of the Soviet Union lies on the continent of Asia. Dozens of different peoples in the East have for

centuries lived side by side with. Russia and still have the Soviet Union as their neighbour. The peoples who liberated themselves from colonialism and who are still engaged in the fight against it, form together with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the international working-class movement a powerful force today which stands for independence, peace, security and social progress.

The most immediate historical task facing them today is the complete and final destruction of the last vestiges of colonialism and racism. The world has entered a new historical era in international political and economic relations which is marked by a decisive change in the old, colonial principles of international politics and the establishment of new, progressive, anti-colonialist principles whose implementation can lead to full political and economic equality among all the peoples of the world.

Many socialist-orientated Afro-Asian countries are today following the Soviet Union, the pioneer of socialism, and the entire socialist community on the road to the building of a progressive, socialist society.

And this once more affirms the tremendous importance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and its influence on the hundreds of peoples and ethnic groups, who have recently cast off the chains of colonial slavery.

The majority of liberated countries have maintained staunch anti-imperialist positions. Lenin's idea for an alliance between the victorious socialist revolution and the peoples of what are now the former colonial and semi-colonial countries has never been more relevant. But, it has now acquired new dimensions and new prospects. The historical experience of common struggle against imperialism that has been gained over the last 30 years has made this alliance unbreakable, and the two forces of the world revolutionary process together with the international working-class movement will continue to wage the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism.

An evaluation of the part played by the developing countries in international affairs must necessarily be based on an analysis of the dialectics of their similar social structures and the diverse and far-reaching class differentiation which is taking place within them. Even so, in all the liberated countries, taken individually or collectively, it is the conflict with imperialism, the international monopolies and contemporary neo-colonialism which

remains the most important conflict, and this is something which no contemporary political trend can keep aloof of or ignore without risking serious mistakes. The Afro-Asian countries¹ are at various stages of a national liberation and social struggle, which is adopting different forms and moving at different rates according to the different situations. But despite the variety of traditions and ethnic and social conditions, despite the existence of numerous socio-economic formations and the various levels of development of capitalism, the working class and the national bourgeoisie, despite the contradictions in domestic and foreign policies, all these countries are facing the necessity of *continuing the struggle* for an end to the political influence of imperialism and economic dependence on it, and for equal rights in international relations. This is most important. All these countries have to make a break (whether radical, or slow and agonising, purposeful or spontaneous) with the old socio-economic structures under the impact of the economic policy pursued by the new state power, whether it comes as a result of capitalist development or of socialist-orientated development.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev noted that 'in the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades in struggle'.² This real community of interest in the struggle against imperialism and for full national, political and economic independence, for the eradication of backwardness and advancement on the road to social progress provides a basis for coordinated efforts and mutual understanding among all the liberated countries, the socialist community and the international communist and working-class movement.

The anti-imperialist potential of the liberated countries can be judged on the whole from the totality of principles that determine and characterise their domestic and foreign policies. Genuine anti-imperialism is inseparable from the struggle for social progress within the former colonial societies. The strengthening of imperialism's alliance with the big bourgeoisie, the forces of social reaction and the new bureaucratic bourgeois elite which has taken place in recent years is an incontestable fact, despite the

¹ The author does not deal here with problems facing the national liberation movement in the Latin American countries which differ greatly from those of the Afro-Asian countries and therefore call for a special investigation.

² *Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, p. 16.

temporary and at times sharp conflicts between these strata and imperialism. Even during the recent oil crisis attempts were made to create certain conditions for strengthening this bloc in the future as a barrier to the progressive and democratic forces in the liberated countries preventing them from achieving genuine national independence. The vast profits accrued from the rapid rise in oil prices have been reinvested by the oil kings of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran under the Shah's regime, etc.) in real estate and monopoly shares, and this binds them closer to the imperialists and at the same time encourages private capital in the Arab East, Northern and Central Africa and South and Southeast Asia.

All of this serves to encourage the opponents of socialist orientation in the liberated countries to draw up new neo-colonialist coalitions of the exploiters—the rich oil exporters in certain Afro-Asian countries and the monopoly bourgeoisie in the developed capitalist countries. The so-called oil anti-imperialism of the feudal-bourgeois compradore elite in a number of the oil-producing countries cannot hide their anti-national and pro-imperialist character however much they may try to assume the garb of anti-imperialist fighters.

The question of the national bourgeoisie, however, is more complicated. The Marxist-Leninist evaluation of its duality, its objective interest in getting rid of foreign political and economic domination, its inclination to cooperate with foreign capital and compromise with imperialism and its desire to identify the national liberation movement with its own egotistic class interests and act in the name of the whole nation has been borne out by the entire course of the anti-imperialist struggle. As the immediate goals of the national liberation movement are achieved and its social content expanded, the correlation of progressive and conservative trends in the politics of the national bourgeoisie gradually undergoes a change in favour of the latter. Its anti-imperialist revolutionary spirit diminishes while its conciliatory national-reformism increases in direct proportion to the resoluteness and independence with which the working class and the working peasantry make known their demands. This development has been experienced by all national liberation movements in the 20th century.

In an era of the general crisis of capitalism and socialist revolution history has not been generous in its assessment of the

progressive possibilities of the national bourgeoisie. But to write them off in the present struggle with imperialism would be premature. Occasionally the assertion is made that as distinct from the period between the two world wars, the national bourgeoisie having now achieved state independence has lost all importance as an anti-imperialist force and consequently completely gone over to imperialism. The assertion is not new, and its fallacy lies in its simplistic nature.

The point is that with regard to the national bourgeoisie as a class (and not to its individual groups, particularly the big monopolists in industry and trade who have preferred a conciliatory course to the anti-imperialist line they pursued at an earlier stage) such an evaluation is unrealistic. The upper crust of the national bourgeoisie, including the representatives of big business, the bureaucratic and the 'military' bourgeois elite in certain countries are quite prepared to compromise with imperialism and even enter into overt or covert collusion with the imperialist powers. This as a rule is an expression of their class position, their political limitations and their fear of the further development and strengthening of the anti-imperialist movement. By pursuing such conciliatory policies they are prepared to sacrifice national interests (as has been the case, for example, in Egypt, Indonesia and Thailand). But in the majority of developing countries the policy of the national bourgeoisie, though it is chiefly reformist in character, is still sufficiently anti-imperialist to permit a certain degree of manoeuvre. Combatting conciliation on the path of certain sections of the national bourgeoisie and winning over its more consistent anti-imperialist and democratic elements (policies which are being carried out in a number of countries, including India, Iraq, Syria and the Philippines) are today among the most important means for intensifying the national liberation struggle. Such policies apply primarily, of course, to the urban middle and petty bourgeoisie and the intermediate strata, which for the last 15-20 years have shown considerable anti-imperialist potential and even partly ousted the higher strata of the national bourgeoisie that came to power in the 1950s and 1960s.

The question of the extent to which the national bourgeoisie in any given country is capable of maintaining its anti-imperialist potential is closely linked with another—the extent to which it is capable, if at all, of pursuing a policy of social progress, in so far as social progress and anti-imperialism are as inseparable as imperialism and reaction.

There is no doubt that the national bourgeoisie in the liberated

countries in which they are in power are fully aware of their class interests and that to defend them they are capable, if only to a certain extent, of resisting the imperialist pressure and providing a certain economic growth. But then economic growth has also been achieved by openly pro-colonialist regimes. Social progress, of course, does not amount only to economic growth, it is a wider and more varied concept. As a rough approximation it obviously includes maintaining and defence of national independence on the basis of an anti-imperialist foreign policy, declaration of the principle of social and economic equality, elimination of the vestiges of feudalism, agrarian reform, a gradual increase in living standards, culture and education and economic growth not only as the result of an expansion of production, but also from the creation of a state sector which is to be given priority over the private sector. A policy of social progress implies national consolidation, the struggle against corruption as a dangerous social phenomenon, democratic principles of state government and the organisation of an effective and simple governmental apparatus.

Not every national bourgeoisie is capable of carrying out such a socially progressive policy. In certain of the developing countries which have chosen the capitalist path, the scope, character and rate of social progress are limited by the class interests of the national bourgeoisie and are therefore not very pronounced. But the majority of developing countries can definitely be said to be energetically upholding their political and economic rights in the struggle against imperialism and trying to strengthen their independence and raise the level of the social, economic and cultural development of their peoples.

Of course, it is not altruistic motives that lead the national bourgeoisie to implement progressive social transformations, but their own interests and requirements. To maintain their position as the ruling class they are compelled to introduce anti-imperialist and anti-feudal reforms. To save their countries from economic collapse and build up their own national economies they often have to limit the profits of the imperialist monopolies. Thus in certain countries like India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Nigeria, Kenya, the oil-producing Arab countries, Iran and Turkey, taxes on foreign profits reach up to 80 per cent of gross profit.

The national-bourgeois rulers are by no means convinced that economic growth is guaranteed in a weakly developed economy through the 'natural evolution' of capitalism just by increasing capital investment. Traditional structures, on the one hand, and

the foreign monopolies, on the other, prevent the effective use of national capital and the creation of a large and varied internal market which can be exploited for the purpose of developing an independent national economy. Hence arises the objective necessity for social reforms, particularly agrarian reform, which despite their limitations nevertheless offer some hope of partially overcoming the backwardness and stagnation that were engendered by imperialist exploitation and the social and economic structure of the former colonial-feudal society, which the new society has inherited. Finally, the aggravation of social contradictions arising from neo-colonialist exploitation and from the introduction of capitalist relations also compels the national bourgeoisie to implement social transformations and make certain concessions to the working people.

At a time when the liberated peoples of Asia and Africa are offered the real possibility of advancement along the road of socialism by adopting socialist orientation, reforms that are class-limited and implemented by national capital cannot be considered to constitute real social progress. But in certain circumstances, such national reforms carried out by the ruling bourgeoisie can make a contribution to the national struggle against reaction and imperialism and clear the way for more consistent democratic transformations in the future. It would be unrealistic to refuse to recognise that the national bourgeoisie, particularly its nonmonopolist sections, stand in opposition to imperialism and are trying, admittedly by capitalist methods, to find a way out of the situation into which the international monopoly corporations and their neo-colonialist exploitation have driven the liberated countries. This is even more so in those countries (like Pakistan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Kenya) where the working class and the working people as a whole can find consistent revolutionary solutions to the problems of the struggle against feudalism and imperialism, but are not yet sufficiently organised to lead social emancipation in their countries.

The progressive forces, particularly the adherents of scientific socialism, build their relations with the national bourgeoisie on the basis of a dialectical understanding of their dual nature. They support such progressive steps as are made by the national bourgeoisie and severely criticise its limitations and inconsistency. They cooperate with the left wing of the national bourgeoisie and stimulate it to greater consistency, radicalism and wage an irreconcilable struggle with all forms of its vacillation and compro-

mise with neo-colonialists. This tactics has been pursued now for some fifty or more years during which solutions have been sought to the problem of what attitude the proletarian parties should adopt towards the national bourgeoisie and national-reformist anti-imperialism in the developing countries.

In many of the developing countries, particularly in Africa, the Arab East and Southeast Asia, there is no clear social stratification with the result that neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat are capable of leading the anti-imperialist movement in such countries. This, in turn, brings the middle, or the intermediate strata into prominence. There is, of course, no clearly established line of demarcation between these latter and the national bourgeoisie: they are both tightly interconnected and subject to one another's influence. In certain countries, particularly in Tropical Africa and the Arab East, national capital is so weak that it would be more correct to refer to bourgeois tendencies in the dominant intermediate strata, rather than the power of an actual national bourgeoisie. By virtue of their intermediate position these classes can move either to the right or the left, either in the direction of the bourgeoisie or the working people. And frequently the national interests of their countries and the social contradictions push them towards radicalisation, lesser dependence on national-bourgeois elements and the proclamation of socialist ideas. Over the past decade or so such shifts have been observed in many countries, such as Libya, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Mauritius and even earlier in Tanzania.

In more recent times major developments have occurred in this direction in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa where colonialism was destroyed after a 10-12-year national-revolutionary war and where victory was to a considerable extent aided by an anti-fascist social revolution in Portugal itself. Obviously the socialist orientation of the intermediate strata that came to power in these countries has been broad and far-reaching. Of considerable significance too have been recent developments in India, where a split has occurred in the national bourgeoisie. Left and centrist elements have begun to consistently pursue the anti-imperialist policy of national independence and take steps in the direction of social and economic changes in the interests of the working people. But the ruling Indian National Congress party did not fulfil its promises.

A characteristic of many of the Afro-Asian countries over the past 15-20 years has been the considerable increase in the independent role of the state superstructure. From 1960 to 1975 there

were roughly 90 military coups or attempted coups. By 1975 more than 20 of the 46 African states were under the rule of military regimes. In this sort of situation we usually find that the state apparatus is rarely subjected to the direct control of the class organisations. A number of African countries do not even have such organisations at all or they are set up and controlled by the state. In this sort of situation the ruling intermediate petty-bourgeois strata become increasingly manoeuvrable and sometimes cease to take account of even the interests of those social groups that stand close to them. This gives rise to new governmental forms in which social development is carried out under the control of the armed forces. Often these military regimes evolve in a progressive direction, developing into a new political organisation of society, carrying out and expanding social and economic transformations. Such was the case of Egypt under President Nasser, in Algeria, Burma, Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia, Benin, the Congo, Nigeria and other countries. In time these regimes begin to acquire constitutional forms of government, although the reins of power may remain for a long time in the hands of the military.

In situations of this kind state power appears to exist autonomously. There is a natural process of its relative alienation from society. The army, too, seemingly plays an independent role as the genuine holder of power, whether in military or civilian dress. A curious phenomenon has occurred in the Afro-Asian world in the recent past in the form of what might be described as anti-imperialist bonapartism, with the military intelligentsia and the democratic petty bourgeoisie at the head; as a result of the absence of a clearly defined class structure and of political parties in civil society, the army—the anti-imperialist progressive officer corps supported by the rank-and-file soldiers—assumes political leadership in the formation of the nation and the state. Undoubtedly such military leaders—national revolutionaries brought to power as a result of the anti-imperialist movement who have set themselves the aim of ridding their countries of imperialist and neo-colonialist domination, overthrowing decaying monarchies and destroying the feudal system in the name of social progress—are considerably aided by the socialist world, which not only serves to support them in international affairs, but is able to show them the role and importance of revolutionary dictatorship during the period of transition to a society of social progress.

But at the same time it must be pointed out that the entry of such countries as Egypt (1960-71), Ghana, Mali, Guinea and

Tanzania on the path of socialist orientation was not the *direct* result of a military coup. It was the result of the evolution of the intermediate strata which began their political activity with a traditional national-reformist programme, but later became convinced of its inadequacy as a guarantee for independence and social progress.

But this is just one side of the matter. During that same 15-20 year period there were also examples when the army served to fulfil the reactionary function of crushing the revolutionary forces and, unless these latter were able to gain control of the army, of fettering them completely. The intensification of the class struggle in Indonesia, Ghana, Sudan, and Bangladesh was accompanied by miscalculations on the part of the revolutionary democrats and this, combined with the weakness of the progressive political leadership in the army, imperialist pressure, lack of solidarity in the anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary front, and individual tactical failures by the progressive forces, resulted in the movement along the road of social progress in these countries being impeded. In some of these countries (Indonesia, for example) reaction was triumphant, while in others (Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Bangladesh) the unity and consistency of the anti-imperialist front was badly damaged.

This objective complexity and contradictoriness in the position of the national bourgeoisie and the patriotic petty-bourgeois circles is an important factor determining the attitude adopted by the forces of progress towards nationalism in the liberated countries.

Anti-imperialist nationalism today is a dominant force in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries. It represents a natural stage in political development in those countries that liberated themselves from colonialism or are still fighting for national independence. It would be wrong to think that nationalism can be overcome by advancing slogans and appeals to the peoples of the liberated countries to renounce it. It is deeply rooted among the popular masses, particularly the peasantry and the intermediate strata, as the result of many years of unequal struggle against foreign domination and it is interwoven with religions (particularly Islam and Buddhism) and with moral values that have their origins in the ancient past.

For decades and in many countries for centuries the European, Japanese and North American colonisers have cynically trampled

on the Asian and African peoples and this has led, at a time when these peoples are awakening to a sense of their own historical identity, at a time when they are achieving their national independence, to the rapid growth of national feeling. Nationalism, whatever its particular brand, is in the final analysis bourgeois or petty-bourgeois and this is the case with the feudal and semi-feudal nationalism that has been observed in recent decades in such places as the Yemen, the Arab Emirates, Afghanistan up to the republican revolution, the feudal-tribal Kurd movement in Iraq and the tribal-separatist nationalism of the type that was seen in Biafra in Nigeria, etc.

The types of nationalism are many and varied and its political spectrum is broad. It may be progressive at one stage and conservative and reactionary at another. Its evolution is full of contradictions and enormously broad in its range of variations from the patriarchal-tribal nationalism that led the armed struggle against the colonialists in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, to the conciliatory national reformism that has predominated in Egypt since the death of Nasser as well as in Tunisia, Senegal, Zaire and Kenya, and which has lost or blunted its anti-imperialist edge.

Of considerable importance for an understanding of nationalism in the developing countries is the uneven development of nations and national states. Almost all the new states that were formed, for example, in Africa after the fall of the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial empires, gained political sovereignty long before they actually constituted a united nation or group of nations. Mostly they were nothing but a conglomeration of ethnic groups living at the tribal or neighbourly peasant commune stage of development. Such states had seen no process of consolidation among their peoples and bore none of the distinguishing characteristics of a nation. But these states did have one common and most important feature—their waging of an active anti-imperialist struggle (peaceful or armed) against foreign oppression, a struggle that was supported by the socialist countries and the international forces of progress and that triumphed in overthrowing imperialism thereby giving prominence to a militant anti-imperialism such as was capable of creating new states before their peoples bore the economic, cultural and territorial characteristics of a nation.

Such are the underlying characteristics of nationalism in the developing countries, an indisputably powerful political force that demands close attention.

It is important to realise that under a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois control of the anti-imperialist struggle national elements tend to become, to their own detriment, nationalist, isolationist, separatist, exclusive, messianic and, in the final analysis, chauvinist, which consequently opposes the national to the international.

The transition from the anti-colonial struggle for self-determination to the building of a national economy and the upholding of economic sovereignty under conditions of political independence that was already achieved is an important milestone in the evolution of nationalism. Once past it, nationalism gradually begins to be transformed. From an ideology of struggle for political independence bourgeois nationalism tries to become an ideology of national and social renewal and the reconstruction of the old society on a capitalist basis. This is a natural reaction to the new tasks facing the national liberation movement under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the ideologists of the renewal and reconstruction of the old society practically never, even in the bourgeois Afro-Asian countries developing along the bourgeois path, openly hold capitalist positions. The most influential and flexible variant of bourgeois nationalism is that type of nationalism which tries to use socialist slogans, thereby presenting a nationalist ideology that is wearing the garb of socialism.

Nationalism has many forms and guises. There is bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalism, and feudal and semi-feudal nationalism as professed by those elements that are gradually becoming bourgeois and seeking independence. Each of these types has its own effect on the peasant, proletarian and especially the intermediate urban strata and non-proletarian working masses. There is also an anti-imperialist nationalism, which is the ideology of the patriotic sections of the national bourgeoisie primarily orientated on the exploitation of the domestic market and consequently standing in opposition to the rich bourgeoisie who are allied with foreign capital and therefore stands in the way of indigenous middle and petty bourgeoisie. This has been particularly evident in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and a number of other countries. Then there is the compradore nationalism of the new compradore bourgeoisie, who have been nurtured on merchant's usury capital after winning independence and have close ties with the new bureaucratic bourgeois elite (as, for example, in Egypt after Nasser's

death). This type of nationalism is not actively anti-imperialist and is only out to maintain and exploit the privileges of the exploiters allied with foreign capital. There is also the nationalism of the military and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which has grown out of the dominant position of the military circles and the state apparatus. It is a mixed and highly contradictory type, being both anti-imperialist and anti-communist, the degree of its antagonism changing one way or the other according to circumstances. There is nationalism which is openly chauvinistic, anti-communist and anti-Soviet. And finally there is revolutionary-democratic nationalism, that is more or less free from narrow-mindedness, isolation, intolerance, from anti-communism and its variety, anti-Sovietism.

Reactionary bourgeois and feudal nationalism of all types cultivates tribal, caste and clan interests and encourages religious, ethnic or racial fanaticism and intolerance. It promotes mistrust of the socialist countries, spreads illusions about the changing nature of imperialism, ignores the necessity for anti-imperialist struggle and alliance with the socialist community, and seeks to replace the concept of the division of the modern world into capitalist and socialist countries by arguments about the 'rich and poor nations'. Finally it is ideologically cut off and seeks to prevent scientific class concepts from penetrating society. One of its worst manifestations is hostility to the theory of scientific socialism and the socialist community and harassment of democrats and Communists.

An important characteristic of contemporary bourgeois nationalism is the fact that now it does not reduce itself to the quest for solutions to national or colonial issues since they have already been essentially solved by the achievement of state sovereignty. It now comes out with a definite social and economic programme of its own. Take, for instance, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Pakistan and a number of other South and Southeast Asian countries. They have all introduced reforms of a bourgeois character in industry, agriculture, domestic and foreign trade and finance. Similarly the non-socialist-orientated countries of Africa and the Arab East have also introduced bourgeois-democratic reforms. The purpose of all this national-reformist activity is to preserve and strengthen the bourgeois-nationalist leadership. Hence the well-known concessions made to the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the working class and the encouragement given to national entrepreneurs. Should contemporary imperialism actively hamper this, bourgeois national reformism

goes over to the offensive taking various measures, up to and including the nationalisation of foreign property.

As for the militant nationalism of the ruling and exploiting classes (in Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates, Indonesia, etc.), it negates the class struggle, underestimates imperialism as the main danger and disregards the interests and rights of the working people. It bases itself on open anti-communism and frequently anti-Sovietism. Thus it is certain that an uncompromising struggle with the reactionary aspects of nationalism remains necessary today, too.

Although it is in principle true to say that the reactionary elements in bourgeois nationalism are growing in proportion to the intensification of social contradictions, it must not be forgotten that the democratic content of the nationalism held by the politically oppressed and economically exploited strata, classes, ethnic groups, tribes and nations has also increased during the crisis of the neo-colonial system. An analysis of both tendencies must determine specifically which is dominant at any given period, in which direction it is headed, what kind of struggle is taking place between the two tendencies, what classes support which tendency and what are their future prospects.

The historical achievement of the national liberation movement over the past 10 or 15 years as part of the world revolutionary process has been the welding together of a radical revolutionary democratic and left-centrist wing out of a wide variety of anti-imperialist tendencies and the strengthening of this wing to become the leading force of social progress in many of the liberated countries, including the nearly 15 Asian and African countries that have proclaimed socialist orientation.

Cooperation between this radical and left-centrist wing and the Marxists-Leninists has made it possible to conduct a joint struggle for socialist prospect. This is precisely what Lenin predicted when he said that the oppressed peoples, having taken up the struggle against imperialism, would eventually come to fight capitalism as such, for the petty bourgeoisie, that forms the popular base of anti-imperialist nationalism, would launch an offensive against capital. The period of such an offensive has, to all intents and purposes, begun.

Recent years have seen increasing desire among the reactionary bourgeois and landowners to use religion and religious bodies in their struggle against the adherents of social progress and the

alliance between anti-imperialist nationalism and the socialist world.

Thus in the last few years there has been a noticeable increase in the Pan-Islamic movement inspired by certain Islamic states. As they have done in the past the leaders of this movement try to rally reactionary Islamic circles on a generally anti-communist platform as a counterpoise to the progressive transformations that have taken place in a number of the Middle East and North African countries that have Moslem populations.

Pan-Islamism is not a religion but a class political doctrine. It does not mean the unification of the Oriental peoples against imperialism as the Pan-Islamists would claim. It is rather an ideological and political current aimed at the consolidation of reactionary, theocratic Moslem circles against the anti-feudal movement and secular power, against social progress and democracy. Progressive forces in the countries with large Moslem populations are conducting a struggle against Pan-Islamism on two fronts. They are fighting against the reactionary, chauvinistic trends of monopoly-bourgeois and feudal nationalism headed by the oil kings of Arabia, who seek conciliation with imperialism, and against their desire to control Islam and use their religious influence over their populations as a class and political weapon. Genuinely democratic, anti-imperialist and progressive circles cannot accept this anti-social and anti-popular exploitation of Islam. Of course, the history of the national liberation struggle, particularly the bitter armed struggle of the Moslem peoples which has gone on for centuries first against the crusaders and the Ottoman Empire and later against the British, French, German and Spanish colonisers, has known whole periods when this struggle was carried on under the banner of Islam. For Islam at the time was the only ideology that expressed protest and opposition to foreign invasion and reflected the desires of the enslaved peoples for liberty and independence.

But today it is not that the conservative essence of this religion has found new historical confirmation. Democrats, anti-imperialists and progressives do not want to see Islam given over to reaction so that its egalitarian and anti-imperialist attributes can be used against democracy and social progress.

In this connection recent events in Iran (1978-79) are of particular interest. What happened essentially was that a popular movement, directed against the monarchic system, which was politically and militarily allied to US imperialism, gained rapid momentum during this period and attempted the overthrow of the

'king of kings'. The revolution was victorious and a republic was proclaimed in the country.

For monarchists inside and outside Iran the revolution came as a bolt from the blue. For the previous quarter of a century the monarchist regime had done all in its power to clear the way for the development of capitalism both in the cities and in the countryside. Intensive development of the country's productive forces was begun on a capitalist basis under what was termed the 'white revolution' and these transformations even affected the social infrastructure in the form of education and the health services.

But Iran's development on capitalist lines under US neo-colonialist patronage gave rise to sharp contradictions both in the economic and in the social sphere. The rapid accumulation of capital intensified the contradictions between it and labour. Growing large-scale capitalist production brought ruin to the artisans and small entrepreneurs. Agrarian change in the villages drove landless peasants to the cities to swell the numbers of unemployed. Thus the 'white revolution', the 'revolution from above' resulted in a highly inflammable social and economic crisis.

Popular discontent was further increased after the coup and the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in 1953 when the Shah ceased to be a constitutional monarch and became a virtual autocrat. The intelligentsia, the students, the patriotic representatives of the national bourgeoisie and the Shiite religious leaders protested against the flouting of constitutional freedoms and curtailment of civil rights. The demand for the upholding of constitutional liberties and the democratisation of social life became the slogan for increasingly larger sections of Iranian society.

Political tension grew, particularly in the towns. Official press statements referred to labour conflicts and the prosecution of those who acted against the regime. But feelings of deep discontent continued to grow and find their unambiguous expression in a rising mass movement of opposition.

But the country's rulers paid no heed to these ever increasing signs of discontent. They chose not to remember the great revolutionary traditions of the Iranian people and their courage and readiness for self-sacrifice, which had been clearly shown during the revolutions of 1905-12, during the Gilan revolution in 1919 and in the struggle for the nationalisation of the foreign oil companies in the early fifties.

In an attempt to conceal the class antagonisms of Iranian

society and overcome the disparity that was observed even within the dominant classes themselves, the rulers banned all political parties in March 1975 and decreed the formation of the Iran National Resurgence Party which supposedly expressed the interests of all sections of Iranian society. This party was dissolved after the first mass demonstrations in summer 1978.

The 'white revolution' had involved the attraction of foreign capital to introduce advanced technology and this led to the formation of a new chain of contradictions. The national bourgeoisie and associated strata soon began to feel their subordinate position in relation to foreign capital and its neo-colonialist methods. In the economy, just as in the military and political spheres, the leading role was played by the United States, which became particularly noticeable after the oil price increases in autumn 1973. The Iranian monarchy and its US patrons were trying to turn the country into an American military and political base against the Soviet Union, and to control the world important oil reserves and communications in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. They realised this aim by stockpiling enormous quantities of US military and technical hardware at stupendous cost, which in its turn brought a flood of US military experts and advisers. Regional hegemonism in the Persian Gulf and part of the Indian Ocean became one of the dominant characteristics in Iranian foreign policy with the Iranian monarchy seeing itself as the gendarme of the Gulf. One of the first acts in this direction was the sending of troops into Oman to crush the liberation struggle which the partisans were leading against Sultan Cambyes. The monarchy accomplished a senseless militarisation at a rate that was out of all proportion to the size of the country and which, as was shown by the revolution, was carried out in the interests of US imperialism. Clear confirmation of this came with the removal of the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) which the US military had installed on the shores of the Caspian to spy on the Soviet Union and the transference of F-14s with the help of Israeli pilots from Iran to bases in Saudi Arabia.

The enormous increase in oil revenues in 1974 served as the catalyst for all these developments, which were intensive enough even before that. In the first place, as a result of the rapid acceleration in industrial production, certain branches of the infrastructure showed themselves to be weak points in the economy. Expenditures during the fifth development plan almost doubled; coupled with an increase in state credit to the private sector, they

provided particularly favourable conditions for embezzlement, quick profit-making and shady dealing. A new class of nouveaux riches sprang up for whom wealth without ostentation had no importance. In a comparatively short time the already blatant contrasts between the luxurious residences in the north of Teheran and the hovels in the south became even sharper. It is hardly surprising that this ostentatious wealth and extravagance led to a deepening of the gap between rich and poor and an intensification of social contradictions.

During the course of the Shah's reforms, and largely as a result of them, the consciousness of the masses began to change. For more than half a year Iran witnessed a wave of demonstrations in which the most varied strata of the city's population took part. The highest level of consciousness was shown among the oil workers who called a general strike that paralysed the core of the economy. They were joined by civil servants, and workers in the communications, transport services and the airports. Thus, by the late seventies the 'white revolution', that is the bourgeois revolution from above, had become one of the causes that brought about the collapse of the monarchist regime.

The pioneers of this movement, that developed into a revolution, were the religious leaders of the Shiite sect. And it was this which gave the whole movement the appearance of being religiously inspired. But the solidarity of millions of workers was determined by the democratic, anti-monarchist and anti-imperialist slogans which these leaders put forward. The revolution in Iran was thus one more demonstration of the fact that in the Moslem East mass democratic movements tend not only to adopt a religious guise but to be carried out under the banner of Islam. Similar movements have been known in many of the African and Asian countries: Sudan, Indonesia, India, the Yemen, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iran.

In the specific situation obtaining in Iran, where all progressive political parties and public organisations had either been broken up by the SAVAK secret police or forced to go underground, Shiism became the only political anti-imperialist and anti-despotic force capable of expressing the opposition of the broad popular masses to the Shah's regime.

Dozens of thousands of Shiite priests, who preached their sermons in the mosques, came largely from the people, being the sons of artisans, small shopkeepers, peasants, clerks and teachers, who had received the traditional religious education. They lived among the people and knew their hardships and suffering. They

shared the social aspirations of the ordinary Iranians who dreamed of equality and justice. Their sermons expressed these moods and put them into ways that were understandable to the masses. The repressions that were carried out against the Shiite priesthood by the secret police only served to increase the popularity of the religious leaders, by turning them into martyrs who were suffering for the good of the common people.

Thus the Shah and his entourage were virtually unable to exploit Shiism and the Shiite priesthood as a weapon for strengthening the despotic rule. This explains why the Shah and the ideologists of the Shah's regime propagandised the magnificence of the pre-Islamic monarchist structure in Iran. It explains why, for example, in March 1976 the Moslem calendar was replaced by a new system of dating which ran from the year 558 B. C., when Cyrus, founder of the Achaemenid dynasty, became 'king of kings' in Iran. There were also a number of administrative and legislative measures objectively aimed at undermining the position and authority of the Shiite priesthood. But in the end they all proved futile. Furthermore, they only served to intensify the struggle between the main body of the Shiite priesthood and the Shah's regime and turned Iranian Shiism into the banner of a mass anti-despotic, anti-imperialist popular movement.

It was this appeal by the Shiite priests to the masses and their desire to express the faith of the Iranian workers in social justice, that in 1978-1979 formed the political basis for the so-called populist Islam, for unity between the religious Shiite leaders, the broad democratic sections and the forces of national democracy.

As events showed, the sole bulwark of the monarchy was the army. But over the years doubt and hesitation had begun to creep into its ranks so that when it was finally confronted by the people in armed revolt it fell apart.

The peasantry, oppressed by debt and lacking sufficient land, also gave their full support to the revolutionaries.

Being essentially a national liberation movement, the revolution in Iran was aimed at the social, political and economic renewal of Iranian society. In the social and political sphere it did away with the Shah's dictatorship and its apparatus of coercion that had discredited itself in the eyes of the people through its anti-national policies, and established a republic in the country. Economically the revolution aimed to free the country from neo-colonialism and conduct a genuinely sovereign foreign and domestic policy—all these aims received wide support from all over Iranian society.

The motive force of the revolution in its early stages was provided by the urban middle classes—the petty bourgeoisie (the artisans, traders), office workers and students. A great role was played by the impoverished townspeople deprived of work, the roof over the head and any means of subsistence. Among the demonstrators there were many women and, of course, the Shiite religious leaders took an active part in the processions and demonstrations.

The brutal suppression of these demonstrations by the army, far from weakening the movement, led to more violent and bitter response. In answer to the shooting of the demonstrators a general political strike was called. In the first place the oil workers halted the production and export of oil, which deprived the state of revenues in currency, threatened the country with a severe shortage of petroleum products and paralysed the state's economic mainstay. The general political strike, which is a specifically proletarian class method of struggle, united the whole of the people against the monarchy, the army, the Shah's guards and the security services.

And it was this combination of mass demonstrations by the urban middle classes with strikes by workers in many different industries as a result of clear understanding by the working class of the aims of the revolution that made it the most dynamic force in the revolution and guaranteed it success.

During the last five years the autocratic regimes in three Oriental countries—Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Iran—have been overthrown, showing clearly the strength of the revolutionary movement in the East. The first two of these states have chosen socialist orientation, and now the third country, the former kingdom of the Shah, which for many decades has gone along the road of capitalism, has entered a new stage of its development.

Judging by the programme of its revolutionary leaders, Iran now intends to pursue a policy of decisive struggle with imperialism, oppose its intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, defend the interests of the oppressed masses and stand up against the nouveaux riches and the extremes of the Western way of life. Iran has left CENTO.

The Iranian people expect their new Islamic Republic to successfully complete the anti-monarchist, anti-imperialist people's revolution, do away with militarisation and establish a peaceful policy of non-alignment. Progressive forces in the country which supported the creation of the Islamic Republic believe that it ought to guarantee full independence, abolish exploi-

tation, establish democratic freedoms and raise the workers' standard of living. In foreign policy they want to see the cancelling of all the military and political agreements that have been foisted upon the Iranian people, as well as the safeguarding of territorial integrity, a strengthening of national independence and equal rights for all the nationalities.

The attitude of the CPSU and the Soviet Government towards the revolution in Iran was expressed by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev when he said that the events in Iran were the affair of the Iranian people alone and no one should intervene in them. The borders of Iran and the USSR ought to be the borders of peace, good-neighbour relations, friendship and cooperation.

Communists, of course, have never tried to hide the fact that they are atheists, but together with revolutionary democrats, educationalists and other progressive peoples in the East, they have always observed great tact in their relations with Islam and never advocated the abolition of religion. Even so reactionary Pan-Islamists and imperialist politicians and ideologists have done all in their power to turn the faithful against Communists and democrats and convince the religious masses that socialism and Islam are age-old enemies. Progressive and democratic organisations in the Islamic countries have never opposed scientific socialism in their ideological and political activity to Islam. On the contrary, they stress that the traditional moral, social, and egalitarian characteristics of Islam do not contradict the struggle for social progress or the principles of scientific socialism in economic, social and cultural development, and that those circles and classes that are most frenzied in their attacks on socialism, constantly and flagrantly violate the social and ethical principles of Islam. This was most convincingly shown in recent years in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Algeria, Iraq and a number of other socialist-orientated Islamic countries, where the revolutionary democrats had frequently to expose the counter-revolutionary agitation and subversive activity of the Pan-Islamic fanatics in the people's courts and at the same time draw attention to the fact that the basic canons of Islam forbid the exploitation of man by man, usury and corruption.

The critical thrust of communist, revolutionary-democratic and educationalist thought is directed not against nationalism and Islam in general, but against reactionary nationalism and the fanatic exploitation of religion to justify the exploitation of the people and its poverty and misery.

In the democratic and progressive struggle against reactionary

nationalism and Pan-Islamism a stable alliance is possible between those religious believers, whose political positions are anti-imperialist and patriotic. And these are in the majority. Understanding of the necessity for such an alliance has in a number of Afro-Asian countries led to cooperation between adherents of scientific socialism and the left and centrist democratic wings of the nationalists. Such cooperation can only be to the benefit of the people and strengthen the positions of all democratic forces.

There is a tendency among certain writers and political commentators to idealise non-capitalist development in the Afro-Asian countries that have adopted socialist orientation in domestic and foreign policy. This is because the developments that have taken place in Mongolia and in the Soviet Central Asian Republics have been identified with those of recent years that have taken place in the East. But such an identification forgets the fact that in the socialist-orientated countries it is not Marxist-Leninist, but left-democratic and nationalist forces that are in power and implement non-capitalist development and that there is no socialist dictatorship of the working class there. This is what distinguishes the experience of these countries in principle from that of the Soviet Central Asian Republics, Kazakhstan, the Far North and the Soviet Far East.

But though the two forms of development are not identical, they have certain things in common. There is a definite kinship between the historical struggle of Mongolia and certain of the Eastern countries, particularly in relation to *the transition from pre-capitalism (or the early phase of capitalist development) to socialism*.

Not only Mongolia, but also the Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus, the Far North, Siberia, the Soviet Far East and many Afro-Asian socialist-orientated countries provide excellent confirmation of Marx's and Lenin's theories about the possibility of *avoiding or curtailing* the capitalist stage of development among the backward nations. But no matter how much this experience differs—as regards the class basis, political leadership, the forms and methods of implementing their policies and internal and external conditions—it is essentially akin in so far as it makes it more or less possible to completely avoid, interrupt or substantially curtail the capitalist stage of development. And it is this which Marx, Engels and Lenin had in mind.

If we take the experience of non-capitalist development from the first days of the Mongolian revolution right up to present-day developments in Africa and Asia, we can establish at least three main dangers which face any attempt to avoid or curtail the capitalist stage of development.

First: underestimating the reactionary role of the feudal-land-owning system and patriarchal-feudal and tribal relations that hold back the revolutionary activity of the peasantry, and prevent the country from advancing, especially in its agrarian-peasant structure, which leads to the revolutionary leadership becoming divorced from the peasantry, i.e., the mass of the population.

Second: underestimating the many and varied elements of capitalism that are spread at various levels throughout an economic system which is trying to prevent capitalism from becoming the inevitable and dominant force in its development. The essence of this danger consists in the fact that it may lead—and in the absence of the right policies actually does lead to—the strengthening of capitalist relations, the class stratification of the peasantry and the growth of the strata of the rich peasants farming in a capitalist way. And this in turn leads to the consolidation of bourgeois-landowner-rich peasant reaction, allied with imperialism and capable of opposing the revolutionary-democratic state and even overthrowing it if this bloc is not given the necessary rebuff from the state and the people.

Third: ignoring the ethnic, national, cultural, historical and psychological characteristics of a people that has been gradually moving away from the capitalist path of development and is striving to build a progressive socialist-orientated society. This danger is considerable particularly if there is any mechanical copying of the transition to socialism in the highly developed or medium developed capitalist countries and consequently disregard of the fact that the general laws of any transitional period manifest themselves both in time (the stages and rates of transition) and space (local and regional peculiarities).

In all three cases there is the potential, constantly existing danger that the reactionary classes and strata that stand in opposition to social progress will set themselves against the strengthening of the revolutionary-democratic state, its internal policies for change and its anti-imperialist foreign policy in the hopes of impairing relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The events of the last decade in Egypt, Sudan and Indonesia are examples of this.

But the recent proclamation of scientific socialism as the official ideology in a number of national-democratic movements (the People's Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Socialist Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) leads to the conclusion that the peoples of the liberated countries are intensifying their struggle for socialist-orientated development.

This acceptance by revolutionary democrats of certain of the principles of scientific socialism is taking place in conditions of the discrediting of nationalism, particularly in its most tenacious conservative aspects, i.e., the discrediting of political slogans, concepts and terminology which have been adopted by the different types of nationalism. This process takes place gradually, by stages. First of all some of the leaders of the national liberation movement began to adopt the word socialism and decided that it was not as dangerous as they used to believe in the fifties and that it could externally be compatible with national reformism. Hence the slogan 'national socialism' which was adopted in Indonesia (under Sukarno), partially in Egypt (until the sixties), Tunisia, Singapore, Sri Lanka (under S. Bandaranaike), Iraq (under Kassem and Aref) and a number of other countries. It was later recognised in many Asian and African countries that 'scientific socialism' was a more effective and acceptable term since both in form and content it was more suitable as a means for actively influencing the masses.

The use of this term by a number of revolutionary-democratic parties (the Baath Party, the Front of the National Liberation of Algeria, the Congolese Party of Labour, the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt under Nasser, etc.) in the sixties and seventies was already connected with serious class changes in favour of the working people and with foreign and domestic policy shifts in some countries towards social progress. On a number of important questions of Marxist-Leninist theory (particularly its economic and social aspects) these parties drew closer to the position of the CPSU and the other communist parties. At the same time bourgeois nationalist leaders like Leopold Sedar Senghor announced that 'national socialism' is genuinely scientific and 'democratic' as distinct from communist ideology. Senghor and his party joined the Socialist International and this has given rise to the increasing desire, supported by European social-democrats and the Socialist International, to identify the concept of 'national

socialism' in Africa and Asia with the 'democratic socialism' of the European social-democrats, so as to check the spread of scientific socialism. The conference of African nationalist parties in Tunisia (February 1975) which was held under the patronage of Senghor and Habib Bourguiba in cooperation with right-wing European social-democrats, is a clear example of this.

That revolutionary democrats have adopted and put into practice certain aspects of scientific socialism, especially those relating to economics, is obvious proof of the existence of certain political trends in their midst. But when the socialist consciousness among the masses is weak and the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata are exerting continuous pressure, such political trends are, more often than not, evidence of belief in the magical effect of words and the need to introduce new slogans in place of the old ones that have to some extent lost their effectiveness.

Declarations by the revolutionary democrats on their allegiance to the principles of scientific socialism sound sincere enough. But it should not be forgotten that the ideology which revolutionary democrats identify with scientific socialism often has no real social or party base. It can frequently amount to mere phraseology which has found no real response among the people, the workers or even the leadership itself. But as always in such matters, it is practice that counts. Practice, that is, real politics, is the only criterion of adherence to scientific socialism and is the decisive test for all who claim to have adopted it.

Contemporary revolutionary democracy continues to base itself on what is for the liberated countries the main irreconcilable antagonistic contradiction with imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism. It is this which gives rise to the imperative necessity for a consistent progressive foreign and domestic policy accompanied by the structural transformation of society in the interests of the nation as a whole and the working people in particular.

In their struggle to achieve these aims the revolutionary democrats have come a considerable way. In Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Egypt (until 1971), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the People's Republic of the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, Burma and others, serious limitations have been imposed on foreign capital and national private capital (with occasional concessions to the latter). In some cases the foreign corporations have been completely taken over, while feudalism has been seriously under-

mined and its vestiges all but done away with in agrarian relations. All large industrial enterprises and a considerable proportion of medium ones have been nationalised with the result that the newly-created state sector controls between 30 and 80 per cent of gross industrial product and accounts for 60 to 80 per cent of capital investments. The state sector in all the socialist-orientated countries has become a powerful economic force.

But private capital still has a wide sphere of activity and continues to spring up spontaneously. The peasantry, the artisans and the small traders and producers form a considerable part of the population in the liberated countries. They are socially differentiated from the rest of the population and are a fertile source of bourgeois tendencies in economics, ideology and politics. Differentiation between the small-scale producers in the towns and in the countryside, market relations, hired labour, machinery and growing property and class inequality serve to generate capitalism. Thus the fate of socialist orientation as an approach to socialism is decided, from the point of view of the internal correlation of forces, in close connection with the transformation of agrarian relations and of the numerous artisan, semi-industrial and trade enterprises in the towns. It is a question of whom the peasantry, the artisans and millions of small shopkeepers will follow and which orientation they will choose: will they join the working class, the progressive socialist intelligentsia, or will they align themselves with the national bourgeoisie? The struggle for the transformation of peasant agriculture and artisan production on cooperative, non-capitalist lines is in its beginnings. Only in a few of the socialist-orientated countries like Algeria, Iraq, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Burma and Tanzania has this question gone beyond the bounds of pure discussion and become of practical importance.

The non-capitalist path of development as the basis for socialist orientation manifests itself today in democratic transformations and clears the way, as it were, for a possible future transition to the direct struggle for introducing socialist relations in society. This is quite natural and should not be regarded as evidence of lag. The implementation of elementary democratic transformations is only the beginning and in these conditions a comparatively large amount of work has to be done so that subsequent acceleration in the onward movement can be achieved.

The socialist-orientated countries are becoming the vanguard of the national liberation movement. But within these countries the formation of relatively mass vanguard parties which could

assume the complex task of deepening the revolutionary process towards a transition to socialism, has only just begun.

According to the programme documents of the revolutionary democrats (the Congolese Party of Labour, the Democratic Party of Guinea, the Charter of the Socialist Revolution of the FNL in Algeria, the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania, the programmes of the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, the Programme of the National Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia and the Documents of the Burma Socialist Programme Party), they see their major aims in socialist-orientated countries to lie in strengthening their political and social positions, in repelling reaction and imperialism and in preparing, on the basis of the successes already achieved, the gradual and systematic transition to a new stage of progressive social development. They expect that within a period of 20-25 years, with the help of the socialist community, a reliable economic foundation will be built by the people which will make it possible to overcome social, economic and technical backwardness.

Though they have experienced temporary setbacks due to the intensification of the social struggle, the resistance of imperialism and internal reaction, the revolutionary democrats in the socialist-orientated countries have built, so to speak, a working model of non-capitalist development in the national economies and are trying to introduce socialist orientation into all spheres of social life. This requires economic and political stability and guaranteed progressive social and economic development, which though perhaps slower than the revolutionary leadership would like is nevertheless constant. It is this which the best representatives of revolutionary democracy see as their prime objective and it is this which constitutes the most important international task for the socialist-orientated countries.

There is good reason to believe that in the coming 20-25 years the correlation of class forces in the liberated countries will see a growth in the active role of the working people and the working class in a left anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist bloc. The potential of such a bloc is far from being exhausted. And there is every possibility that such a bloc will become a reality in the foreseeable future.

In a number of countries a gradual rapprochement is taking place between the national-democratic and Marxist-Leninist parties on the basis of scientific socialism. Favourable conditions have arisen for joint activity and for effective and honest mutual cooperation in the interests of the people and progressive national

fronts which include both parties have been formed. All of this goes to show that the tactics of forming a left bloc of forces opposed to imperialism and reaction is effective. But at the same time active anti-communist groupings continue to function amongst the revolutionary democrats and nationalist revolutionaries. They aim at disrupting the unity and impairing the cooperation between the forces of the left bloc and setting the revolutionary democrats and anti-imperialist national reformists at variance with the working class and the Communists.

In a number of national-democratic countries (Algeria, for example) the communist parties are not recognised although Communists actively support the progressive measures of the government and together with the left wing of the national liberation front oppose reaction and imperialism. In other countries where Communists have entered the national progressive fronts, attempts have been made to limit their activities and international connections; even though successful cooperation between revolutionary democrats and Communists is an important condition for the advancement of such a country to social progress.

It would not be out of place at this point to consider the formation of progressive fronts in certain of the Arab countries, where this process has gained some ground. The most natural question that arises in this connection is why the Arab countries have, even those with progressive regimes which are more or less the same politically and socially, been unable to achieve an optimum effective unity of action indispensable in the current international situation and particularly in the struggle against Israeli aggression, imperialism and reaction.

The main reason for this seems to be rooted in the fact that the anti-imperialist, progressive and democratic forces have long been disunited in the various Arab countries and have not only opposed, but have even been engaged in fighting against each other. This situation has remained unchanged in many Arab countries and today the anti-imperialist and progressive forces are riven with internecine strife.

Clearly firm unity between anti-imperialist, national-democratic and progressive forces can only be achieved in the Arab world on the basis of an alliance between all these forces in each individual country. Calls for all-out anti-imperialist unity are, of course, important and necessary, but if they are not realised even in the political life of individual countries they frequently remain no more than abstract, ineffectual hopes in relations between Arab countries, too.

The history of the Arab world, particularly during the period of struggle for national liberation and state independence, has provided innumerable examples of unity and solidarity of action by the Arab peoples. And yet during the last 10-15 years the national-democratic parties of such countries as Iraq and Syria, which have similar class roots and hold similar views on fundamental issues, have frequently waged war upon each other. Relatively unimportant differences were artificially blown up and subjective contradictions given paramount importance with the result that political consolidation on a broad anti-imperialist and social base could not be achieved. In other words, these contradictions have become a stumbling block in the way of a united anti-imperialist front of all democratic and progressive forces. Extensive alienation which at times developed into internecine struggle between progressive forces was the characteristic feature of certain stages in the national liberation movement in a number of Arab countries.

The coming to power of one progressive national-democratic party was usually accompanied by an attempt to exclude all the other progressive parties and organisations from social and political life so as to win for itself undisputed monopoly. The party or its most powerful faction heading the regime aimed at crushing all the other progressive organisations, which were looked upon as rivals, though they did not lay claim to power and were only seeking together with the other anti-imperialist forces to honestly serve the people and cooperate with the ruling party. Such a situation, of course, did nothing to help the fulfilment of the working people's aspirations and only served to prevent them from being drawn into socio-political and state activity. Political struggle finally manifested itself in an intensification of contradictions within the ruling party, in the imposition of limitations or even a formal ban on the other national-democratic and progressive parties and in the harassment of the adherents of scientific socialism. The result of this was that a potentially anti-imperialist political regime ended up, as it were, hanging in the air, for it had no stable social base and was increasingly forced to seek support in the army, which itself contained a considerable number of right oppositionist and openly reactionary elements that were out to reverse the direction of the country's development.

But in recent years a markedly positive shift has taken place in relations between the progressive parties and organisations, including the Marxist parties, in a number of Arab countries.

Dialogue constantly going on between those forces that hold

the anti-imperialist progressive positions is aimed at achieving closer cooperation between them. But cooperation between national-democratic and Marxist forces and their joint efforts in the interests of the working people are visibly more effective when definite political and organisational forms are found. In a number of Arab countries this is being achieved with the formation of a united national front of progressive forces, as a result of which the masses are rallied behind the various political parties on a common platform of persistent struggle against imperialism and reaction and for social progress and cooperation between all progressive forces.

In a number of socialist-orientated Arab countries there is an obvious desire, which assumes its own specific form in each country, for closer relations and cooperation between national democrats, Marxists-Leninists and other progressive elements within the framework of a national anti-imperialist front or coalition of progressive forces. But though this is a process which can only serve to benefit the national-democratic revolution, it has been preceded by long years of vacillation and indecisiveness nurtured by mutual distrust. Many leaders of the democratic, progressive wing of the national liberation movement are coming to realise more and more that all those, who oppose imperialism and reaction and stand for social progress, i.e., for the elimination of the exploitation of man by man irrespective of party membership, nationality, religion or world-outlook, can find a common platform on which to actively promote social and economic progress and strengthen political independence.

The objective historical necessity for the formation of a broad anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front of progressive forces comes primarily from recognition of the fact that no single class force or single political party in a liberated country that has entered the stage of national-democratic revolution, can cope with the tasks presented by such a revolution even with the support of the army and the state apparatus.

The national-democratic rulers have usually come to power as the result of military and political coups. To implement their constructive programmes for progressive change they are forced to widen their social base and turn the military-political dictatorship of the army which brought about the coup into a national-democratic dictatorship of the people without which the construction of a new state and a new society would be impossible. Solving the radical problems of reconstruction inevitably demands the active, conscious participation of the working

people, whose vital interests lie in the victorious outcome of the revolution. The national-democratic character of political power after the formation of a front of progressive forces does not undergo any fundamental change. It remains in the hands of a bloc of social forces which stand together on a platform of anti-imperialism and social progress. But the formation of such a front allows a regime to consolidate its position and repose on a broad social base which includes the working class, the peasantry, the working intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie and in certain circumstances part of the middle bourgeoisie, if the latter do not oppose revolutionary transformations in property relations (i.e., in land, industry and other types of property) or the state's domestic and foreign policy. By widening its social base in this way, the regime can help to bring about positive changes in the activities and structure of the executive bodies of power, develop closer relations between them and the people, and promote the democratisation of the army, the people's militia, the police and the security services.

At the same time strengthening and widening the social base of the national-democratic regime by the formation of a united front of progressive parties and organisations allows the working people to conduct a more effective and resolute struggle against the capitalists and landowners and all kinds of national and foreign exploiters. This is especially important in those Arab countries which have taken the road to social progress, for there internal reaction which has exploited the difficulties that arose after the June 1967 defeat, are particularly active, and often successfully so, in their attempts to prevent the implementation of social and economic transformations and retain their lost positions, so that ultimately their countries will be pulled off the path of progressive social development and be run along Western, capitalist lines. This is also the intention of reactionary attempts to sow the seeds of distrust in relations with the USSR and turn patriotic circles against it.

It is just such a united front of progressive forces, guaranteeing as it does a mass social base for the national-democratic regime, that is capable not only of delivering a rebuff to external and internal reaction, but of inflicting upon it a resounding defeat. Such an ultimate aim—the elimination of imperialist and reactionary influence in internal and external affairs and the implementation of social, economic and political transformations in the interests of the people—can motivate the advanced parties and organisations to unite their efforts in a voluntary alliance although

their differences are sometimes quite substantial over matters of ideology and world-outlook and they maintain their own organisational and political independence.

The guarantee of success for such a front is the mutual trust, sincere cooperation and militant unity of all participants, particularly its nucleus, the national-democratic ruling circles and the Communists who work closely together with them in the implementation of their progressive programme for the radical transformation of the social system.

The internal and external enemies of the national-democratic regimes deliberately try to cause conflict among the participants of progressive coalitions. Of course, they conceal intentions by calling for the creation of a united front without the participation of the Communists, or with the participation of some Communists, but only on condition that the Communist and other left-wing parties would be dissolved. The aim of these manoeuvres and intrigues is clear: to split the natural unity of all forces that are in favour of non-capitalist development and thereby to damage the radical interests of the peoples who have chosen just this path of development.

The common struggle of the revolutionary democrats and the communist parties for social progress, the joint efforts to overcome difficulties in the way of building a new society and honest service to the people who are struggling against imperialism and reaction can promote the gradual drawing together of all progressive forces and the removal of the vestiges of the past.

Cooperation between the communist and revolutionary-democratic parties has emerged from the joint anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the oppressed peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the international working class and the socialist states, from the rapprochement between non-Marxist socialism and scientific socialism and from the new correlation of class forces in the world favourable for the victory of the working people, and it is therefore in line with the objective requirements of the development of those countries and peoples, which have established such cooperation. It is an important achievement for the working-class party, the revolutionary-democratic party, which is composed chiefly of peasants, and all patriotic forces, and, as history has shown, plays a great role in the implementation of progressive social and economic changes.

Obviously, in the course of cooperation differences of opinion on immediate tasks and tactics are bound to arise. Sometimes these differences can become long-term disagreements and cause

undesirable friction. They can also provoke certain of the revolutionary-democratic party leaders to limit the contacts between their own Marxists-Leninists and communist parties in other countries or between them and different social strata and groups in their own countries, such as the youth, students, women and civil servants, etc. Phenomena of this kind reflect the extent to which society has stratified in conditions of national democracy.

The process of social and class stratification in national-democratic states is expressed principally in the growth of new sections of the bourgeoisie, which have adapted themselves to new social conditions. It has been more or less the rule over the last 15-20 years (as can be seen from the example of such countries as Egypt, Syria, Guinea, Tanzania and Burma) for a fairly influential group of compradore bourgeoisie to make its appearance in the civil service, the army and the state sector. This new group's activity is centred either in the domestic commodity-money exchange between state enterprises, suppliers and private merchant's capital engaged in wholesale, mixed and retail exchange in the country or between state trade and industrial enterprises and the foreign importers and exporters. Such activity is now fairly widespread and has assumed a large scale.

Another cause for the growth and development of the new sections of the bourgeoisie is the fact that a considerable share of building, transport and contract work as well as the public services are in the hands of private capital. Furthermore, after liberation from feudal domination rapid stratification takes place in the countryside between the better-off and the less well-to-do farmers, with the former accounting for some 20-25 per cent of the peasant population. Together with the landowners that are becoming bourgeois they control agricultural production in a number of socialist-orientated countries. In the villages, as distinct from the towns, the state has no developed state sector and its control there is still very weak. Land speculation in both towns and villages, the tremendous increases in the cost of ground rent in the towns and in hired labour in the villages, the buying and selling of real estate in inflationary conditions and the control of trade between town and village have given rise to intensive private capital accumulation. Another important and socially dangerous source of wealth is the widespread corruption prevalent in the civil service, the state sector and the military bureaucracy.

This new, largely small and middle industrial, commercial and compradore bourgeoisie has a negative influence on the state apparatus and the ruling party. It mobilises the right forces to

limit the role and influence of the left, democratic elements, the working class, the trade unions and radical peasant organisations. Once it has arisen, this new bourgeois stratum tries to entrench itself, form links with the expropriated bourgeoisie and landowners, and extend its own economic base, doing everything in its power to push the country towards capitalist economic development. The natural consequence of this is an intensification of the struggle between the capitalist and the non-capitalist paths.

Foreign policy orientated either towards the capitalist or the socialist world also becomes an important issue in the class struggle. Then again there is the possibility of political instability bringing the threat of reactionary coups, economic difficulties, a worsening of living standards and growing discontent among the working population. In some former progressively orientated countries (Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Indonesia) political instability has led to political crisis. The new sections of the bourgeoisie with the support of internal reaction and imperialism exploit nationalist and chauvinist slogans to resist social progress and particularly non-capitalist development. But it is not only slogans that change. Most important is the change in foreign and domestic policy and the serious economic and political concessions made to the local bourgeoisie and foreign capital. Recent developments in Egypt have shown this most clearly.

The movement of non-aligned countries which was formed after the Bandung Conference in 1955 holds an important place in the national liberation struggle today. On the whole it plays a progressive role, its strength lying in anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-racism. Though the non-alignment movement is not part of the world socialist system, it arose and developed in close connection with it. Furthermore, its successes may be largely attributed to its alliance with world socialism and its important role in the anti-imperialist struggle, a fact which is fully realised by prominent representatives of the non-alignment movement.

In recent years the non-aligned countries have come to play a more noticeable role in world affairs than in the past. The number of countries participating in the movement in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe has risen more than three times.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev noted that the non-alignment movement was an important link in the struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism, colonialism and aggression.

But this is not to say that the movement is without internal political differentiation. The conservative wing of the movement would like to pursue a policy of isolation from the socialist world and organise the movement as an independent political force which is 'equally distant' from both imperialism and socialism.

Among certain circles of the non-alignment movement the concept is fairly widespread of the confrontation between the 'rich' and 'poor' nations irrespective of their social and political nature. This concept is used by opponents of the Soviet Union in an attempt to camouflage their true colours by claiming that they champion the interests of the developing countries against the 'two superpowers'.

Some politicians in the liberated countries try to represent the non-alignment movement not as being anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-racist, but as essentially a means to limit the dependence of the smaller and medium-sized countries on the great powers and the military blocs. Such views can hardly be ascribed to lack of political experience alone. The disregard for the fundamental social and class differences between the socialist and the capitalist systems and the dangerous inclination to identify their foreign policies are all too clear. By exploiting unstable elements in the non-alignment movement, the reactionaries in the developing countries try to inculcate views which are damaging to the movement and exploit them to weaken the liberation forces, which are conducting an anti-imperialist struggle and making common cause with the socialist community.

In the final analysis these conservative elements aim to weaken the anti-imperialist orientation of the non-alignment movement and prevent the adoption of decisions that are against the interests of the Western imperialist countries.

Economic problems are of considerable importance in the non-alignment movement. Most important among them is the demand for a new international economic order based on the principles of 'collective self-sufficiency' and 'all-round interdependence'. Obviously, since the movement is not homogeneous, these principles are subject to various interpretations, particularly the principle of interdependence. Conservative members of the movement see it as meaning that the young national states should be concerned to maintain their neo-colonialist links with the West. But the decisions of the non-aligned countries on economic matters still have fundamental importance in so far as they

oppose imperialist monopoly exploitation and proclaim the right of the developing countries to control and regulate the activities of the imperialist monopolies and nationalise them in the interests of the nation.

Responsibility for economic backwardness in the liberated countries is justly attributed by the non-alignment movement to imperialism and colonialism, which continue to exploit developing countries through an unequal economic system imposed on them. The main characteristics of this system are non-equivalent exchange and international monopoly profits, which accrue as a result of the high prices of industrial goods and the low prices of raw materials. At the same time it should be pointed out that the request for 0.7 per cent gross national product to be allocated in aid to the developing countries, which is addressed to all developed ones, both capitalist and socialist, shows an inclination to accept the unfounded thesis that both the capitalist and socialist countries alike are equally responsible for the difficult economic situation in the liberated countries.

It should also be noted that the economic resolutions adopted by the non-aligned countries contain no reference to the importance of the role of socio-economic transformations in the developing countries. Improvement in the economic situation in the liberated countries is to a significant extent dependent on extending the process of detente in international relations, on achieving general disarmament and on strengthening peace and security.

The non-alignment movement continues to retain its anti-imperialist potential and actively participates in the anti-imperialist struggle. The differences that exist between its members are only to be expected, inasmuch as the dissimilarity between them has grown markedly. There can be no doubt that imperialist forces will take active steps to split the movement and bring considerable pressure to bear upon some of its members. All of which, of course, imposes upon progressive forces in the movement, as the natural allies of the socialist countries in their common struggle against imperialism, the important tasks of maintaining, strengthening and consolidating the non-alignment movement on consistent anti-imperialist lines.

The foreign economic policy of the Soviet Union and the socialist community is designed to cooperate on an intensive scale with the economies of the liberated countries.

For more than 20 years now the Soviet Union and the socialist community have provided disinterested aid to the developing countries. That the assistance is genuinely disinterested can be seen from the fact that state credit is made available at the rate of 2-2.5 per cent a year, while national capital investments in the USSR, especially in the consumer industries, bring in between 12 and 20 per cent annually. Furthermore, the socialist countries now rendering disinterested assistance to the developing countries, have never acted in the role of colonisers, and therefore bear no historical responsibility for the plunder of these countries and their natural riches that has gone on for centuries or for their deprivation and low standard of living. Consequently, the disinterested aid of the socialist community is an expression of the new, socialist nature of international economic relations and the high sense of international duty and solidarity which is possessed only by the socialist world. There is one more important political and economic aspect of this aid: it is provided not as a result of the need to export capital that has not found profitable domestic application through overaccumulation. The growth of national wealth in the USSR and the entire socialist community has a source fundamentally different from that in the industrially developed capitalist world.

The pseudo-scientific concept of the 'rich North' and the 'poor South' will not stand up to criticism.

The source of Soviet aid does not lie in the superprofits of the international capitalist monopolies that grow rich on neo-colonialist plunder, nor in any superexploitation of its own working class, its own working people. It lies in the wealth created by the labour of the working people, the peasantry and the intelligentsia in a socialist country, whose people deny themselves resources they could well use so as to aid the peoples that are fighting for political and economic independence from imperialism.

The socialist community's disinterested policy of economic aid to the former colonial and semi-colonial countries that have won political independence, state sovereignty and international recognition has played a major, and for some countries (India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Algeria) a decisive role in the building up of their state economies, in the organisation of economic planning, in the development of natural resources and in the training of qualified workers, technicians, engineers and scientists.

Such economically effective forms of aid as technical cooperation under favourable long-term state credits, which are usually

paid for in the goods that are traditionally exported by the country that is in receipt of the credit, have shown themselves to be fully justified. In so far as the socialist countries only provide credit for state-owned projects in the developing countries, the state naturally undertakes all construction work and subsequently operates the enterprise using advanced, effective methods. As a result the state sector of the national economy grows and strengthens from year to year and plays an increasingly greater role in the national economy as a whole, particularly in such basic industries as metallurgy, engineering, energy, oil extraction and oil refining, irrigation, etc.

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the work done jointly by the socialist and developing countries over the last 25 years. The fact that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, despite limitations on their own resources and the need to repair the enormous damage inflicted by the war and undertake the technical reconstruction of their own economies, have come to the aid of the peoples in the liberated countries in their long struggle against centuries of backwardness, is something that only history will fully appreciate. Furthermore, this aid was given under conditions of the bitter political and economic cold war which was waged by the imperialist powers and which drained considerable resources from the socialist countries' economies to maintain their defence capabilities.

The political, economic, diplomatic and military aid of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community to the developing countries has played a decisive role in helping to form and strengthen the international position of that large group of independent young national states which have shed neo-colonial bondage and have upheld their integrity and independence.

Today it can be said that the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa, which have achieved independence after the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism and as a result of the collapse of the colonial system which followed it, have successfully passed the first and most difficult stage of establishing their own statehood.

For each of these countries the future development of its national economy, the formation of its own industrial and technical base, and which is particularly important, its increasing degree of economic independence from the world capitalist market with its prolonged destructive crises are now directly linked, to a hitherto unprecedented extent, with the position it occupies in the international social division of labour. And this is determined

by its connections not only with the world capitalist market, of which it still remains a part, but also with the world socialist market, of which it is not yet a member, but with which it has connections that are increasingly growing.

Whereas in the past appeal for technical aid and state credits to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries has to a large extent helped the developing countries avoid slavish dependence on the imperialist international monopolies, today the most important question is with which world socio-economic system and which world market are to cooperate the new projects, new productive capacities, new lines of production, and the two thousand or more industrial, energy, mining, processing, transport and agricultural enterprises that have already been built with the aid of the socialist countries and the approximately similar number that are in the process of design or construction. The answer to this will have enormous influence on future economic development in the liberated countries.

It is a matter of whether the new industrial production capacities, which have been built with the help of the socialist countries, are henceforth to become part of the system of the international capitalist division of labour with all that this entails, or whether when they come fully into operation they are to enter into exchange and cooperation with the world socialist system of social division of labour and thereby be guaranteed greater stability, independence and planned development. We repeat, the answer to this is of vital importance.

We can say that aid to the developing countries in the traditional forms of mutually advantageous cooperation on the basis of state credits has proved itself to be indisputably viable. But experience shows the need to improve forms of economic cooperation so that projects built in the developing countries under the system of productive ties with corresponding industries in the socialist countries should cooperate on voluntary and mutually advantageous terms with the economic system of the socialist world. Such cooperation would strengthen and increase mutual economic ties, develop production technology, promote more effective economic management and set the whole system of credit relations on a sounder footing. Repaying credits in goods that are the traditional exports of a given developing country will long remain the most important form of compensation. But when a particular project, which has been built in a developing country, or is still on the drawing-board, is linked up with the economy of the socialist world, repayment for equipment, building and ser-

vices can be partially made in the goods produced by that particular enterprise. And this would enhance coordination between enterprises and industries in the developing countries and the economies of the socialist countries.

All the evidence goes to show that the last quarter of the 20th century will see an intensive struggle by the developing countries to reduce their economic and technical dependence on the developed capitalist countries and thereby attain complete national independence. It is possible that this struggle will even continue on into the first decade of the 21st century. It will be characterised by the desire of the liberated peoples to achieve decisive results in doing away with backwardness and catching up economically and technically first with the moderately developed agrarian-industrial countries and then with the industrial-agrarian countries.

We can predict that such a complex issue, which is one of the most vital questions of our time, will give rise to bitter struggle between the liberated countries and the forces of imperialism and will be accompanied by intense international conflicts. There can be no doubt as to the anti-imperialist and progressive nature of this struggle, nor as to the fact that the liberated countries with the help of the socialist world will achieve their goals. And it is quite clear that the final solution to the question of how to get rid of centuries of economic, technical and cultural backwardness among the former colonial peoples that account for more than half of the world's population and bring them up to the level of the sufficiently and highly developed countries, will be found only by means of transition to socialism and, in the final analysis, together with the victory of socialism on a world scale.

Only socialism can bring the former colonial peoples complete national and social liberation.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and the socialist community are well aware of the tremendous difficulties which face the liberated countries on their long and hard path to overcome centuries of backwardness. The Soviet Union has consistently striven to do away with all forms of national oppression, political diktat, economic discrimination and rapacious exploitation that have dominated international relations foisted on the developing countries by the imperialists. Important successes have been achieved, but the struggle continues.

THE COUNTRIES OF SOCIALIST ORIENTATION

The part played by those countries that liberated themselves from colonial dependence continues to be of increasing importance in the modern world. Now that they have gained political independence, they have real possibilities for choosing a path of social and political development and bringing their influence to bear on the solution of international problems.

But the mere proclamation of national state sovereignty does not, as Marxists-Leninists have always maintained, automatically lead to the solution of the complex socio-economic problems that have been left by the past era of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The burden of backwardness still lies heavy on many countries in Asia and Africa.

More than ever before the Afro-Asian world today is separated on class, rather than national, principles. The countries of these continents are divided into the forces of social progress, peace and freedom, on the one hand, and those of imperialism, reaction, racism and war, on the other. This complex process of division of the class forces and the growth of the class struggle in the liberated countries appears differently in different parts of the world. New and progressive shifts have taken place in the economic and political life of those Arab, African and Asian countries that have chosen the path of socialist orientation. On the other hand, there are countries where development has continued along capitalist lines. The distinction is making itself increasingly felt in both Asiatic and African countries. Furthermore, this rapid differentia-

tion and regrouping of class, political forces is taking place both within the various countries themselves and between them. But the problems still remain the same: combatting imperialism, overcoming exploitation by the international monopolies and securing peace, genuine national independence and social progress. And these problems are inseparably linked with the internal politics, with the choice of social orientation, with the domestic and foreign policies and with the development of the whole social system of these countries.

In certain countries there has been an increasing tendency to strengthen ties with their former metropolises. Internally they are supported by local neo-colonialist and bourgeois elements, who appear under the flag of national reformism and conceal themselves behind slogans of national, and in recent times 'democratic socialism'. Essentially they support domination by the bourgeoisie and the pro-bourgeois classes and strata, who exploit the national liberation struggle for their own interests. They try to achieve progress by means of capitalist modernisation and in this way tie themselves fully to world capitalist economy which facilitates the penetration of the international monopolies and increases their own economic dependence. Capitalist corruption and the parasitic use of foreign 'aid' are important levers in their power. Furthermore, this rapprochement with the developed capitalist countries has been accompanied by a propaganda campaign of distrust in world socialism which has had the effect of weakening the Afro-Asian peoples in their struggle against the giants of world capitalist economy that continue to exploit their labour and raw material resources.

But other developing countries—and their number is continually increasing—have adopted a policy for continuing a resolute and uncompromising struggle against imperialism, the monopolies and neo-colonialism while at the same time supporting genuine national, including economic, independence. This policy naturally has led, on the one hand, to a closer rapprochement with the socialist countries, and, on the other, to the curtailing and weakening of the forces of internal reaction and exploitation that support imperialism. In other words, it has led to socialist orientation.

World socialism consistently strives to strengthen and develop its relations with all the developing countries, while at the same time encouraging and supporting their anti-imperialist potential. But primarily it deepens and widens its ties with the socialist-orientated countries, seeing them not only as allies in the struggle

against imperialism, but as promoters of the social progress akin to socialism.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev noted that there is a large group of Arab, African and Asian countries today that are following the path of socialist orientation—countries which, though not yet socialist, have rejected capitalism as a system and in which radical transformations have taken place that are capable of facilitating and accelerating a possible transition to socialism. The countries implement an anti-imperialist policy of peace and security, democracy and social progress and form the vanguard of the national liberation movement today.

Over the years since the idea was advanced by the international communist movement of a national-democratic state as a form of non-capitalist development for the Afro-Asian countries (during the early sixties) socialist orientation, or, what amounts to the same thing, the non-capitalist path of development, has unquestionably ceased to be merely a theoretical hypothesis. It already has a twenty-year history behind it. But the degree of advancement among the socialist-oriented countries along the road of social progress has been varied. The countries which have long undergone deep social transformations include the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, the Republic of Guinea, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the United Republic of Tanzania. The countries which have adopted a path of socialist orientation comparatively recently include the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique, Socialist Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

This new form of progressive social development has tremendous appeal. The number of developing countries that have chosen socialist orientation is growing, and recently they were joined by Afghanistan. In these countries the political regimes are stabilising, important successes are being achieved in the sphere of economics and education, anti-feudal, democratic agrarian reforms are being carried out and progressive labour legislation introduced.

If we take the totality of economic, social and political factors as the criterion of the effectiveness of socialist orientation, then its positive results are plainly apparent. Socialist orientation in 20 years has become an historically objective reality, an integral

part of the world revolutionary process and the vanguard of the national liberation movement.

On the other hand, during this same period a number of countries—Egypt, for example—have been interrupted in their non-capitalist development as a result of betrayal by the ruling circles of the anti-imperialist struggle and the people's interest. These setbacks and partial losses have been greatly relished by the opponents of socialist orientation who try to show that it is not a feasible policy. But doubts can only be entertained by those whose understanding of recent events and the concept advanced by the international communist movement is oversimplified and one-sided, who are inclined to identify socialist orientation with socialist revolution or with the well-known historical experience of Soviet Central Asia and the Mongolian People's Republic where the intervening stage of developed capitalism was bypassed in conditions that were more favourable for the establishment of socialism.

The transition to socialism without the intervening stage of developed capitalism was most reliably achieved within the Soviet socialist state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the European and Asian North of the RSFSR and within the people's democratic states (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Republic of Cuba during the early years of their existence, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic).

Socialist orientation today is implemented within the national-democratic state. A similar phenomenon was observed in the Mongolian People's Republic until 1940, where after a lengthy period of internal differentiation national democracy acquired a consistently Marxist-Leninist character and received all-round support and material aid from the USSR where the socialist revolution had been victorious and therefore could be protected from the influence of world capitalist economy.

But conditions similar to these have so far not occurred in their totality in any of the socialist-orientated Afro-Asian countries. For a variety of radically important reasons these countries have not yet been able to rid themselves of their dependence on the world capitalist economic system, in which their own economies have in many cases been an integral though peripheral part for centuries. Though strengthening their economic ties with the socialist states and using them as an important lever in their struggle to review their dependent relations with the capitalist world, the socialist-orientated countries nevertheless remain

today deeply involved with the international capitalist market and, in circumstances where a monoculture is predominant, extremely dependent on it.

As distinct from the earlier examples of nations that avoided the intervening stage of developed capitalism by completing this process within the framework of the proletarian state of the USSR (during the twenties and thirties) and under the guidance of a Marxist-Leninist party, socialist orientation today in the nearly 15 countries of Asia and Africa is carried out under the guidance of revolutionary national-democratic parties, which are variously placed in their approximation to scientific socialism. These parties reflect the interests of broad sections of the working people and the exploited masses, but also to a certain extent those of the intermediate strata. But new developments have recently been observed in countries like Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Afghanistan, etc., where the leading role of the working class has been officially proclaimed and the ruling parties of these countries have announced their adherence to the ideology of scientific socialism. Official statements of this kind are deeply significant politically, because there is as yet no fully formed working class in these countries, and indicate the early possibility of these countries joining the international working-class movement and their growing closer to the international communist movement.

In their aspirations revolutionary national democrats are convinced socialists, but in many cases their consciousness is affected by the contradictions, weak differentiation in the social structure, the predominance of petty-bourgeois, peasant elements, the comparative independence of the middle strata (the background from which most of the political leaders and administration in the developing countries come) and the influence of nationalist ideology.

Are realistic steps towards socialism feasible under such complex and contradictory conditions? The answer to this must, of course, be in the affirmative. But having said this, it must at the same time be clearly understood that although capitalism as a symbol of foreign domination has been discredited in the overwhelming majority of former colonial countries the conditions for an immediate achievement of a socialist revolution do not yet exist and that therefore we can only speak of a totality of measures orientated towards socialism, of the preparations of conditions for socialism, of a pre-socialist, so to speak, stage of historical development. The mere achievement of state sovereignty is

insufficient for the broad tasks of democratising society to be fulfilled, for they can only be achieved at first within the framework of a consistent anti-imperialist, national-democratic state. As for the creation of a genuinely socialist state, this is at present out of the question. Contemporary conditions require initiative on the part of revolutionary forces and their resolute support for anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, anti-monopolistic and to a certain extent anti-capitalist policies. But at present there are still no guarantees that the revolutionary processes that have taken place within the socialist-orientated countries are irreversible. The strong influence of petty-bourgeois ideology on the leadership of the non-proletarian intermediate strata, the weakness of the political and economic system and at times even the absence of a working class, the power of feudal, semi-feudal, tribal and patriarchal traditions, the enormous cultural backwardness and the predominance of the economic influence of the world capitalist market, which at times makes it necessary to adopt policies that are in line with the interests of the multinational monopolies, constitute the real political, economic, social and ideological basis of the changes occurring in the domestic and foreign policies of these countries. All this has been considered in developing the concept of socialist orientation as the non-capitalist path of development. Nor can setback be ruled out as individual countries are forced into retreat instead of advancing along the path of socialism, or get bogged down at a general democratic stage of development, or even succumb to neo-colonialist intrigues.

The laws of social development and the internal and external conditions affecting the developing countries lead to the inevitable conclusion that where there is lack of political consistency on the part of the leadership of a given socialist-orientated country, where it shows nationalist tendencies or undervalues the principles and experience of scientific socialism there can be no guarantees of preparation for the transition to a socialist society. On the contrary, movement may even be retrograde. This approach to the question combines historical optimism, on the one hand, with common sense and critical realism, on the other.

Sometimes socialist orientation is treated as if it were identical with socialism. Such a viewpoint is erroneous and leads to an incorrect evaluation of the national-democratic stage of development, a disregard for its natural limits and internal contradiction, an uncritical attitude to socialist phrasology and a failure to draw a distinction between subjective socialism and scientific socialism. On the other hand, setbacks on the difficult path of

socialist orientation have sometimes led to the equally erroneous view that denies the revolutionary potential of national democracy and the possibility of preparing for socialism under its leadership.

Behind both these views lies a lack of understanding of the specific nature of socialist orientation as a distinctive transitional pre-socialist stage of development in those countries that have embarked upon a path of socialist orientation.

Today, with the benefit not only of theory, but of historical experience we can set out, with a fair degree of completeness, the characteristics of a socialist-orientated state. Such a state will have:

- undergone change in the class composition of its political leadership whereby the national bourgeoisie (containing national-bourgeois and feudal elements) will have lost their monopoly of political power to the more progressive forces, who act in the interests of the broad masses of the people, and will have created a new revolutionary-democratic state with a new state apparatus;

- abolished the political and weakened the economic domination of imperialism and the monopolies;

- set up state and cooperative sectors in the economy and promoted their priority development over the private capitalist sector;

- instituted state regulation and, at a certain stage, limited the private capitalist sector to the extent of nationalising foreign capital or subjecting it to rigorous state control;

- established and developed all-round cooperation with the socialist countries;

- waged an unrelenting war on corruption;

- carried out social transformations in the interests of the people, including such measures as agrarian reforms, the abolition of social privilege, the liquidation of illiteracy, the establishment of equal rights for women and the passing of progressive labour and social legislation, etc.;

- fought against the ideology of imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism and for the establishment of revolutionary-democratic ideology which is historically linked with the world liberation movement and the experience of scientific socialism.

Thus socialist orientation is determined by the domestic and foreign policies of a given state being directed towards anti-impe-

rialist, anti-feudal and, to a certain extent, anti-capitalist transformations, the purpose of which is to create the state-political, social, economic, scientific and technical conditions for a gradual transition to socialism in the future. These transformations are not socialist in character, but they are deeply democratic. Their successful implementation is possible under the leadership of a revolutionary-democratic party that functions on the principles of scientific socialism and the historical experience it has acquired and that stands in the vanguard of political power. A programme of political, social and economic change which is being consistently and thoughtfully implemented can offer the peoples of the socialist-orientated countries the prospect of developing the national-democratic stage of the revolution into the socialist stage.

Recent years have not only provided practical experience in socialist orientation on the examples of a number of countries, but have taught a number of definite lessons.

The incorrectness of a hurried, unprepared 'transition to socialism' through the artificial speeding up of the political and economic processes is now quite apparent. Politics of this kind are not scientifically grounded. They bear the marks of voluntarism and undermine faith in socialism and the possibility of successful socialist orientation, which might pave the way for a gradual transition to socialism.

Simplistic ideas on the transition to socialism must be dispensed with. National democrats must adopt a more correct approach which takes into consideration the comparative length and complexity of the pre-socialist stage with a number of transitional periods.

These conclusions are contained in such documents as the Algiers Charter (1976), the Programme of the Congolese Party of Labour (1972), the Programme of the MPLA—the Workers' Party (1977), the FRELIMO Programme (1976), the Programme of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia (1976) as well as in the constitutions adopted in some of the socialist-orientated countries (e.g. Madagascar in 1975, Algeria in 1976). As a result the countries that have taken the path of socialist orientation in recent years—Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Madagascar and others—have been able to avoid the setbacks suffered by the pioneers of this movement in Ghana, Mali and other countries.

Socialist orientation objectively demands the all-round strengthening of the new state, its popular institutions and its

new economic policy. This implies obligatory consideration of a number of interconnected factors:

—effective political leadership by the vanguard party or alliance of progressive national parties of the state and the domestic and foreign policies.

Many revolutionary democrats support the creation of vanguard parties that are close to the parties of scientific socialism. Adopting the position of scientific socialism at the national-democratic stage of development promotes solidarity among the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata, among all advanced elements of the working people, and among the most consistent anti-imperialist and patriotic forces. But sometimes such a position is officially proclaimed even though there is no social, political or ideological basis for it. It then degenerates into a type of nationalist, would-be socialist orientation (Somalia, for example). The creation of a genuinely vanguard party, orientated towards scientific socialism, in a post-colonial society which is still suffering from extreme social and economic backwardness is a highly complex task. It is of course not just a matter of approving and proclaiming a programme of scientific socialism. It is far more difficult to have a correct understanding of the theory and practice of scientific socialism at all party levels, to be guided by it in its day-to-day activity and build up the social, ideological, political and organisational structure of the vanguard party in conformity with the tasks of leading the majority of the people towards socialism.

—artificially speeding up the transformation of the national-democratic state into a socialist state is futile, for such acceleration shows precisely that the conditions for this transformation have not yet matured. But at the same time it is essential to strengthen the revolutionary-democratic state consistently, gradually break down the old system and create a new state apparatus that is reliable from a class point of view, reorganise the army and the security bodies, particularly the officer corps, and firmly secure socialist orientation from encroachments by reaction at home and abroad, and from counterrevolution;

—the political system of the socialist-orientated state must be provided with an adequate social base, i.e., the role of the masses, and particularly of the working class, proletarian and semi-proletarian elements in the towns and the countryside should be increased. This implies the growth of political self-awareness among the working people as well as a rise in political conscious-

ness and activity, an expansion of political initiative and the formation and strengthening of class organisations among the workers and peasants. Socialist orientation suffered defeats as a result of political coups or betrayal among the rulers, which would be impossible if the working masses really did play a decisive role in political life, as it is claimed they do in the programme and constitutional documents of the national-democratic parties. Turning a national-democratic state from a power, which declares its aim to be promoting the interests of the working people, into a real working people's power relying on their class, political organisations would to a certain extent guarantee the irreversibility of the social progress achieved on the basis of socialist orientation;

—all those political forces and parties that are genuinely anti-imperialist and convinced of the necessity for a socialist orientation, particularly Marxists-Leninists and revolutionary national democrats, must unite in a single front. A long and stable community of interests has sprung up between these groups in the course of the world revolutionary process which has been expressed in the struggle for national independence, progress and the rejection of capitalist in favour of socialist perspectives. Individual differences should not be permitted to interfere with the establishment of an alliance between these groups on the basis of mutual respect for one another's views, ideological and organisational independence at the present time and later on a merger on the basis of a common acceptance of scientific socialism. Marxists-Leninists in Asia and Africa are fully in favour of such a prospect. They extend the hand of friendship and cooperation to all the progressive forces in their countries. And it is becoming clear that the national democrats, who include in their ranks some of the best progressive leaders, ardent supporters of socialist orientation, are gradually coming round to the conviction of the desirability and even inevitability of such an alliance, in so far as both allies are seriously fighting for socialism. Sometimes they do not understand or are unwilling to accept everything in scientific socialism, but at the given stage of the revolutionary process this should not be an insurmountable obstacle to progressive politics. Later on, at the higher stages of the social liberation revolution a complete acceptance of scientific socialism becomes an imperative requirement essential to the success of socialist orientation and the victory of the chosen course the aim of which is to avoid, by-pass or simply interrupt capitalist development and begin the building of socialism. But distrust and at times even harassment

of Marxists-Leninists which results in depriving them of the opportunity of openly expressing their views or working among the masses casts doubt on the socialist slogans of certain national-democratic parties, undermines the alliance of progressive forces and opens the way to conciliation with reaction and imperialism. *Witch-hunts of Communists, adherents of scientific socialism mean one thing—that socialist orientation has been sacrificed to a narrow and potentially dangerous nationalism.* History, unfortunately, knows several such examples, and they deserve the strongest moral condemnation.

Socialist orientation can only develop successfully given a realistic economic policy. The basis for this is unquestionably the priority development of the state and the cooperative sectors. No one today doubts the possibility of using foreign investments within certain limits or private national capital in the form of medium and small-scale business. Socialist-orientated economics does not rule out foreign or local private investments. But these must come under strict control from the national-democratic state. The difficulty of such economic policy consists in finding the correct combination of economic expediency and effect, material interest of the working people and a principled socialist perspective which would rule out any return to a bourgeois system.

An important aspect of economic policy is the gradual raising of workers' living standards. Without this the ideas of socialism risk losing their appeal for the masses.

The essential condition for the success of socialist orientation is the implementation of democratic national policies involving the elimination of tribalism and the establishment of equal rights and regional autonomy for the peoples and ethnic groups within the framework of a single centralised state.

Socialist orientation in foreign policy is strengthened by expanding political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation with the socialist countries. Distrust of, and particularly enmity towards the socialist world, any inclination towards conciliation with the imperialist powers or insufficiently resolute rebuffs to the intrigues of the neo-colonialists, those latter-day Greeks bearing gifts, are usually the first signs of a retreat from socialist orientation.

Even the negative examples provide useful lessons for understanding the reasons for deviations from this path. An analysis of

those countries where socialist orientation was interrupted—Ghana, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia—shows that the reasons fall, generally speaking, into three groups:

First, there are powerful dependence on the world capitalist economy and its markets and credit, centuries-old backwardness, low level of productive forces, monoculture type of economy and the subversive activity of foreign and home reaction that had not been dealt a timely rebuff.

Secondly, there is the specific contradictoriness of the non-capitalist path of development in contemporary conditions which is connected with the class instability of petty-bourgeois democracy and the pressures exerted on it by the big business and neo-colonialist strata, private enterprise, foreign capital, widespread corruption and the formation of an active neo-compradore bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Thirdly, we have the absence of a strong vanguard party, the subjective mistakes of the leadership, the setting of development targets without consideration of the economic and personnel situation, chauvinist nationalism accompanied by fear of the masses and the inability and unwillingness to cooperate with the other anti-imperialist and progressive forces.

Summing up the experience of a large group of socialist-orientated Afro-Asian countries, it is noticeable that the popularity of socialist orientation continues to grow as is shown by the fact that new Asian and African countries are more and more adopting this course. The socialist tendencies in a number of the countries that have chosen socialist orientation are gradually strengthening and deepening. And behind the process stand the broad masses of the people, the proletariat and semi-proletariat, the advanced sections of the intelligentsia and the left wing of the national-democratic parties, which is on a path of rapprochement with scientific socialism, taking it as the basis of its ideology.

The ways of by-passing capitalism are many and varied as is shown not only in historical retrospect, but also in the present and will be still more varied in the future. Each country has its own distinctive characteristics which determine the socialist orientation of its domestic and foreign policy. The countries that entered this path more recently have the experience of their predecessors to draw upon. These latter have shown great consistency in implementing generally progressive policies, and particularly in their rapprochement with scientific socialism. And strengthening this rapprochement is the fairly general characteristic of present-day revolutionary national democracy in the Afro-Asian countries.

It results in the adoption of programme ideas of a Marxist and near-Marxist complexion containing the definition of a national-democratic state as a state of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, the concept of a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party such as that on the basis of which FRELIMO, the MPLA and the Yemeni Socialist Party are organised as working-class parties, and recognition of the alliance between the workers and peasants. Then there is the formation of a bloc of all progressive classes and strata of the population as the social basis of state power, which has been reflected in the programme documents of Angola, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Benin, and the thesis of the new anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist social essence of the state sector and its leading role in the economy, as included in the constitutions of Algeria, Benin and Mozambique.

Rapprochement with the socialist world can also be seen in the strengthening of all-round ties with the socialist community, in the close interaction with it in international affairs and in the mutual understanding and mutual support between the socialist countries and the socialist-orientated countries over such vital issues as the struggle for peace, security, detente and disarmament, and against colonialism and racism, and the desire to establish a new world economic order.

As we look back over the past and compare the situation in the developing countries today with what it was in the early 1960s when the theoretical work on the present concept of the non-capitalist path of development was first undertaken, a concept which reflects the new progressive correlation of classes and political forces in African and Asian countries, we can draw the conclusion that socialist orientation has become a noticeable and influential factor in the development of these countries, and a real and feasible path of advancement to socialism for peoples of two continents that for centuries have been oppressed by colonialism.

THE GENERAL LAWS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORIENTAL COUNTRIES

The laws of social development which were formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin have universal application. Obviously, at different times and under different conditions they appear in different forms. The way in which these general laws apply specifically to the countries of the East is an important subject for social and political research. Disregard for, or underestimation of, the specific characteristics of the Orient has sometimes led to the social, economic and political processes in the countries of Asia and Africa being identified with those that have taken place in the developed capitalist world. But vulgarisation of this kind is not only a scientific falsification; it can also have negative practical consequences, as reality has shown.

No serious student of the subject can dispute that failure to consider the specific characteristics of the Oriental countries is impermissible. But it is equally and no less dangerously erroneous to identify the specific characteristics of a given law with the law itself. Substituting the particular characteristic for the general law amounts to a negation of that law. Alternatively, there is also the distinct possibility of an occurrence of what Lenin meant when he said: 'The surest way of discrediting and damaging a new political (and not only political) idea is to reduce it to absurdity on the plea of defending it. For any truth, if "overdone"..., if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions.'¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, '“Left-Wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder', *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Moscow, 1966, p. 62.

Furthermore, excessive concentration on the specific characteristics of the Oriental countries can lead to a situation in which a given phenomenon which has no direct analogy in the contemporary capitalist West is for that reason alone considered as something 'specific to the East'. In so far as it is not included in the 'general law' (which is established by comparison with the present situation in, say, Europe), such a 'specific Oriental characteristic' takes on the appearance of a special Oriental law (it is unimportant whether the actual term 'specific' is used or not) and as such provides a basis for a subsequent theoretical construction.

Thus one argument runs as follows. The socio-economic base of the developing countries in Africa and Asia is characterised by the presence of numerous transitional forms, social fragmentation and general complexity in the socio-economic structure. Hence it is possible to speak of qualitatively different (i.e. different from the West) types of social evolution and a specific multi-structural economy, the latter being largely the result of the distorting influence of foreign capital. Thus the main characteristic of society and the economy in the developing countries is the fact that their economy is multi-structural, that is to say, that they have several different types of economy, each with its own relations of production and specific objective economic laws.

Here it should be pointed out that if the existence of various structures is seen as the main characteristic of the essence and at the same time as its (the essence's) specificity, such an approach makes the specificity the essence and establishes the exclusiveness of the East as compared with the West.

A number of works devoted to a study of the peculiarities of socio-economic development in the East note that structures are not separate independent types of economy: they interact and constitute an object in the struggle between the two world social systems. Since over the course of their long evolution not a single structure in the developing countries has reached the formational stage, the inter-formational stage has been prolonged and the multi-structural economy has in certain places gained a specific, relatively stable character.

The multi-structural economy with its numerous transitional forms, social fragmentation and their relatively stable and complicated character actually exist. But these phenomena have existed everywhere. By themselves they certainly cannot be regarded as the 'exclusive peculiarities of the East'. On the contrary they are a general law of social development. During the rise of capitalism

in Europe, which did not prevail until the 19th century, a number of countries, where victorious bourgeois-democratic revolutions had not taken place, had multi-structural societies and social fragmentation as a fairly stable phenomenon. Some of these countries, like the German states, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Romania and Russia, displayed almost the whole spectrum of structures that can be seen today in the East.

Of course, the subsistence economy in these countries was spread less widely than in the present-day East. But, in the first place, even in the East its share is not the same in different countries; secondly, an economy which does not sell its own produce is not always a subsistence economy (if it serves as an additional source of existence for a semi-proletariat—the hired labour, then its most important element, the work force of the 'owner' serves as the object of trade); thirdly, though the subsistence-patriarchal structure has maintained stability in the villages in the East, it is usually noted that it is rather a matter of minute peasant holdings functioning under conditions of the gradual break-up of feudal relations and not of subsistence economies in the full sense of the word. As for foreign capital, though it functioned in the above-mentioned European countries during the 19th century, it never formed a special structure in any one of them. The 'exclusive peculiarities' of the East do not lie in the presence of this structure, but in the variety and relative stability of structures in general and pre-capitalist (patriarchal-subsistence and patriarchal-feudal) structures in particular.

Let us note that it was just this stability of the multi-structural society that made for the complexity of problems facing the proletariat in Europe developing along the capitalist road. Thus if it were not for the multi-structural society, the proletariat would not have had to lead the struggle for bourgeois-democratic transformations. If it were not for the multi-structural society of the pre-capitalist or transitional (to capitalism) type, Marxists would not have had to win over the peasantry to the side of the workers such as it was then in the West and as it is now in the East—i.e. living in a multi-structural society. If it were not for the multi-structural society, the whole of Marxist strategy would amount to the simple formula of 'class against class', the workers against the capitalists. But the whole point is that such a simplistic formula as this, neither in the past (some 45 or 50 years ago) nor in the present, when the intermediate strata of the population are not only stable, but in a number of countries (e.g. in the United

States) are increasing numerically, has ever accorded with the actual situation.

The multi-structural society was done away with in Russia only after the Great October Socialist Revolution, and then not all at once. In those countries of Western Europe where the multi-structural society collapsed—and this occurred by no means everywhere (it still persists in Southern Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece)—the process also took centuries. Even today a 'chemically pure' form of all-embracing capitalism is not to be found anywhere in the world. Metayage and peonage continues to flourish in the North American cotton belt.

Even in those European countries where the bourgeois revolution was victorious, the multi-structural society remained for a fairly long period. Take France, the country that underwent the most decisive bourgeois revolution. Here small-commodity, small capitalist, capitalist proper and state-capitalist structures went to form the state-monopoly capitalist system.

So far we have only considered the period when capitalism was first the leading structure and then the dominant one. If we turn to earlier periods in European history we see that the capitalist structure in, for example, the Italian states, existed for centuries alongside small-commodity and patriarchal structures. A similar situation obtained in many other European countries. In other words, the absence of many structures was the exception rather than the rule even in Europe. Europe developed passing from one socio-economic formation to the next and therein gave rise to new structures which existed alongside the old for a fairly long time, forming that same 'mosaic' pattern which is sometimes called today a specific characteristic of the East.

The history of the East shows that this 'mosaic' pattern, however long the combination of various social and economic structures has been in existence, is itself the result of tremendously accelerated development, particularly that of capitalism.

A definite feature of social and economic development in the East has been the accelerating and at the same time distorting role of the world capitalist economy, of which Oriental society became an integral part when capitalism entered its imperialist stage. But again, this is not a specific characteristic of the East; it is a specific characteristic of the present stage of world development. The specific characteristics of Oriental society in our view lie in the particularly stagnant character of its feudalism and the occasionally relatively progressive and occasionally reactionary influence of its various religions—Confucianism, Buddh-

ism, Islam and many others. But here we are not treating what does constitute the specific characteristics of the East, but what does not.

Strictly speaking, the whole world capitalist system including the developing countries (but not only these latter) should be seen as a set of economic 'structures' in a complex process of interaction. In relation to such a country as Italy, for example, this set will be large and will include various structures. On the other hand, even a highly-developed capitalist country like the FRG has within its state-monopoly capitalist system structures that are private monopoly, private capitalist, small capitalist and even small commodity, although it has no pre-bourgeois structures. Compiling such 'sets', of course, adds nothing to our understanding of the real specific characteristics of a given region or country, for the existence of a particular combination of structures (whatever it may consist of) is, in the first place, an obvious fact, and, secondly, requires explanation itself. Bourgeois sociological and economic literature, from before Marx to Galbraith, states the existence of numerous 'economic orders' and describes their interaction. As was noted above, Marxists have always considered the existence of various structures in their analysis of developments taking place within a given country or region, although the bourgeois vulgarisers of Marxism ascribe to them the claim that the population of the world consists only of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and is a purely antagonistic society (existing on the 'class against class' principle) which the scheme of the class struggle fits perfectly.

This brings us to the question of how to apply Lenin's approach to the problem of structures in Russia to the situation in the East.

In his work entitled 'The Tax in Kind' (1921) Lenin considered it necessary to quote a large extract from his article, "Left-Wing" Childishness and the Petty-bourgeois Mentality' which was published in May 1918. Now, after the victory in the civil war the practical question again arose of how to accomplish the transition to socialism. It was in this connection that Lenin quoted this extract where the existence in Russia of various socio-economic structures is noted.¹ This is not just mentioning the fact; it was necessary to establish the optimal way of transition to socialism and to assert that the leading economic structure was the dominant one and could displace all others. And it was precisely this answer to the question that was of decisive signifi-

cance for Lenin—the leading structure was the socialist structure. Once the proletarian revolution had been completed there began a period of transition from capitalism to socialism and this was the result of the working-class party's scientific application of the objective historical trend of changing socio-economic formations. Consequently Lenin was treating the theme of socio-economic structures not so as to disregard the question of *formations*, but to determine which was the leading structure that had the potential of developing into a socio-economic formation.

Right from the outset of his theoretical and practical work on this question Lenin rejected any approach to the problem which disregarded this matter. His main conclusion, which was made on the basis of the concrete situation obtaining in Russia at the time, consisted in the following: Marx was right to maintain that it was impossible to stop the development of capitalism once it had started (let us remember that the world socialist system was not yet in existence), while the Narodniks were wrong in believing that the specific characteristics of Russia made it possible to 'check capitalism' and that non-capitalist structures had a future. The Narodniks limited themselves to stating the presence of many economic structures using only formal characteristics as their criteria.

There existed in Russia not one but several economic structures. Evaluating their potential, Lenin reasoned thus: to say that 'Russian capitalism is confined to one and a half million workers' is 'childish'.¹ What the Narodniks call 'small-scale people's industry' cannot be opposed to capitalist industry for it works for the market and is a form of enslaving labour to capital. Large-scale capitalism grows out of 'people's industry' and is its direct continuation. 'As a matter of fact,' Lenin emphasised, 'the important thing here is not the absolute figures, but the *relations* they disclose, relations which are bourgeois in essence and which do not cease to be such whether their bourgeois character is strongly or weakly marked.'² The accumulation of capital by one producer and the ruin of another might be insignificant, but it leads to harsher and more cruel forms of exploitation, while the character of production relations³ remains the same. The Russian peasant

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats', *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1963, p. 195.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.

³ Production relations are the totality of economic relations which arise between people in the process of production, exchange, distribution and

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 32, Moscow, 1965, p. 330.

and the Russian artisan live in a commodity economy which inevitably produces a capitalist economy. Market fragmentation and backwardness of the countryside make 'bourgeois differentiation'¹ particularly pronounced.

In 1894, then, the existence of various structures was an obvious fact both for Lenin and the Narodniks. But the Narodniks limited themselves to merely pointing this out, while Lenin was concerned to determine which was the leading structure and which particular structure was 'favoured' by the main socio-economic tendency. His conclusion was that the capitalist structure was the leading one, though it was not dominant as regards its share in the social product or the number of producers engaged in it. By this Lenin had put forward the Marxist thesis of the leading structure within a multi-structural socio-economic framework. And without that thesis, the mere assertion of the existence of a multi-structural society is nothing more than a statement of the obvious. After the Revolution Lenin used exactly the same approach. Accepting that Russia was a multi-structural country and that small-scale production was still predominant, Lenin saw that now the socialist structure was the leading one and the political power of the proletariat ought henceforth to determine the optimal strategy for making it prevail.

In their studies of the East some writers are often inclined to limit themselves to listing the various structures in existence there, pointing out their close interconnection and noting that their variety is in all probability even greater than it was in Russia, that they are combined differently in the East and that a certain correlation between certain of them constitutes the essence of a given transitional period. This kind of interpretation is usually employed to support the thesis that in the course of their long evolution not a single structure has achieved the formational stage, i.e. prevailed over the other structures, with the result that the 'inter-formational stage' of social development in the young states has been unduly prolonged. But this is just the same type of argument that Lenin's opponents were putting forward with reference to Russia: capitalism had not yet dominated the other structures, they existed and accounted for a greater share of the Russian economy than capitalism, with the result that it had not

consumption of material goods irrespective of their conscious will. The character of production relations is determined by who owns the means of production and how they are connected with the producers.—Ed.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 235.

yet reached the formational stage and so it was possible for Russia to remain at the pre-capitalist, 'people's' stage. (We should note in passing that on the basis of an analysis of the laws of world capitalism and world socialism Lenin had established that it was possible for the backward countries to choose the non-capitalist path of development, but this has nothing in common with the utopian ideas of the Narodniks that capitalism could be arrested by 'the people's economy', by which a small-commodity economy was meant.) By omitting Lenin's main conclusion on the leading structure which he arrived at in his analysis of the multi-structural society in Russia, and attempting to apply the distorted theory to the East one must inevitably draw the false conclusion that none of the structures there is formational, that not one of them is leading and may transform society on its basis.

The fact that Lenin considered capitalism to be the leading structure in Russia was of tremendous significance in the formation of his theory and strategy. It was from the fact that 'the exploitation of the working people in Russia is *everywhere capitalist in nature*, if we leave out of account the moribund remnants of serf economy'¹ (and these remnants were so many that their elimination required a socialist revolution!—R.U.) that Lenin drew the remarkable conclusion that the Russian worker was the natural representative of the working people and the whole exploited population of Russia. And it was this conclusion that led him to appeal to the Russian worker to arise and lead all the forces of democracy to overthrow absolutism and bring about a revolution. Later it was on the conclusion that capitalism was the leading structure and that in this sense Russian society was already bourgeois, that Lenin determined the relationship between revolutionary social-democracy and the mass of the peasants who were both landowners and workers at the same time and constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. Lenin reasoned thus: in whatever structure the commodity producer functions—whether he brings his goods to the market, whether he is directly dependent on a small-scale capitalist buyer (and is thus part of the small capitalist structure) or whether he sells his labour to a factory-owner while retaining his own small economy (and consequently being part of the capitalist structure)—if he works for the market, he is essentially a member of bourgeois society and all these small-commodity producers

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats', *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 299.

together constitute a class of bourgeois society. For this reason Lenin defined them—both peasant and artisan—as petty bourgeois, as owners and workers at the same time, as a class with a dual social nature.

The fact that capital ruins small-scale production and stratifies the small owners into capitalists and hired labourers was already well known to Marxists. Lenin was not trying to reveal this phenomenon anew. In just the same way, when he characterised the Russian small-commodity producer as a petty bourgeois, he had not yet begun to consider the question of which side was the dominant one—the worker-socialist or the bourgeois. This was left for a later analysis. This is natural, because the predominance of one or the other side depends on many circumstances—on the degree of departure from peasant ideology, the force of tradition, the locality, the power of the working class, and the degree of poverty (which could be sharply intensified through, for example, a war). In 1917-1918 the Russian petty bourgeoisie repeatedly showed the prevalence of one side and then the other in turn. The essence of Lenin's new understanding of the problem, which he arrived at in the late 19th century, consisted in the following: if capitalism is the leading structure in society even though it is not yet dominant, then the mass of small-commodity producers, which remains as it has always been, can only act in conformity with the general laws of capitalism. It is not necessary that capitalism should have become the dominant structure, much less dominant everywhere. This conclusion was something entirely new and required the analysis of a society in which capitalism was only in the process of development. (Marx, of course, did not carry out an analysis on such a scale as this in his *Capital*, having a totally different object in mind. But Lenin's conclusion has direct relevance for the present situation in the multi-structural East.¹)

How did this conclusion affect Lenin's later work? If, under the conditions when the capitalist structure is the leading, though not yet prevailing one, the mass of small-commodity producers is to a greater or lesser degree the eroding class of bourgeois society, then it follows that 1) on the whole their interests lie in eliminating all means of exploitation other than bourgeois and in doing away with the remnants of feudalism (this in the final analysis is

true of the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie which is gradually becoming the bourgeois exploiter and which is shackled by the vestiges of feudalism); 2) however much the Russian peasantry were tied up with the vestiges of feudalism, they still remained the most powerful force of the petty-bourgeois class in bourgeois society; 3) the interests of the workers and the peasants coincide in so far as the peasantry (and also the petty bourgeoisie as a whole) have an interest in overthrowing absolutism and doing away with the remnants of feudalism and also in so far as it is the exploited (in a bourgeois way), the overwhelming, the working mass of the peasantry and not the exploiting (in a bourgeois way) section of them that are objectively interested in the collapse of the bourgeois system. These conclusions form the basis for an effective working-class party policy that is aimed at winning over the peasantry as an ally in the bourgeois revolution, and its poorest strata, which represent by far its overwhelming majority not yet turned into proletarians, as an ally in the socialist revolution. There is a direct link between Lenin's thesis on the importance of the leading structure and the strategy for turning the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

Those who see the specific characteristics of the East as of paramount importance argue thus: the small-commodity producer, the petty bourgeois operates within the commodity economy and whereas this means that the mass of the population in the East are petty-bourgeois, it does not follow that in this society capitalism is the leading structure and therefore the society is bourgeois.

Let us return once more to Lenin's polemic with the Narodniks. The whole point was that the latter could not see the relevance to the situation in Russia of the fact that a commodity economy and a money economy are a capitalist economy. This idea Lenin had occasion to repeat many times. He drew attention to the fact that 'the "people's system" consists of the very same capitalist production relations, although in an undeveloped, embryonic state',¹ that under the given economic system the independent economy of the peasant and the artisan is petty-bourgeois, and that only in capitalist production the commodity form of labour becomes general and not exclusive, not single, not fortuitous. Lenin also pointed out the 'second feature of capitalism'—the fact that 'human labour-power... assumes the form of a commodity'—on

¹ We have dealt here in some detail with material that relates to Russia, not in order to identify Russian conditions of development with those in the Orient, but in order to show Lenin's approach and methods in the study of these sociological problems.

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats', p. 214.

the assumption that the first feature inevitably leads to the second; and also the fact that retaining a 'peasant semi-natural economy' 'neither in the West nor Russia does ... away with either the predominance of commodity production, or the subordination of the overwhelming majority of the producers to capital: before this subordination reaches the highest, peak level of development, it passes through many stages that are usually ignored by the Narodniks despite the very precise explanation given by Marx'.¹

How then are we to understand Lenin's words in this context when he said: 'A small producer, operating under a system of commodity economy—these are the two features of the concept "petty-bourgeois", Kleinbürger, or what is the same thing, the Russian *meshchanin*'. Lenin, of course, includes here both the peasant and the handicraftsman, explaining that to a certain extent Narodism was a 'well-knit doctrine in a period when capitalism was still very feebly developed in Russia, when nothing of the petty-bourgeois character of peasant economy had yet been revealed'.² It is quite clear that according to Lenin the peasant, who is the worker in feudal society, gradually becomes a petty bourgeois as capitalism develops and becomes the leading structure and as the peasantry becomes a class in the new bourgeois society. Lenin's main idea is that a commodity-money economy gives rise to capitalism. To suggest anything else is sheer utopia. That the peasant, while remaining a worker, becomes a petty bourgeois and part of the bourgeois system is explained by the fact that a small-commodity economy inevitably gives rise to capitalism. In other words, the very existence of a commodity-money economy is sufficient for the peasant and the artisan, while remaining workers, to become petty-bourgeois, for it is this type of economy which brings about bourgeois society. The above formulation shows that the petty bourgeoisie is a distinct class in bourgeois society, that becomes such during the development of capitalism as the leading structure, and is not a social group that is linked with a simple commodity economy.

According to Lenin, the petty bourgeoisie is formed of various social groups which originate from various structures, but in bourgeois society forms a distinct class. The whole of Lenin's analysis shows that the appearance of this petty-bourgeois con-

glomerate, however broad, varied and backward it might be, can be taken as evidence of the gradual, rapid or delayed development of capitalism into the leading social structure. And this in no way tallies with the idea that in the East no single structure has yet achieved the formational stage.

To complete our analysis of the question we refer to Lenin's conclusion that in the backward countries 'any national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consists of peasants who represent bourgeois-capitalist relationships'.¹ This does not of course mean that Lenin considered the peasants in the East as 'bourgeois-capitalists'. But it does show quite clearly which social relations Lenin considered to be the leading ones in the East. And it also shows that Lenin approached Oriental society (after the formation of the world capitalist economy which had taken control of the colonial countries) as a society formed on a bourgeois basis in the same sense in which he applied the word 'bourgeois' to Russian society in the late 19th century (for all the backwardness of the East). Lenin's formulation is particularly important because it relates directly to the East, to the 'backward countries', the countries with 'pre-capitalist relations'. Moreover it was arrived at in 1920 when bourgeois-capitalist relations had penetrated the peasantry of the East to a far less extent than they have today.

In relation to the petty bourgeoisie in the Oriental countries it would seem possible to say that the big, medium and small entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the petty bourgeoisie, on the other, do not constitute a single class, and that only the most privileged, higher section of the petty bourgeoisie (the owners of small workshops and farms, etc. that employ hired labour) could be considered as part of the bourgeois class and called 'petty bourgeoisie' in the actual sense of the word, while the huge mass of small producers (artisans, small landholders, etc.) can only be considered petty bourgeoisie in the widest sense of the word. Such an argument does not stand up to criticism.

In the Marxist understanding of the term the petty bourgeoisie is a class in bourgeois society, where capitalism functions as the leading structure. The fact that the bourgeoisie proper (i.e. the class that exploits hired labour) and the small producers that operate in the system of a commodity economy do not form a

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'The Economic Criticism of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book', *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 437, 438.

² *Ibid.*, p. 396.

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'The Second Congress of the Communist International', *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 241.

single class, cannot be considered as a specific characteristic of Oriental society. The same could be said of Russia, England, France, Germany and in fact of any other country, where the capitalist structure from the very beginning was not dominant, where capitalism grew out of feudalism, where the classes of bourgeois society were formed as a result of a transformation of the classes of feudal society—i.e. everywhere in the world, except North America, where capitalist relations were at first transplanted from abroad and later developed on their own base.

Of course, if we compare this or that stage of social development with its final result, the difference will be considerable. But such a method of comparison which does not take into account the stage of development can hardly be called scientific. The petty bourgeoisie in the East can and should be considered with regard to their ambiguous nature as a class that gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, even if the vast majority of them do not consist of small capitalists—for after all they are the product of bourgeois society (let us remember that in Russia the small-commodity producer became a petty bourgeois as a result of the transformation of Russian society into a bourgeois society). It is only possible not to consider the vast mass of small owners of the means of production in the East as belonging to the petty bourgeoisie, if instead of being considered as the product of bourgeois social development with capitalism as the leading structure, they are thought of as coming from various social structures, none of which is strong enough to be formational.

This logic of the 'exclusive specifics' of the East leads to one-sided conclusions in regard to the national bourgeoisie in the countries of Asia and Africa. It is claimed, for example, that in those countries where the national bourgeoisie have come to power—and there are supposedly few of them—they are unable to fully determine national policies and have not yet gained complete control of the state, unlike in the West. Furthermore, the weak bourgeoisie in the East itself needs the support of the state as well as that of foreign capital. And this too is supposed to be a specific characteristic of the East.

It is worth noting in this connection that neither in the vast majority of the Western, nor in the Eastern countries did the bourgeoisie come to power alone. Marx, Engels and Lenin wrote, for example, about the power of the bourgeoisie in Germany which they characterised as a bourgeois-Junkers state (we will leave aside the question of just how many structures there were in the German village that developed along the Prussian road and

that was the base of the Junkers' power). Thus once we establish the difference between coming to power and coming to power alone, we see that in the East the bourgeoisie in fact came to power in quite a few countries. In the majority of Eastern states it was the national bourgeoisie (usually in some combination with the other classes) that came to power as a result of the victory of a national liberation revolution. But there were also many Eastern countries where the bourgeoisie came to power without any national liberation revolution. In different combinations with other classes the bourgeoisie is in power in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and many African countries, and elsewhere.

In the West it took a fairly lengthy period of struggle before the bourgeoisie could gain control of the state. But the bourgeoisie was not strong enough for this by its very nature alone, it had to become strong enough. In bourgeois England the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the landed gentry went on for many decades, until the former had 'absorbed' the latter. In Germany monopoly capital had for a long time to share its power with the big landowners. In Austria-Hungary the bourgeoisie never succeeded in gaining complete control of the state, since the landed aristocracy were too strong. As for the state providing support for the bourgeoisie, this too is not a specific characteristic of the Afro-Asian countries. The specific characteristics are something different—they are the forms and methods in which the state aids the bourgeoisie and bourgeois development and, of course, the role played by foreign capital.

The history of the West European countries gives no grounds for the conclusion that the bourgeoisie in the West arose as a powerful class, so powerful that it did not require the support of the state. Without the Tudor legislation, the English bourgeoisie could never have begun the process of primitive accumulation of capital so early and so effectively. The absolutist state played a tremendous role in the development of the French bourgeoisie. As for the German bourgeoisie, it could never have made such a gigantic leap forward in the late 19th century from a weak social grouping to a monopolistic leviathan, had it not had the support of the state which at first was not even a bourgeois state.

To continue our analysis of the question (in relation to the role and prospects for the national bourgeoisie) as to what constitutes the specific characteristics of the Asian and African countries, we should consider first of all the very real possibilities that exist for preventing the growth of the bourgeoisie at a comparatively early

stage of its development, a stage which was long past in the West. This possibility has come about as the result of the existence today of an anti-capitalist alternative. But, strictly speaking, such an alternative is far from being a distinctive characteristic of the East conditioned by its specific nature. It is rather a specific characteristic of the present stage of world development, which happens to have made its appearance largely in the East. It is also a specific characteristic of the manifestation of the law of uneven development under imperialism in conditions of the struggle between two world systems.

In turning to the problems of non-capitalist development, attention must be drawn to the following. Marx and Engels showed the possibility of non-capitalist development, and Lenin developed this idea in relation to the new era. Their conclusions have tremendous methodological value and practical relevance, for we can now say that non-capitalist development has become a real possibility and that a qualitatively new stage in the development of revolutionary democracy has begun. The world situation has changed radically and this has not only brought about circumstances in which non-proletarian, non-Marxist revolutionary-democratic aspirations and ideology incline, in the final analysis, to favour socialist transformations to a much greater extent than was possible in the late 19th or early 20th century. It has also led to significant changes in the revolutionary-democratic ideologies themselves, which now borrow many of the theses of scientific socialism. The peculiarities of the Afro-Asian continent and particularly the fact that as a result of the historical conditions, i.e. colonial exploitation, this region held a subsidiary peripheral position in the colonial system have largely served to hinder the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology there. But a definite rapprochement with scientific socialism has taken place and this is the result not so much of developments in the East as of those throughout the whole world.

Turning now to the question of Populist ideology in contemporary conditions, we would note that if it had remained as it was formerly, i.e. without borrowing some of the principles of scientific socialism, it would long have been absorbed by bourgeois ideology. Whole layers of Populist ideology have in fact undergone such a negative evolution now, and before the October Revolution this tended to be the general rule. The 'Friends of the People', about whom Lenin wrote, at the end of the 19th century became liberals, in so far as they abandoned their revolutionary principles, while the socialist-revolutionaries, who had once

constituted a revolutionary-democratic party, finally ended up defending the landowning bourgeoisie, which had been overthrown in 1917. It remains to be seen how far the 'non-Marxist socialist systems' of today differ from the Populists of the past.

Populism in Russia (Narodism) was a combination of bourgeois-democratic aspirations and anti-capitalist demands. Of course, the main demands of the Narodniks—the creation in Russia of a kind of socialism that did not require a capitalist base—were anti-capitalist, but they were at the same time highly unrealistic. Objectively the content of Narodnik demands amounted to a call for radical bourgeois-democratic transformations and, as Lenin pointed out, contained not a grain of socialism. The anti-capitalist elements in their ideology were only a cover for bourgeois-democratic orientation and nothing more. They acquired a socialist content only when they were implemented under the leadership of the proletariat and its party.

Of course, Narodnik-peasant anti-capitalism was a natural phenomenon, but the millions that took up the struggle exaggerated the significance of possible victory. In an article entitled 'Two Utopias', Lenin contrasted the utopia of the liberals with that of the Narodniks and the Labour Group,¹ who stood for a 'just division of the land'. He emphasised that the Narodnik utopia amounted to 'a highly consistent and thoroughgoing capitalist measure with regard to the agrarian question in Russia' and that 'when the issue of economic emancipation becomes as close, immediate and burning for Russia as the issue of political emancipation is today, the utopia of the Narodniks will prove *no less* harmful than that of the liberals'.² Lenin claimed that the utopia of the Narodniks corrupted the democratic consciousness of the masses. But its most important element—the bourgeois-democratic desire to share the land and the peasants' desire to farm the land freely—helped the Bolsheviks to form a united front of the revolutionary forces, lead them to victory in the October Revolution and defend its gains against the counter-revolution organised by the bourgeoisie and landowners. But at the same time this important element was opposed to socialist co-operation in the villages. As Lenin predicted, the Narodnik utopia turned out to be 'harmful'. But the ideology and politics of the working class was able to overcome this utopia, which was

¹ The Labour Group (*trudoviki*) were a petty-bourgeois political faction in the Russian State Duma. Formed in 1906, they broke up soon after the 1917 October Revolution.—Ed.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 355, 356, 357.

against the interests of the working peasants, and overcame it with the help of their mass active support. The working class in Russia showed the peasantry how to achieve liberation (for which it had to renounce its Narodnik aspirations) and led it in the struggle for socialist goals, while the Narodnik utopia of the Russian peasantry, essentially bourgeois-democratic in content, was an obstacle in the way of that struggle.

There is no need to make a thorough analysis of Russian Populism of the past in order to estimate the opportunities of the Populism of the present day. But when tackling this question one must take into consideration the elements of socialist orientation that characterise the evolution of present-day Populism in alliance with world socialism and the international working-class movement and the influence which the world-wide alliance of Marxism-Leninism and the liberation movement exerts upon it.

Lenin's theories on non-capitalist development were worked out in 1920. But already previously he had formulated his concept of the possibility for backward, dependent peasant countries to avoid the capitalist stage. He stressed that 'as a result of the (last) imperialist war ... the East, India, China, etc. have been (completely) jolted out of the rut ... their development has definitely shifted to general European capitalist lines'.¹

Thus Lenin clearly and unambiguously stated that capitalism was already the leading socio-economic structure in the East. Not that this meant he considered such development would inevitably result in the capitalist system becoming dominant there. On the contrary he showed that departure from the path of capitalist development was possible, and possible precisely because this development on a world scale had created the objective conditions for the victory of the proletarian revolution in a large Eurasian country, a country which stood at the crossroads of two continents. When in the above quotation Lenin used the word 'definitely', he was using it in the sense that capitalist orientation in the late 19th-century Russia was 'definite'. 'Definite' in the sense that the countries of the East had been drawn into a process that could only lead to the crisis of capitalism on a world scale. We see the same fundamental principles in Lenin's approach to the problem of capitalist development in the backward countries during the socialist transformation of the world: such development will aid the process of doing away with capitalism on a world or local scale, but it cannot be stopped by pre-capitalist

social relations, since capitalist production relations have already become or are in the process of becoming the leading ones.

In 1923 Lenin was perfectly justified in saying that development in the East had shifted on to general European capitalist lines. The events of the present epoch prove the correctness of Lenin's theory which, we would stress once more, by no means excludes the possibility of non-capitalist development or an interruption of the development of capitalism. To understand the word 'definitely' in Lenin's analysis as meaning the exclusion of non-capitalist development is just as erroneous as to see in it grounds for the renunciation of the socialist revolution. The transition to non-capitalist development and the socialist revolution are various forms of interrupting capitalist development, which naturally assumes rather than excludes such development.

For Lenin one of the most important indicators of the direction of economic development was the percentage of hired labour. Let us consider this all-important criterion (see Table 1).

We can see that the percentage of hired labour among the working population all over the East is very high and undoubtedly exceeds the corresponding indicator for Europe during the early period of manufactories and primitive accumulation of capital. The percentage of hired labour in industry in the developing countries can be as much as 2-4 times higher than the percentage of hired labour in the working population as a whole.

The conclusion is obvious: the huge growth of hired labour, particularly after the two world wars, meant that essentially capitalist productive relations had made deep penetration into all the pre-capitalist structures. And it is the development of capitalism as the leading structure and not some 'inter-formational stage' that gives rise to the conditions and social forces for new breaks in the imperialist chain. The change of formations in the backward Oriental countries, for all their variety, occurred and will occur in the future not by 'putting a brake on capitalism' using pre-capitalist structures, but through the development of capitalism which brings about the struggle between imperialism and socialism.

If the data in the following table, covering 22 developing countries in Asia and Africa, are considered to be sufficiently convincing and relatively typical and if we then extrapolate them to cover all the developing countries on the two continents (Latin America calls for a different approach), then it follows that:

—the majority of developing countries in Asia and Africa can hardly be expected to avoid capitalism completely, i.e. advance along the classical (Mongolian) path of non-capitalist develop-

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'Better Fewer, But Better', *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Moscow, 1966, p. 499.

Table 1

Indicators showing the percentage of hired labour among the working population and in the main industries in the capitalist countries and in the developing countries (second half of the 1960s)

Country	Percentage of hired labour among those employed		
	in the working population as a whole	in agriculture	in industry
Developed capitalist countries			
Britain	90	56	95
United States . .	89	36	96
FRG	81	13	93
France	72	22	91
Japan	60	53	87
Developing countries			
Mauritius	86	90	87
Kuwait	82	75	83
Singapore	73	33	82
Reunion	72	59	87
Lebanon	63	43	86
Sri Lanka	60	55	79
Jordan	55	27	71
Tunisia	53	33	80
Malaysia	50	45	70
Iran	43	25	72
Morocco	35	20	64
The Philippines .	32	14	66
India	30	25	44
Indonesia	28	20	46
Turkey	22	7	64
Ghana	20	10	50
Burma	20	15	33
Gabon	20	7	95
Nepal	16	14	54
Zaire	15	5	70
Thailand	12	3	58
Senegal	10	4	50

ment with the transition to socialism being effected without the capitalist stage. Capitalism in these countries exists and is developing, being implanted by national and foreign capital with the aid of the state; it is growing out of small-commodity production;

—capitalism having made comparatively deep penetration into these countries, an alternative can only be found through an interruption of its development with subsequent socialist orientation in the economy and society so as to cut short or avoid the development and domination of the higher forms of capitalism;

—some 15 countries with a total population of 150 million have started on the non-capitalist path of development. Some, like Ghana, Mali, Egypt and Somalia have deviated, but there are now greater opportunities for breaking or curtailing capitalist development and it is very likely that many new countries in Asia and Africa will choose this path. National-democratic revolutions that proclaim socialist orientation are now an objective possibility for many peoples and countries that are fighting for independence and social progress;

—at the same time the further growth of capitalism in the Afro-Asian countries that have chosen non-socialist orientation, the ever deeper class differentiation in society, the rapid expansion of capitalist industry, the growth of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers, the landowners becoming bourgeois, the vast increase in small and medium-scale capitalist enterprise, the great power of the state-capitalist sector which promotes the development of private capitalism and the first local monopolies—all combine to put numerous difficulties in the path of those countries which are trying to break out of the capitalist orbit. Nevertheless the objective laws of the struggle between the two world social systems over whom the liberated countries are to follow, and their hopeless age-long backwardness maintained by the neo-colonialist policies of the imperialist powers, will help more and more countries in Asia and Africa to break away from capitalism.

Overestimation of the importance of the multi-structural system and the specific features of Oriental society leads to 'confirming' the exclusiveness of the East. In fact if the petty bourgeoisie in the developing countries that have chosen the capitalist path are not the class from which bourgeois society with capitalism as the leading structure is formed (leaving aside the fact that this process can be interrupted by choosing the non-capitalist path), then it follows that the peasantry in the East cannot play essentially the same role that was played by the peasantry in the West when bourgeois society was established there. The central question of

the revolutionary process in Asia and Africa today,' declared Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 'is that of the attitude of the peasantry, which make up a majority of the population.'¹

Sometimes the peasantry of the East are presented as being inert, by which is meant that they hardly take any part in the contemporary socio-political struggle. This seems justified only at first sight. While not doubting that the Oriental peasantry have in general been downtrodden and long-suffering, let us not forget such important historical events in the 19th century as the liberation war in India and the Taiping rebellion in China, the revolution of Kemal Attatürk in Turkey, the Mongolian revolution in 1921, the 1925-1927 revolution in China, the Soviet movement in China and lengthy peasant revolts and national-revolutionary wars in Vietnam—all of which were great peasant movements. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma and the Arab countries the peasantry showed considerable revolutionary activity, particularly after the Second World War and the defeat of fascist Germany and Japan. Gandhism, which played an important role in India's struggle for liberation, relied on the powerful peasant movement, while the Communists in China and Vietnam who were victorious after the Second World War led great peasant wars. The peasantry made an enormous contribution to the victory of the Angolan and Mozambique peoples. True, they were led by other classes, but so were the French peasants who overthrew feudalism in the French Revolution of 1789-1793, and no one would possibly say that they were politically inert or played a minor role in the French Revolution.

Clearly the peasantry in the East from the earliest days of the liberation struggle after the October Revolution in Russia and particularly after the Second World War showed themselves to be a powerful revolutionary force. After the achievement of national independence, the direct revolutionary activity of the peasants in many Asian and African countries, particularly in the form of armed struggle, markedly subsided. We no longer see the peasant wars and major uprisings of the past. But this cannot be explained by inertness as a specific characteristic of the Oriental peasantry. Certain aspirations of the peasantry have been realised, the governments of the national bourgeoisie and the landowners that have become bourgeois have means at their disposal to hold the peasants in check that were not available to the colonisers, and in a number of countries, the reforms that

were won by the masses are being gradually implemented, while in the rest, promises of such reforms have been made. But the fact remains that the peasantry in the East have received only a small fraction of that for which they fought and continue to fight. Therefore so long as remnants of feudalism are alive in the East, the peasantry will continue to be a class possessing tremendous revolutionary potential. Of course, it is the peasant revolutionary spirit, accompanied by its impulsiveness, passivity and many setbacks that are only to be expected in the social and political activity of hundreds of millions of people.

Today the revolutionary activity of the peasantry in a number of countries is expressed in day-to-day mass struggle which is giving tangible results and in the progressive policies of the revolutionary democrats who objectively, and often consciously, express their interests. Far-reaching and rapid stratification is taking place in the countryside. In many Asian and African countries the peasantry has long ceased to be united, its unity destroyed by capitalism. In general the overall social and political influence of the working peasantry on the course of the world revolutionary process in Asia and Africa has grown immensely to reach its present scale. To take one example: if it were not for this tendency, socialist orientation would still be something exceptional. The forces of reaction are afraid of the growth of peasant activity; therefore one of the most important objectives of those who led the right-wing coup in Indonesia and the reactionaries in Egypt has been to suppress and 'hold down' the peasantry, which in these countries can only satisfy their need for land by radical means. The land reforms in Java that offer the peasantry a little land and the curtailed reforms in Egypt that were blocked by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie could not provide land for the tens of millions of peasants, for this would require an agrarian revolution led by a genuinely revolutionary-democratic regime.

The revolutionary movement of the Asian and African peasantry has still to develop its full potential. And this is a matter of historical development and conscious guidance by Communists and revolutionary democrats. It is a task of great proportions which requires many years, and possibly, many decades.

The forms of peasant struggle have changed. At the present stage it is the peaceful forms of class struggle which predominate. But then the forms of revolutionary struggle of the working class have changed too, but no one would try to claim that the West European proletariat is inert simply because there are no uprisings in Europe. Unquestionably the Maoist principle stating that

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The CPSU in the Struggle for Unity of All Revolutionary and Peace Forces*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 73.

the peasantry are the most revolutionary class is fallacious. Maoism even today remains the main opponent of the thesis that the leading role with respect to the peasantry in liberated countries belongs to the international working class and world socialism. But the peasantry cannot be considered 'inert' just because it is not the most revolutionary class. As we have already said the logic of the proposition about the Oriental peasant's inertness may have been determined by the logic of the analysis which takes as its starting point the thesis that the peasantry in the 'specific' East, where the existence of many socio-economic structures supposedly prevents the appearance of a formational structure, cannot play essentially the same role that it did during the rise of the bourgeois societies in the West. Of course, the peasantry in the East today should not be represented as if they resembled the peasantry in France, after the latter had already achieved their bourgeois goals.

Revolutionary democracy in the East obviously has a very important role to play. It can be characterised as an overt and direct bearer of the revolutionary spirit, chiefly of the peasantry, but also of the urban petty bourgeoisie that has been moved to the foreground. But the revolutionary spirit of the urban petty bourgeoisie can hardly be considered one of the basic characteristics that distinguish the Asian and African countries from the Western developed capitalist countries at a similar stage of development. It is hardly true to say that the petty bourgeoisie there played an insignificant or reactionary role. The most radical bourgeois revolution at an analogous period of European history was the French Revolution in the 18th century in which the petty bourgeoisie was a powerful revolutionary force at its culmination; its representatives, the Jacobins, took ruthless steps to do away with the 'old order' and its leaders were giants of revolutionary action. In Holland and England, too, the petty bourgeoisie played an important role. In Italy the similar period terminated at the end of the Risorgimento and the petty bourgeoisie fought fierce revolutionary battles in the 1850s and 1860s. As for Germany, when in 1850 Marx and Engels still thought that the revolutionary movement was on the upsurge, they were of the opinion that the petty bourgeoisie would betray the proletariat in the struggle for socialism. They wrote that in the course of the further development of the revolution the petty-bourgeois democracy in Germany would come to exert a dominant influence for a certain period of time. They outlined the limits of a temporary alliance between it and the proletariat, when the latter was already sufficiently strong.

We have discussed certain aspects of the so-called exclusiveness of the East as compared to the laws of development of the West and drawn the conclusion that the countries of the East, for all their specificity, have developed largely in the same way as the countries of the West at a corresponding historical stage, and that the specific characteristics of the development of the East fully accord with the general socio-economic laws established by Marxism-Leninism.

Let us consider what are often termed the specific characteristics of the East. These are very far-reaching and all-embracing. But it would be erroneous to look for a single 'key' to them and naturally a simplistic scheme of the 'socio-economic structure—class—party' or the 'coalition of socio-economic structures—coalition of classes—coalition of parties' type is totally unsatisfactory. For that matter neither in the East nor in the West had the situation been so simple and clear-cut. We will not therefore try to give a detailed analysis either of the specific characteristic of the East or of the structure of Oriental society but restrict ourselves to treating just a few of their important aspects.

It is beyond dispute that economically speaking the countries of the East have lagged behind Europe, Japan and North America by a whole historical epoch. The brunt of the blame for this must fall upon the shoulders of foreign oppressors who for centuries have saddled these lands with the yoke of colonialism and bled them dry of their vast material resources. But economic backwardness, which is so important that at times it even obscures those particular spheres in which the East has by no means lagged behind the West, is not entirely the result of foreign intervention. This backwardness, the scale and character of which have exercised a significant influence on the social structure of the Eastern countries, has to a certain extent been the result of other factors.

First of all there is the question of traditionalism. The great conservative force of traditions that exist in the social consciousness and economic life of the peoples of Asia and Africa, has become a wall blocking progress and a vast obstacle in the way of advancement. Traditions have penetrated deeply into the whole of the spiritual and social life of the Orient and into the consciousness of each individual there. It is no exaggeration to say that the force of conservative, reactionary traditions is evident everywhere. Of course, in modern times it has been partially broken by the development of capitalism and the national and class struggles. But traditions, added one upon the other like rock layers, have covered every aspect of Eastern society with a hard

crust. Hence the exceptionally strong resistance to anything new in the consciousness of society in general and of the individual in particular. It is this far-reaching and all-embracing traditionalism that conceals the class basis not only of the feudal but of the national-bourgeois and occasionally petty-bourgeois reaction and it is this again that is the reason for the low level of the people's consciousness both in the villages and in the towns.

In many of the countries that liberated themselves from colonialism but are still backward economically a curious phenomenon is evident. Both among the general public and in the intellectual community there is unusual sincerity in their excessive praise of the past. This is characteristic of many countries in Asia and to a lesser degree of the countries in central and southern Africa. It is also the case in the Arab world. In these countries there is an excessive fixation on the past, which is perpetually brought before the public in an attempt to conceal historical backwardness by references to a bygone 'golden age'. This is, of course, the manifestation of conservative traditions, in so far as praise of the past is used as a counterbalance to the necessity for social progress and all-round modernisation. But at the same time it must be realised that the East has known numerous examples of absorption and assimilation which have gone on for decades and even centuries. Many still continue to this day. This is why the social and individual life and consciousness in these countries shows so many transitional, intermediary, amalgamated and synthesised forms while the forms of classical purity are extremely rare.

At the basis of these traditions lie a rigid morality and a similarly rigid code of social conduct. In a number of countries, India for example, a caste system prevails despite its formal abolition and the gradual assimilation of the castes in the process of capitalist development, while in Africa it is the tribal system which is of no less importance. But these caste and tribal systems, which have been in existence for centuries, and their survivals in our days, are of great importance for an understanding of the historical process of development of the economic life and consciousness of the peoples of the East.

There can be little doubt that the high level of religious consciousness among the Oriental peoples, which lies at the basis of traditionalism, is characterised by stagnation and intolerance. They cling to the old ways only because they are old, and at the same time extremely convenient for the ruling groups and old dominant classes.

It has often been said that the peoples of Asia and Africa were easy prey to an invader, and there is truth in this. One reason is

that the Asian and African peasantry, which comprise 80-90 per cent of the population and which as a rule have stood aside from politics and historical progress, have been continually exploited. State-imposed taxes, feudal rent, bondage to their lords and masters, and permanent debt have reduced them to a condition in which they accepted passively almost any invasion in the hope that it will bring a change for the better. Many examples of this could be cited, but let us consider just one. Until the present century power in the East had always been the power of the despot. In this connection we should digress for a moment to say a few words about the specific characteristics of the non-economic method of acquiring wealth. The appropriation of another's surplus products¹ takes place in the course of the direct exploitation of labour. But the distinctive characteristic of the East consists in the fact that from ancient times on, over the middle ages and right up to the colonial period the possession of unlimited power (tyranny) has made it possible through renting, taxation and the state-feudal system, to appropriate not only the entire surplus product but also the essential part of the necessary product. The possession of despotic power in the East has meant the acquisition of wealth in the form of both the surplus and the necessary product of the peasantry on a scale as a rule unknown in the West—and this all without possessing real property, without running a large economy and without organising production. Colonisers of all type have made skilful use of this major lever of non-economic appropriation over the centuries until the collapse of the colonial system itself in our own times. The living standards of the actual producers of wealth have for thousands of years been at the very lowest, with millions dying of hunger. The colossal wealth, which so astounded the first Europeans who set foot in the East, had been amassed in the hands of rulers, who usually had no economy of their own. This is true not only of the Oriental despots themselves and later the colonisers, but of all their vassals of whom there were so many in the East and who comprised the vast network of rent collectors that covered the lands. The parasitic nature of rent-collecting from the producers by forced non-economic appropriation on the principle of author-

¹ The surplus product is the amount produced in material production sphere over and above that required for the reproduction of labour power (the necessary product).

The surplus product is appropriated by the exploiting classes who own the means of production without compensation and is used for their personal requirements or for the expansion of production.—Ed.

ity is a phenomenon the consequences of which are still in evidence today. The specific characteristics of the East today still are forced non-economic appropriation from the peasantry, the direct producers, and unequitable exchange, the means by which the newly-liberated countries are robbed of their wealth.

Obviously the indigent, illiterate peasant, shackled to his land and living in a constant state of appalling poverty and hunger, is in no condition to fight for his master when threatened by an invader. Such a peasant—potential soldier—has not much to defend. For this reason the lands of the East from the Atlantic to the Pacific have always been an easy prey to invaders and some of these invasions have indeed been remarkable. To illustrate.

Over 25 years in the seventh century the Arabs conquered the peoples of North Africa, Persia, Syria, Armenia, Egypt, Central Asia and Asia Minor almost without resistance and ruled an empire which stretched from the African shores of the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. They were helped by the fact the green banner of Islam which they bore before them was at that time a symbol of the equality and brotherhood of all Moslems. This, of course, had tremendous appeal for the downtrodden peasantry. Wherever the Arabs went the oppressed peoples not only offered them no resistance, but even went over to them. But early Islam, like all other religions, brought no social revolution in its wake. Exploitation, far from being abolished, became even harsher as Islam degenerated into the religion of new Oriental tyrannies.

For thousands of years the East has thirsted for social revolution. But the peasantry and artisans were unable to bring it about. When the first European colonisers arrived in the 14th century, a new stage of history began. The peoples of the East had to endure first the burden of colonial and feudal oppression and then the long years of imperialist rule before, after unbelievable sufferings, approaching national, anti-imperialist revolution, and in present time, social revolution, which leads the way to socialism.

What have been the consequences of this historical process? What are the specific characteristics of the East today which insistently demand dialectical analysis?

For all the variety of religions in the East—Hinduism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, Islam and innumerable religious sects—they have one thing in common: not one of these religions that play such important part in the lives of all in the East has ever undergone a reformation comparable with that in European Christianity, and not one of them has provided such a powerful spiritual basis for the political, social and economic

activity of society and the individual as has European Christianity in its time, particularly Protestantism that gave a great impetus to capitalism and brought the European peasantry and townspeople into the forefront of the class struggle to establish the bourgeois system. The religious factor, and this cannot be stressed too heavily in analysing society in the East, must not on any account be underestimated. Religion in the East, and for that matter in the West, too, besides its purely spiritual content, represents a rigid way of life and thinking both for society and the individual. But there is nothing in European Christianity to compare with the all-embracing force of such social and religious canons as the Rig-veda, the laws of Manu, the Dhammapada, or the moral and ethical canons of Confucius or the laws of the Shari'a. Undoubtedly the social structure of the East would be quite different if the ideological shell of its material existence had been differently composed. This is not to say that Christianity is more advanced than the religions of the East. Such an approach would be quite unscientific. It is impossible to compare such complex phenomena from one aspect alone. The culture of the Moslems, Buddhists and the peoples professing other Oriental religions is in no way inferior to that of the West. But it is different; it is different in its impact and different in its consequences. Religion in the West, particularly beginning with the early 14th and 15th centuries, promoted the social and economic development of society there to a much greater extent than it did in the East. It is no accident that it was the Christian countries of the West, the lands of moderate climate and not the Islamic and Buddhist countries of the tropics which were the birthplace of capitalism.

The considerably belated economic development of the East meant that national states, i. e. the states of the capitalist type, began to form much later, in many cases many centuries later than in the West, where the appearance of national states gave a powerful impetus to capitalist development. This 'tardy' appearance of the national states in the East is, of course, explained to a large extent by foreign intervention and domination, but not by these alone. Of extreme importance was the insufficient scope of the entrepreneurial economic base and particularly the slow development of the social division of labour and commodity-money relations. The inadequacy of the economic base for the emergence of a national state was to a large degree the result of stagnation in all aspects of the life of society. Recall one of the important characteristics of the East, which is inherent in the imperialist stage.

Whereas the growth of national self-awareness in the West was

connected with the rapid development of capitalism, the growth of national self-awareness in the East was primarily a reaction to aggression, occupation, violence and the system of oppression, in fact to everything that foreign invaders, and later imperialism, brought in their wake.

In our days we have seen that many of the peoples liberated from colonialism have not yet formed as a nation, even though they have achieved state sovereignty. There are many external and internal reasons for this, not the least important of which is the speeding up of the historical process by the creation of new national states following the formation first of socialist Russia, then of the USSR, and then of the world socialist system. This, of course, is to the credit of world socialism and the alliance of socialism with the international working-class and national liberation movement. These have accelerated history to such an extent that almost one hundred new states in Asia and Africa have achieved self-determination in the space of some 15 to 25 years. In the West this process took two to three centuries.

There is still another aspect of the problem. It is claimed that European and American superiority over their colonies in Asia and Africa for two to three hundred years is the result of the higher level of production. This is of course true, but it should not be regarded in absolute terms, for the situation is in fact relative. It cannot be understood without consideration of international political and economic factors which in the final analysis show themselves in the superiority of organisation, consolidation, social cohesion, ideology, national spirit, in a word, all those things which have been absent or lacking in strength in the East. But the fact remains that one hundred economically backward Oriental countries with predominantly peasant populations and pre-capitalist economic systems which industrially, scientifically and technically were centuries behind the Western countries, have nevertheless achieved liberation from the political domination of European, US and Japanese colonialism and cast off the yoke of oppression. How did this come about? What advantages did the backward peoples possess over their oppressors? Certainly they did not lie in methods of production, in the system of productive forces or in economic and technical organisation. It was rather anti-imperialist and democratic nationalism which awakened the peoples of Asia and Africa and led them in their oppressed millions to the struggle. It was this anti-imperialist nationalism that established close contacts with world socialism, formed a united front with it and, aided by the USSR, the other socialist

countries and the international working-class and communist movement, fell upon their oppressors. During the 15 to 20 years after the Second World War a veritable tornado of national-revolutionary wars and uprisings was unleashed, breaking their hold in all countries and forcing them on to the defensive.

Thus it is not only a matter of economic superiority, which is important in itself and under certain circumstances might have guaranteed success to its possessor. In this case it was the correlation of world forces which led to the liberation of the East after many centuries of subjection to the capitalist West. For this to happen in such a relatively short historical span is a clear demonstration of the great role which the October Revolution in Russia and the increase in the strength of the world socialist system that emerged after the Second World War played in speeding up all forms of the liberation process.

There are many stagnant social forms that have never made appearance in the West but have existed for ages in the East. Furthermore, when it is realised that the population of the East comprises at least half that of the globe, almost two-thirds of that of the capitalist world, and many times that of the West, it becomes clear that there are many special factors in the East that continue to exert an extremely retarding influence on its social and economic development. Take the conditions pertaining to the economic basis and superstructure¹ which had been in existence in the East before the first colonial enslavement. They have made an indelible impression on the subsequent economic and social development of the former colonies and semi-colonies. On the one hand the intervention of foreign capital has resulted in the undermining of traditional economic modes and to a certain extent promoted the development of the social division of labour and accelerated commodity-money relations. On the other hand colonialism has frequently preserved and extended the pre-capitalist relations, thereby turning Eastern countries into the periphery of the gradually emerging world capitalist market, the situation that lasted for two centuries. And this has meant that capitalism in the East was bound to acquire a distorted form for it is primarily there to satisfy not its own, national requirements, but those of the better developed capitalist countries. Behind this

¹ The basis and superstructure are concepts that reveal the interaction between economic and all other social relations. The basis is the economic structure of society, the totality of relations of production. It includes all economic relations of people arising from production. The superstructure comprises political, legal, moral, ethical, philosophical and religious institutions and attitudes.—Ed.

lie the circumstances that led to the survival in the East of relations of production which in the West have long disappeared.

Let us consider another aspect of the problem. The fact that the East has for a long period lagged economically behind the West does not mean that it will continue to develop slowly or that stagnation is a permanent characteristic. This conclusion can only be drawn if we compare the results of economic development in the East today with analogous results in the West. But a scientific approach requires in the first place a comparison of development rates, for which consideration must be given to the time taken by the West to achieve its present level of economic development.

Capitalism in Western Europe has a history of five centuries, whereas in the East it is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In India, for instance, which is a classical example and the most developed of all the former colonies, capitalism is no more than one hundred years old at the very most—industrial enterprises and railways were only set up in the middle of the last century. But only the last thirty years of this period have seen independent political development in India and this has been under conditions of continuing neo-colonialist exploitation by the imperialist powers. Obviously, of course, due consideration must be given to the aid from the socialist countries. But neo-colonialism still remains a powerful, it may be said, the main force retarding social progress and retaining the liberated countries within the framework of the capitalist system. Yet even under these conditions, when powerful conservative influences continue to be felt both at home and abroad, India still ranks among the top ten industrial nations. Furthermore it should be remembered that we are talking about a country with a population of 600 million, i. e. three to four times as large as the population in Western Europe during the industrial revolution in the late 18th-early 19th centuries and twice as large as the population of Western Europe today. The tendency for accelerated capitalist development which is distorted, but nevertheless still promotes the interests of monopoly capitalism, can be seen in many of the countries of Asia and Africa, that have taken the capitalist path, e. g. Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Zaire, Kenya, etc.

Thus we can establish a complex and highly paradoxical phenomenon: economic development in the East today is characterised by an elaborate interweaving of traditional elements of conservatism and dynamism, and of profound backwardness and social progress. Furthermore bourgeois dynamism, which was

long considered the distinctive characteristic of the Western world, is now gaining increasing ground in the East. Thus the most dangerous element for historical development in the East is national capitalism, for the ruling classes, parties and leaders are highly prone to conciliation with Western capitalism even though at the same time they obviously stand up for the state independence and frequently oppose imperialism and colonialism to which they have no desire whatsoever to return.

Many of the characteristics of the political and economic structure of the liberated countries are far more complex than a simplistic scheme of the interaction of social formations. Many have a completely independent existence and cannot be understood without consideration of many varied and diverse factors—such as specific features of the superstructure and its institutions, the interaction between the social superstructure and the economic basis, with each exerting influence upon the other, the influence of capitalism and imperialism on the developing bourgeois society and the combination of developed capitalist forms transplanted from the West and the preservation or extremely prolonged existence of pre-capitalist relations which in a number of countries and regions still prevail. Analysis of the social structure of these countries should include study of the dependent, subordinate and peripheral place which imperialism has assigned to them in the world capitalist economy.

Finally these specific characteristics cannot be understood without consideration of the help accorded to the developing countries by the socialist community to promote the achievement there of economic independence and social progress.

Today we are witnessing a powerful trend to socialist orientation in the foreign and domestic policies of a large group of liberated countries which, aided by the socialist countries, are basing their development on some of the fundamental principles of scientific socialism and creating national-democratic, anti-imperialist economic structure, thereby offering to the East a fundamentally new socialist prospect of development.

The factor which determines the contemporary situation and the future prospects for the developing countries is not the interaction of the various economic structures. This struggle is now dwarfed by the opportunity of making a choice between two different paths of development, capitalist and non-capitalist, a choice which never confronted the West that had only the capitalist path of development to embark on. In this sense the East stands in a completely new and privileged position.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE PAST AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND AFRICA

For almost two centuries India was under British rule. Its development to a certain extent reflects the fundamental laws of evolution of the colonial world as a whole. It was influenced by all three stages of British capitalism—primitive capital accumulation, industrial capitalism and finance capital. A capitalist structure arose in India itself through the symbiosis of foreign and national capitalism. It was highly contradictory in so far as it consisted of two opposing parts—the capitalism of the oppressor and that of the oppressed nation.

Like the other colonial countries, India was never a passive victim to the foreign invader meekly abandoning itself without resistance. In opposition to external oppression there were the laws and tendencies of the class struggle within the country behind which stood the forces of the Indian economy itself. As capitalism began to develop in India (or in any other colonial country for that matter) it gave rise to the class contradictions that still exist. During the period of colonial struggle right up to the end of the Second World War, these internal class contradictions were covered with a veneer of national unity. But gradually, distinct class forces that were to a greater or lesser degree loyal to foreign rule split from this united anti-imperialist front already at the initial stage of the class political struggle under the direct impact of its scale, nature and the degree of mass participation.

With the establishment of British rule, the colonial monopoly of British capitalism became the main pivot of the country's economic and political development, which it placed under its

control and did everything in its power to deform. British capital undermined the commune, that basic unit of the feudal system and introduced comparatively developed commodity-money relations in the Indian economy. In some places it expropriated the feudal lords while in others it compromised with them out of political considerations. It either left the peasant masses under the direct control of the landowners, or itself exacted taxes and rent from them as the biggest landowner.

In the second half of the 19th century after a number of uprisings and agrarian disturbances, British rule in India had to make a number of concessions to the peasantry, creating various forms of annuity, hereditary and temporary leases. It gained control of the old merchant's capital apparatus selecting from it a loyal group of comprador bourgeois, who in the course of time themselves gained control of Indian industrial capital. British capital built railways for military and foreign trade purposes, ruined the local artisans and flooded the country with cheap imported goods, thereby dooming millions of artisans to slow extinction. Adopting the traditional status of the Oriental despots it became the biggest landowner, turning land into a commodity and expropriating the peasants on a vast scale. It imposed a heavy burden of taxes upon them, utilised various agricultural regions for growing industrial crops that it required and developed the production of certain types of industrial raw materials and semi-finished goods. It aided the growth of the big landowners while its agrarian policies allowed excessive fragmentation of the land and gave rise to an immense flood of pauperised peasants, who were ready to work under the most barbaric conditions of metayage and to till the land by way of paying their debts. British rule left the Indian princes, who were its loyal vassals, one third of the territory of the country and allotted to them a quarter of the population, allowing them thereby to exercise feudal and semi-feudal dominion on a vast scale.

During the last quarter of the 19th century the British colonisers began to introduce capital from the metropolis to finance banking, insurance, trade and transport enterprises and particularly the administrative bodies. Vast amounts of credit were given in the form of government loans, which added up to form India's multi-billion national debt. Capitalist factories were 'transplanted' on to Indian colonial soil, thereby accelerating capitalist development and creating the first detachments of the modern proletariat. Farming, however, was left at its primitive level, the colonialists being content to mercilessly exploit the

peasantry without going to the expense of introducing mechanised methods. India was given over to famine and disease which claimed the lives of millions and millions.

For all their cruelty and excesses in the early years of British rule in India, British colonialists awakened India from its slumbers to the extent that they broke up the archaic Indian society, i. e. commune, highly-centralised Asiatic feudal despotism or independent formations of despotic feudal states, and Britain may be credited with this progressive though historically limited role despite all the destructive consequences of its policies.

But after the economic laws of peculiarly Indian development had brought about the emergence of a local machine industry, national bourgeoisie and a proletariat, in other words, after conditions had been created for independent capitalist development, British rule, although it built railways, ports and mines, became an undisputedly regressive and reactionary factor. The point was that British policy was now directed towards checking free industrial development in India so as to retain its own colonial monopoly of power and its economic, scientific and technical superiority. This attempt to put the brake on Indian capitalism became even more intolerable when the new class, the proletariat, entered the political arena. This was the only class to express consistent protest against the colonial economic policy which fettered productive forces and against obsolete social relations. Thus decades passed in which independent industrial development was severely impeded and this resulted in the stagnation of productive forces.

On the eve of national independence the main contradictions in the Indian economy consisted of the following:

- the objective trends of development of national productive forces and the economically and politically stifling effect of the presence of imperialism's colonial monopoly. Hence the main task was to do away with the political power of imperialism;

- the gradual capitalist transformation of archaic economic relations and the pre-capitalist methods that were in use in the villages, in the crafts and in small industry;

- the import of finance capital from the metropolis and the insignificant progressive social results of 'transplanting' capitalism to the colony;

- the mass expropriation of the peasantry and artisans and the exceptionally slow process of their proletarianisation. Hence pauperisation, or non-proletarian impoverishment, became the scourge of Indian society;

- the stratification of the peasantry as a result of the deep penetration of commodity-money relations, but accompanied by the weak development of capitalist farming. Hence the excessive rise in usury and merchant's capital linked with pre-capitalist or transitional (to capitalism) metayage;

- the domination of the big landowners with only the very poorest terms of land-tenure available to the peasants;

- the domination of the usurer and the mediator in market relations within the village and between it and the town, the vast accumulation of usury and merchant's capital and the lack of any significant means for converting it into industrial capital.

The result of all this was the formation of a colonial-feudal economy, which had been permeated by commodity-money relations (though huge enclaves of the natural-patriarchal economy remained). It was an economy in which the lower forms of capitalism predominated and which represented an extremely delayed transition to colonial capitalism.

The Indian village was under the control of the landowner, the merchant and the usurer, while the impoverished peasantry clung tightly to their diminutive plots. It was this that made it possible to exploit the peasants using pre-capitalist methods for the peasant sold only the product of his labour and not the labour power. The usual process of capitalist development, of course, is that as soon as ruination in the villages has reached a high level, a considerable proportion of the peasantry are forced to quit their land and sell no longer the product of their labour but their labour power. In this way they become a proletariat. At the same time the merchants, usurers and landowners begin to run their land on a capitalist basis, thereby moving from the sphere of the commodity or money market to the sphere of agricultural production, which is now run on industrial-capitalist lines with the employment of hired labour. But in the Indian village this did not take place on anything like the scale on which it occurred in Europe.

The peasantry suffered ruination from three sources: British imperialism, national industrial, merchant's and usury capital, and landowners, but there was no market for their labour power. The ruination of the peasantry and artisans went on on a much greater scale than did the development of industrial capital from merchant's and usury capital or the development of the landowners into capitalist agricultural producers. The reason for this lay in the subordinate position of the country, its people and its economy and the colonial domination of imperialism.

Thus the conversion of money into capital in agriculture took place largely without the organisation of capitalist mechanised farming based on hired labour. And this was an important characteristic of colonial domination, which distorted the normal evolution of capitalism in the village.

Metropolitan capital, which controlled agricultural production through a set of links, appropriated the surplus product of the peasantry through the merchants, usurers and landowners and the taxation system, without mechanising agriculture but using it to develop the productive forces in the metropolis. This had the inevitable effect of dooming the colony to economic stagnation. It meant that metropolitan capital introduced commodity-money relations and the capitalist path of development into the oppressed country, but allowed that country to go only so far along that path as suited the oppressor country. And the distance it progressed depended upon the changing political conditions (world wars, the growth of liberation and revolutionary movements, etc.). The oppressor country did everything in its power to maintain its parasitic exploitation while holding back for decades development in the oppressed country at the early stage of capitalism in which pre-capitalist vestiges were predominant.

Hence it follows that the level of industrial development in the colony is determined, first, by the real possibilities for the bourgeoisie in the oppressor country to extract rapidly, cheaply and conveniently the surplus product of the oppressed nation while providing it with railways, ports and light-industry and mining enterprises; secondly, by the force of national resistance to the colonialist policies of economic stagnation and by the pressure of internal capitalist trends; and thirdly, by the character and forms of struggle with the other imperialist powers that dispute control of a given colony.

It must be stressed that while the economy of colonial India as that of many other colonial and semi-colonial countries like Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Algeria should not be considered as feudal after the First World War, for this would damage scientific analysis, it is at the same time hardly possible to agree that in colonial India and similar countries a bourgeois society had been formed, for such a point of view produces no less erroneous results.

Let us look at one more aspect of evolution in India as a classical colony. The means by which the industrial bourgeoisie was created there and in the other dependent countries were quite different from the analogous processes which took place in the

independent capitalist countries of Europe. In the latter the formation of an industrial bourgeoisie consisted in the merchant getting direct control of production or the producer becoming both merchant and capitalist. This was the radical, the usual way of transition to capitalism.

But in India the formation of a national bourgeoisie under the influence of the economic and political domination of foreign capitalism became seriously deformed. Here the industrial bourgeoisie was formed in the following way:

- the merchant capitalist-compradore became an industrial capitalist without, as a rule, ceasing to fulfil his compradore functions;

- the trader, mediator or usurer acquired shares in the British or local industrial companies;

- the landowner participated in the industrial enterprises without at the same time ceasing to conduct the feudal or semi-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.

The conclusions are obvious. Political and economic dependence creates *colonial* capitalism. This is a special form of capitalism. It is governed by the same laws as 'normal' capitalism, but its forms of manifestation are quite different. These forms consist in the fact that, first, the direct producer does not as a rule become an industrial or agricultural capitalist and secondly, the class of industrial bourgeoisie, which comes largely from the compradores, traders and landowners, does not lose its ties with the land, which remains a source of considerable profit. In India, the merchant, the compradore, the usurer, the clerk and the bourgeois intellectual became landowners, while part of the landowners became shareholders in the industrial and banking companies. Of course, this did not exclude the industrial bourgeoisie from forming subsequent connections with the land. But this phenomenon was concomitant to the main one—the fact that the compradores, merchants, usurers and industrial bourgeoisie retained firm links with the land.

Thus, whereas in the West the industrial bourgeoisie arose from among the direct producers, owners, craftsmen, apprentices of the capitalist manufactories, from among those at the head of artisan and merchant guilds in the early days of industrial development and only later settled on the land, in India it *always* retained its ties with the land where the backward feudal and semi-feudal vestiges still obtained. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to speak of the 'territorialisation' of the Indian bourgeoisie in the sense of its settling on the land, for this slurs over

the characteristics which distinguish the Indian bourgeoisie as a class from the European.

Hence the important political conclusion that the colonial bourgeoisie, unlike the bourgeoisie in France during the French Revolution and in other European countries has never taken, and never could have taken an active positive stand as regards a genuine radical solution to the agrarian question which would be to the benefit of the people. Hence the colonial bourgeoisie's fear of peasant revolution and its repeated attempts to get the peasantry to adopt non-violent methods and retain them in this state.

This feature in the historical development of the Indian bourgeoisie explains its timidity over the agrarian question, which is the pivot of the anti-imperialist national liberation revolution. But it is also necessary to explain its relation to British imperialist rule in India, and this requires account to be taken both of the origins of the bourgeoisie in India and its close cooperation with British finance capital. The Indian merchants, usurers, landowners and compradores became agents of British capital and shareholders in British industrial, trading, banking, railway and insurance companies. They were the minions of their foreign masters. And this also determined their strong connections with British industrial and finance capital and their desire to maintain their class privileges under the aegis of the foreign colonisers.

Substantial sections of the industrial and trading bourgeoisie and the upper crust of the intelligentsia were closely connected to the colonial regime and its apparatus; they took advantage of state loans, enjoyed all kinds of privileges and were continually open to bribery and corruption. But the connections between British finance capital and the Indian bourgeoisie did not preclude contradictions and conflicts between them, or imply that their interests were identical. Such conflicts were usually an expression of the Indian bourgeoisie's claim for a greater share in exploiting the internal market and rarely amounted to anything more than a form of bourgeois opposition.

But the critical political situation and sharp division of class forces in India combined with the general crisis of British imperialism and the threat of revolution and a violent overthrow of the British rule by the people forced the British colonisers in 1947 to hand over power in the country to a bloc composed of the bourgeoisie and the middle strata.

The new national government, in which from its very inception a leading role was played by Jawaharlal Nehru, was faced with a

whole set of problems to be solved consistently and at the same time with regard for their interaction. There was the need to make sovereignty a political reality, the reorganisation and consolidation of the state apparatus on a national foundation, the setting up of a new administrative system, the formation of a new economic policy and the creation of an economic control and planning mechanism. On the horizon there was still the agrarian question and the need to industrialise the country. Most acute were the enormous unemployment and the need for the technical reconstruction of the national economy. The purpose of all this was to overcome the country's centuries-old backwardness and this required setting up a new national apparatus capable of the radical transformation and modernisation of the socio-economic structure of the country.

In recent years progressive thought in India has formulated a number of urgent tasks facing society and it is now a matter of how they can best be implemented in practice while only recently their general purpose was discussed. Under such circumstances it is necessary to undertake a scientifically objective and generalising analysis of the social and economic structures in India at the various stages of its development over the last two centuries. Such an analysis will give a clearer idea of both the conservative and stagnant spheres as well as the progressive and developing aspects of the contemporary socio-economic system and this means having a real understanding of the scope and direction of the efforts and resources that are necessary for the transformation of social being and the consciousness of the people. This also applies to many other colonial peoples which are now trying to renew their way of life.

Sometimes the setting up of a state and economic apparatus, which is essential for bringing about genuine historic change, is understood as making general conclusions as to the concrete tasks that face society and establishing their order of priority. But historical experience continually reminds us that among this list of tasks there are certain determinants, the most important of which is, of course, a correct analysis of the correlation of the class and political forces and account of the aspirations of the people. It is upon this in the final analysis that the viability of the socio-economic system depends once it has begun to form, and on the outcome of the class struggle depends society's transition either to social progress or social reaction.

The traditional pre-colonial society that existed in the liberated countries for many centuries had its own comparatively stable mechanism for the reproduction of conservative social forces ranging from the village commune and the feudal landowners to the centralised military-administrative apparatus of the Oriental despots or other state formations of a similar type. As we have already shown, this mechanism was dealt a damaging blow, but though it was distorted, it was not yet destroyed but to a certain extent preserved. The preservation of backwardness and archaic vestiges was an important organic function of colonialism.

The mechanism by which the conservative elements of society are reproduced is one of the most complex sociological problems of post-colonial society. An analysis of its structure reveals the causes for the tenacity of the social base of conservatism and shows the fruitlessness of leftist tactics which promise no constructive alternative to this structure and, furthermore, to a certain extent rely on its déclassé elements. Those who assumed that under conditions of national sovereignty there would be a rapid collapse of community links and the patriarchal patronage systems which account for the relatively high level of stagnation in society, particularly in the countryside, are now forced, through experience, to reappraise and take a more accurate assessment of the social changes that have taken place in the liberated countries.

Only an objective analysis of the real situation of the people, particularly the pre-proletarian, peasant, artisan and petty-bourgeois masses, the vast mass of the urban poor, the déclassé lumpen-proletariat makes it possible to find an approach to their consciousness, rouse it and direct it to social transformation. Lenin wrote about the backward sections of the Russian proletariat: 'We must learn to approach the most backward, the most undeveloped members of this class, those who are least influenced by our science and the science of life, so as to be able to speak to them, to draw closer to them, to raise them steadily and patiently to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, without making a dry dogma out of our doctrine—to teach them not only from books, but through participation in the daily struggle for existence of these backward and undeveloped strata of the proletariat.'¹ And this conclusion is even more relevant to the non-proletarian working masses which constitute the overwhelming majority in the liberated countries.

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'On Confounding Politics with Pedagogics', *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, Moscow, 1965, p. 454.

The most dangerous illusion in Afro-Asian societies is that the consciousness of an ordinary worker or any downtrodden person is a blank sheet on which the revolutionary propagandist can put any idea he likes. In fact the consciousness of the ordinary worker in a traditional society is fettered by an unusually stable system of simple yet very tenacious ideas about the purpose and standards of his existence. To draw him into the struggle for radical social transformations, he must be put in a situation of daily struggle for aims and ideals he already understands. This, incidentally, is something to be learned from Gandhi who had a deep understanding of the ideals that were accessible and understandable to the common people.

Of course, right- and left-wing extremist politicians and demagogues can arouse and even unite for a short time certain sections of the downtrodden masses behind loud, unrealistically utopian slogans of justice, brotherhood and happiness for all. But in realistic class-political terms this amounts to nothing more than an emotional outburst on a fideistic platform alien to genuine revolutionary activity though adequate for the pre-revolutionary movements of the type that Lenin called 'old Chinese uprisings'. Unfortunately this kind of purposeless, programmeless people's uprisings has been a fairly common occurrence in a number of countries where the bandwagon of popular protest has been jumped on by educated (in the Western fashion) but politically immature and wrongly orientated petty-bourgeois youth. This process has to a large extent been furthered by Maoism.

A comparative analysis of life-styles and the resulting 'practical conclusions' frequently amount to a comparison of living standards, social and individual standards of behaviour, cultural, art and educational achievements and other criteria that have been the result of long historical development. The usefulness of such a comparison is evident, but it can be reduced to fruitless speculation if thought is not given to the means by which a given society reached its present level of development and the costs of so doing.

Explanation of this set of problems will obviously not lead automatically to a mechanism by which the historically backward countries could catch up with the more advanced countries. In the final analysis a new social and economic mechanism, especially in its structural and institutional part, is only created as a result of the victory of the forces of social progress over the forces of reaction, imperialism and conservatism, i.e. in the course of the class struggle.

But study of the experience of those societies which have

reached a higher stage of historical development makes it possible to shorten the time of transformations and therefore the social costs of their implementation. In 1867, Marx already drew attention to the way in which the dominant classes in continental Europe and the United States of America needed to study English factory legislation, and generalised that 'one nation can and should learn from others. And even when a society has got upon the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement—and it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society—it can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.'¹

In the light of this idea the seemingly unusual phenomenon of the mass generation of the lower forms of capitalist production in industry, agriculture and the services in the liberated countries becomes more understandable. The similar economic stage in the developed countries of Western Europe and North America, which took the form of small manufactories and non-mechanised family farms, was completed in the early or at least the mid-19th century. In sovereign India and many other Afro-Asian countries the development of the small-scale enterprise originated from the gradual introduction of industrialisation and under the influence of the 'green revolution' and agrarian reform. The insufficient development of the social division of labour, of socialisation in production, and of cooperative forms of enterprise and exchange, and, therefore, the weak position of the state sector in this sphere have made it possible for private industrial and merchant's capital to gain fairly strict control over it.

In the liberated countries that have chosen the capitalist path of development, the petty urban and rural entrepreneurs, closely linked with traditional spheres of production, are at present unable, unlike their distant historical ancestors of the Third Estate in Europe, to put forward a consistent programme of revolutionary transformations, although admittedly they are being more and more drawn into the political struggle and in recent years have supported both right- and left-wing radicalism in turn. They mostly fall under the influence of religious, national-separatist and other types of movement which, the political leaders of the petty bourgeoisie feel, will protect them from state control,

stable prices, labour legislation and trade unions (i.e. from equality before the law), from secularism which they frequently find intolerable and all the other attributes of bourgeois democracy during the period of backwardness and belated capitalism, and from concrete struggle against foreign monopolies or big national industrial and merchant's capital.

The limitations in the constructive historical activity (even within bourgeois society) of these strata of the bourgeoisie who fall under the dominating influence of the local conservatives are shown in actions which ultimately serve to weaken their own development as a class. These include in the first place the incitement of communalist, nationalist, sectarian and separatist disorders instead of the strengthening of law and order in the state, secondly, speculation in consumer goods, gold and currency, together with corruption and nepotism, which can achieve socially dangerous levels, instead of capital investment in production, and last but by no means least, the encouragement of religious fanaticism, Hinduism, Pan-Islamism, mysticism (in Indonesia) and the ignorance and obscurantism which accompany them instead of the development of bourgeois rationalist individualism. By trying to repeat stages long past in the development of Western capitalism, these sections of the bourgeoisie show no active desire to 'shorten and lessen the birth-pangs' of bourgeois society.

Let us consider this question from another angle. No religion in the East (Islam, Buddhism and particularly Hinduism) has undergone a radical bourgeois reformation. This means that in a new historical situation when the most intense social conflicts are engendered by the incursion of industrial and monopoly capital, the traditional pre-capitalist, communalist consciousness of the religious fanatic functions, as it were, as the natural petty-bourgeois reaction to these new phenomena. Moreover, in a number of Afro-Asian countries a purely secular ideology, including anti-imperialist nationalism, is not usually capable of ousting with sufficient historical rapidity the traditional communalist, clan, caste, estate, tribal, semi-feudal and religious-extremist ideology to become the world-outlook of tens of millions of small owners that are trying to improve their positions in the world and join the entrepreneurs. Hence their stubborn adherence to the standards of tribe, caste and religion.

Furthermore, the intense hostility felt by the small owner towards the usurer and trader in the village, the capitalist in general, and the foreign and local big businessman in particular,

¹ K. Marx, 'Preface to the First German Edition of "Capital"', *Capital*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 20.

gives rise to feelings of anti-capitalism. Anti-capitalism of this kind was known in pre-revolutionary Russia, where 'enraged' small owners more often than not were ready to accept an anarchistic negation of all law and order, including the bourgeois system, and after the revolution sometimes became the breeding ground for the anti-Soviet uprisings of the socialist-revolutionaries and anarchists.

It is of interest to note that in the colonial countries, particularly in India, the rise of capitalism did not engender sharp ideological conflicts between the internal forces of reaction and progress as was the case in Europe. In a purely logical analysis, the positions of such Indian moderate reformers as Dadabhai Naoroji or Motilal Nehru might seem at first glance considerably more progressive than, say, the teachings of Bal Gangadhar Tilak or even Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. But the ideas of the first two amounted to those of the educated national-bourgeois elite in India, while the eclectic philosophy of Tilak and particularly the utopian ideas of Gandhi embraced the aspirations of millions. The formation of an integral class and national ideology of the bourgeoisie in an oppressed country had been hindered by the inability of even its most educated and talented representatives to develop the system of scientific knowledge and abstract conceptions necessary for the study of the life of their peoples in the new situation.

Let us take a major political figure like Jawaharlal Nehru. More than ten years have passed since his death, but even today in looking through his writings and speeches we realise how great was the burden that he had taken upon his shoulders trying to combine the incompatible—the centuries-old fideism of India with the scientific-rationalist thought of Europe, while stressing the world-historical significance of theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. An appreciation of the way in which Nehru's thinking coincided with Marx's ideas can be gained from the following quotation from Marx in which he clearly formulates demands made on the optimal man in a transitional society who 'does not seek to remain something already formed, but is in the absolute movement of becoming'.¹

The appearance of such an individual during the formational period of the new society is essential because 'it [the world of ancients] is superior, wherever one looks for self-contained struc-

ture, form and accepted limits. The ancient world is satisfying from a narrow point of view, whereas the modern world leaves us unsatisfied, or, where it appears to be satisfied with itself, it is vulgar'.¹ Marx writes here of a society transitional to capitalism.

Marx, Engels and Lenin frequently noted that the great philosophers, revolutionaries, scholars and artists who created the ideological superstructure of bourgeois society and its culture, were themselves far from being affected by the cult of profit and, moreover, were intensely hostile to the vulgarity, complacency and narrow-mindedness of the bourgeoisie. But even so, for European capitalism to acquire its spontaneity and irreversibility, for it to gain control of an immense feudal periphery, radical changes were needed in the cultural life of society and its moral and ethical norms; not only an extensive transformation of the means of production and exchange but also the creation of values in all areas of cultural life was needed, these values themselves going far beyond the bounds of the limited, purely bourgeois world order and eventually becoming part of the consciousness and spiritual world of socialism.

Such changes included: the beginnings of a new spiritual awareness, which was most fully expressed in the artistic visions of the Renaissance artists; religious reformation consisting in the tailoring of a religion to suit the needs of a society of commodity producers, of which Marx wrote that 'for such a society, Christianity with its *cultus* of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion';¹ the formation of a totality of anti-dogmatic abstractions associated with cosmological, geographical and anatomic discoveries and the discoveries of natural and exact sciences; the predominance of rationalism and a materialist direction in the philosophy of the Enlightenment; the beginnings of classical bourgeois political economy; the recognition by the historical science of class contradictions and conflicts; the establishment of the applied sciences and their subsequent specialisation to meet the needs of production, exchange and transport, the military needs and the consumer and representation requirements of the propertied classes and the Church; the construction and development of machines and their technology and the discovery of new sources of energy for production and expanded reproduction of relative surplus value; the formation of a world bour-

¹ Marx, Engels, *Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Formations*, A Collection, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 101.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p. 83.

geoisie, an international working class and a stratum of engineers and technicians who mastered the industrial technology and were capable of producing relative surplus value.

These complex changes are given here in approximately the same historical and genetic order in which they took place throughout Europe though in England, for example, this sequence was more than once broken or remained incomplete. But in Japan, China, India and some of the Arab countries (not to mention the rest of the Afro-Asian world), where from the middle and late 19th century foreign technology and mechanised transport were fairly well established, these historical changes, particularly in the sphere of ideology, have been delayed, and even where some of the above-mentioned changes have come about, they have followed a different sequence and, as a rule, lacked integration and therefore been ineffectual. For this reason bourgeois ideology as a system of concepts and standards was never developed in any complete form in any Afro-Asian country, including Japan.

For a long time even the most enlightened of the Afro-Asian intellectual elite had little knowledge of the complex process that Europe underwent from the 16th to the 19th centuries whereby scientific progress interacted with the economic, cultural and ideological life of society. They rightly held the achievements of European science and technology as constituting first and foremost the military and economic superiority of their foreign oppressors. European domination in intellectual life could only be opposed by the cultural and ethical values of the so-called 'golden age' of the East, i.e. the already effete, unproductive and irrevocable past, which had no dynamism, relevance or prospects.

It is noteworthy that the greatest mind that India produced at the turn of the 18th and 19th century, Ram Mohan Roy, was, according to Nehru, primarily a religious reformer. 'Influenced in his early days by Islam and later, to some extent, by Christianity, he stuck nevertheless to the foundations of his own faith. But he tried to reform that faith and rid it of abuses and the evil practices that had become associated with it.'¹ And this religious reformism was served by his vast erudition—a knowledge of Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, Greek, Latin and Ancient Hebrew together with English. But this colossal intellectual power was concentrated on one thing, 'to discover the sources of the religion

and culture of the West'.¹ A similar desire for religious reform can be seen in the intellectual search of Tilak and Gandhi who both insistently strove for a way through to the mass consciousness of their fellow-countrymen at the time of their political awakening to the struggle against colonial domination.

The question arises: can we consider the religious reformist as a revolutionary in the period since the Reformation, or more particularly in recent times? Marxism-Leninism has never given a simple, abstract negative answer to this. The Reformation in Western Europe gave rise to the 'heretical', 'revolutionary-religious views' of Thomas Münzer and other leaders of the peasant and plebeian masses. But religious ideas could become revolutionary only under two conditions: first, that they served as ideological armament for genuinely revolutionary forces in a given society, and second, that these forces could have no opportunity to adopt secular class ideology capable of winning the consciousness of the masses for the simple reason that such class ideology had not yet been developed.

If we apply these criteria to Gandhism, one of the most influential ideological currents in India and a number of other Eastern countries, then we are forced to recognise that apart from genuine anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-racism, many of the characteristics of social radicalism, which were so evident among the plebeian masses and the Third Estate in Europe, are almost completely absent in this, the most popular reformist trend in recent times.

Let us consider the personality and views of Gandhi as seen by Nehru:

— 'Gandhi has been compared to the medieval Christian saints, and much that he says seems to fit in with this';

— 'the appearance of vagueness and avoidance of clarity';

— 'he is not out to change society or the social structure, he devotes himself to the eradication of sin from individuals';

— 'he is more or less of a philosophical anarchist';

— 'he suspects also socialism, and more particularly Marxism, because of their association with violence. The very words "class war" breathe conflict and violence and are thus repugnant to him';

— his 'outlook is as far removed from the socialistic, or for the matter of that the capitalistic, as anything can be';

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1951, p. 293.

¹ *Ibid.*

— 'he wants to go back to the narrowest autarchy, not only a self-sufficient nation, but almost a self-sufficient village'.¹

If we recall the wariness with which Gandhi approached the achievements of industry, technology, science and art, then we are forced to concede that his philosophical position did little and then only indirectly to promote the formation of an integral bourgeois individual. But at the same time the historical importance of Gandhism for India is immense, for it was his philosophical, ethical and political views on which generations of thinking Indians were raised, while an individual was being moulded who, to repeat the words of Marx, 'does not seek to remain something already formed, but is in the absolute movement of becoming'. We consider that, basically speaking, in his undoubtedly sincere reverence for Gandhi as a man and in the fact that he repeatedly stresses the dynamism of Gandhi's approach to Indian reality, Nehru has pointed out precisely this function of Gandhism.

The Afro-Asian, having awakened 'in the absolute movement of becoming' and having overcome the first stage of the dynamic process of the anti-imperialist struggle, finds himself in a labyrinth of complex, highly contradictory, historically concrete, class, national and political assessments and problems. And in this situation the magic Oriental ethics breaks down, and its indifference to social and class distinctions which results in rich and poor being treated alike, degenerates into a form of moralising that is completely bankrupt in the new conditions of a sovereign state.

Mahatma Gandhi himself, more than any of his followers, was deeply aware of the fallacies in the socio-economic aspects of his philosophy under conditions of a sovereign bourgeois state in which all the contradictions of society were openly revealed. His end was the fatal atonement for a great, though unsuccessful attempt to offer an ideological transition from a state in which the bourgeois individuality had been insufficiently developed to 'the absolute movement of becoming' of bourgeois society.

The cult of sacrifice is alien to Marxist-Leninist morality. But it has so happened that the Communists, in laying a path for the

ordinary (and not the elite!) man of the 20th century to 'the absolute movement of becoming' of a new individual of now already socialist society, have brought upon themselves the hatred of all forces of the entire bourgeois, conservative establishment. The cry "Communists, forward!" has raised thousands upon thousands advancing to death and immortality who by their conscious sacrifice in the name and at the behest of their class and party have surpassed the canonised martyrs of all religious faiths of all times. And what have the various religious fanatics of different kinds and countries to offer against the hundreds of thousands of Communists, anti-imperialists and democrats that have been killed in the last decade alone for their belief in freedom and social progress, by religious, racist, caste and class reactionaries backed up by foreign monopolies in Indonesia, Thailand, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia, Zaire, Chile and Vietnam or by the Maoist nationalist Thermidorians in China? Not for nothing do writers of many countries seek inspiration from such fearless and irreproachable Communists as Ernesto Che Guevara. Whatever sins Communists have been accused of by their enemies, no one has ever doubted their courage and readiness for great sacrifice.

But devotion to a philosophy is not identical with the ability to put it into practice. This has been indirectly shown by the losses and setbacks suffered by the forces of progress in India and other liberated countries. Still the gradual accumulation of revolutionary experience in work among the masses and in guiding the masses in the struggle continues. Thus already today in many liberated countries there are increasingly strong trends to assimilate the theory and practice of non-capitalist and subsequent socialist development.

Apart from anything else this experience shows that in the socialist world the law of priority development for the backward countries functions so as to bring them up to the level of the advanced countries. This is what has happened in Soviet Central Asia, Trans-Caucasia, Far North and Far East. The same process also took place in Mongolia, the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, People's Republic of China (until 1958) as well as Bulgaria, Romania and, partly, Yugoslavia; Cuba is undergoing the same process. Furthermore, the new correlation of class and political forces in the world, the mutual cooperation and solidarity between the socialist states and their cooperation with the developing countries, the science-based system of planning, which takes account of past mistakes as well as the optimum variants of economic integration

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography*, The Bodley Head, London, 1953, pp. 509, 510, 511, 515, 516, 517, 522.

that have already justified themselves, have made it possible to shorten and ease the birth-pangs of the new socialist society and the independent, progressive national-democratic state.

Marxists have never thought it advisable to export concrete recipes for the reorganisation of national socio-economic systems from one country to another. Such practice is not in the nature of scientific socialism and runs counter to the tenets of historical and dialectical materialism as well as the methods generally accepted in socialist society. But this does not mean that they go to the other extreme and ignore the attempts of international and national forces to find optimum solutions to the complex problems facing the developing countries. That is why Soviet political leaders and experts have always been ready to share their experience in socialist construction, an experience which has not been easily acquired, but for that reason is the more valuable; and that is also why they point to their successes in general and in particular spheres and are not afraid to reveal their mistakes. Furthermore, the approach of a person to the problems of a foreign society almost always contains something original and a new way of looking at things. From the earliest days of the socialist revolution in Russia Lenin requested the continued publication of books by Western observers, such as John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams and H. G. Wells, who according to their background and objectivity gave rather differing portrayals of the first years of the October Revolution, but whose interpretations at times contained very useful, though uneven, grains of rationality.

Soviet experts on Asia and Africa, guided by Marxist-Leninist methodology, have always sought to achieve the greatest scientific understanding of events and developments in these continents. This difficult task is being carried out with varying degrees of success depending on such factors as the amount of available information, its quality and the reliability of the source (in so far as it is bourgeois information which tends to predominate) and their own understanding of the world revolutionary process at a given stage.

Even before the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920 certain Asian revolutionaries tried to identify the national liberation struggle in Asia at the time with the international working-class movement, particularly the October Socialist Revolution. Things would certainly be easy, if it were all so simple! Furthermore, none other than Manabendra Nath Roy, the man who pioneered the communist movement in India and who knew better than anyone the political situation of the time, claimed that a hundred odd million landless population of the Indian

villages amounted to an agricultural proletariat which was ready for a socialist revolution. He then went on to suggest that 'the destinies of the revolutionary movement in Europe depend entirely on the course of the revolution in the East. Without a triumphant revolution in Eastern countries the communist movement in Europe may wither away.... Therefore, the emphasis should be shifted to the development and raising of the revolutionary movement in the East, with the main thesis adopted that the destiny of the world communist movement depends on a triumph of communism in the East'. Thus simply and emotionally before Lenin and the Areopagus of world communism that had gathered in Moscow did Manabendra Nath Roy, at that time a 28-year-old revolutionary, an enthusiastic Marxist carried away by the international and national revolutionary liberation movement and the Socialist Revolution in Russia, decide the destinies of the movement.

In answering Lenin gave a reply that was extremely tactful in form, and deeply significant in content. 'The Indian Communists,' he said, 'have to support the bourgeois-democratic movement, but not merge with it. Comrade Roy is going too far in asserting that the destinies of the West depend exclusively on the level of development and power of the revolutionary movement in Eastern countries. Despite the fact that there are five million of proletarians and 37 million of landless peasants in India, the Indian Communists have not succeeded in creating a communist party in the country, and this alone proves that Comrade Roy's views have not been sufficiently substantiated.' Lenin's words, of course, reflected the social and political reality of the time (the size of the working class, the absence of a communist party or any Marxist groups) but they are still highly relevant today.

In its historical perspective Lenin's thought contains three postulates: first, the necessity for a reliable and flexible alliance with the widest (at any given moment) democratic movement; secondly, the groundlessness of Orient-centred ideas; thirdly, and of particular importance for our theme, the erroneousness of identifying offhand the landless, poverty-stricken peasantry with the proletariat.

Thus, Lenin categorically rejected the suggestion expressed by Manabendra Nath Roy that the landless peasantry could be regarded as part of the proletariat and confined the latter term to the industrial working class proper. For those acquainted with Lenin's studies on the class structure in Russia, such an approach is quite natural, for Lenin always singled out among the Russian

working people the non-proletarian or, at any rate, the semi- or pre-proletarian strata. Contemporary Marxists in Africa and Asia essentially proceed from these criteria in their analysis of the class composition of society, particularly in the villages.

More than half a century has gone by since Lenin's polemic with Manabendra Nath Roy. Major changes have taken place in the social structure of liberated countries, particularly under conditions of state sovereignty. It is now not only a question of changes in the size and proportion of class forces, but in the quality of the new social groups that have kept their former sociological names. This side of the question is exceptionally important and should always be taken into account whatever aspects of contemporary life are being treated. The thoughtful reader will have no difficulty in finding concrete examples for these socio-economic reflections.

The experience of the Afro-Asian countries is one more confirmation of Lenin's thesis that the proletariat and all the working people must pass through the hard school of struggle for democracy as the essential condition of a successful struggle for the socialist transformation of society. Of course, the struggle for state sovereignty contained many of the elements of such a school, but these often became obscured by the general national aims of the movement and by the harsh demands of underground, and even more so, armed resistance against the colonialists. Only freedom, democracy, state sovereignty and independence make it possible to fully and clearly reveal the genuine interests of individual classes and strata, and foster the awareness of their interests among the working people. This process is neither simple nor straightforward if only for the reason that class consciousness, once awakened, undergoes the agonising process of refraction through the prism of traditional world-outlook with all its prejudices, narrow aspirations, superstition and mystique. Overcoming these vestiges of inertia that have lasted for thousands of years at the first stages of class awakening is a necessary condition for the formation of democratic consciousness and the progressive organisation that accompanies it.

A study of the socio-economic structure and its apparatus at various stages of social development and in its various sections (from the family up to the entire nation) makes it possible to single out from a variegated conglomeration of slogans, demands and claims the long-term issues that reflect the radical interests of

the main classes and strata. Only such an approach can provide a science-based programme of transformations in the foreseeable future and counteract the demagogical, voluntaristic platforms of reactionaries and leftist quasi-revolutionaries.

Socio-economic analysis makes it possible to reveal the essence of those phenomena which are now the concern of public opinion in the liberated countries and form the crux of the political struggle. Take, for example, the problem of prices and, in the East where the food situation has been sharply exacerbated, the problem of the price of grain. Price control in the first place depends on the suppression of speculation and the establishment of fixed wholesale and retail prices. This is an absolutely just requirement meeting with the wholehearted approval of the people. Its implementation has rapid and noticeable effect and makes life easier for tens of millions of working people. Nevertheless even the strictest forms of price control cannot solve the food situation, because they cannot guarantee increased grain production (some landowners will even curtail production) or a lowering of production costs. The whole issue turns on a radical social and technical transformation of agriculture and, consequently, on a change in relations of ownership, an increase in agricultural productive forces and the introduction of advanced production methods.

Speculative pressure on price formation can only be successfully relieved by bringing democratic forces into action. Further steps towards the integral reconstructions of agriculture as regards landownership, land-tenure, cooperative farming, and development of advanced agricultural methods (i.e., a real 'green revolution'), its links with industry and the system of education, as well as the establishment of new institutions in place of the old ones, are thereby made more convincing to the masses. It is this that constitutes, as it were, the second long-term objective of the present struggle for price control, which in many of the liberated countries has been far from achieving its goal because of the superficial nature of the measures introduced which have no democratic, popular support.

The experience of many of the developing countries has shown that the long-term progressive potential of even the most resolute economic measures can remain unrealised, and can even be compromised, if they are carried out in a bureaucratic fashion without the active participation of and control by democratic organisations both locally and at the centre. Therefore, when the democratic state penetrates into the very heart of the private

sector, it must do so with clean and honest hands, the hands of the people. If not, the extension of radical transformations will be accompanied by a corresponding extension of corruption. In other words, what will happen is that ordinary capitalist enterprise will be replaced by still more parasitic bureaucratic capitalism. Dangers of this kind faced the Soviet Union in its early days when a mixed economy was maintained, and forced the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to take extraordinary measures to eliminate them.

The main characteristic feature of the present historical era is the transition from capitalism to socialism. This is a transition which is going on not only in countries where power belongs to the working class. The offensive against capitalism is increasing and the front of that offensive is expanding as the anti-imperialist struggle of the liberated countries becomes directly anti-capitalist.

Lenin, who developed and enriched scientific socialism and formulated an all-embracing theory of the world revolutionary process, showed that the world-wide transition from capitalism to socialism would be a highly complex, long, varied and difficult process. History has fully borne out Lenin's prediction. No single, universal explosion has occurred to destroy the world capitalist and colonial system as many revolutionaries before Lenin suggested. And therefore we have to think in terms of a whole historical era of transition from capitalism and pre-capitalism to socialism.

The colonialists have been driven out and they are no longer the arbitrary rulers in more than one hundred countries that have won political independence. But the former colonialists still retain serious economic and ideological positions in the one-time colonial and semi-colonial countries. Just as in the contemporary world there are two social systems, two trends of development, so in the national liberation movement there are two streams struggling against imperialism. In the majority of countries these streams are not completely isolated from one another, and on a number of vital issues (economic independence, anti-imperialist foreign policy, etc.) they form a general national front.

But only one of these streams unites the forces of social progress, which are capable of going further than the goal of national liberation. As the history of all liberated countries shows, only these forces can consistently fight imperialism for economic independence without making compromises with foreign capital.

Only these forces can decide the land and the peasant question in favour of the people without making deals with big landowners. Only these forces can achieve a real increase in the living standards of the industrial and office workers, the artisans and the whole downtrodden mass without making deals with the local bourgeoisie. Since their interests lie in a just social system, these forces, despite their class diversity are capable, under favourable conditions and with the help of the world socialist system restraining as it does imperialist counter-revolution, of leaving the capitalist path of socio-economic development and progressing via socialist orientation in domestic and foreign policy along a non-capitalist path of development.

The full maturity of the subjective and objective conditions for transition to the path of non-capitalist development, for progress along that path and for gaining initial and subsequent success, or the full economic and political development of the conditions necessary for this transition is not an absolute necessity. Such conditions are relative. Objective conditions must be seen in relation to subjective conditions, and, conversely, subjective conditions must be considered with regard to the objective situation. They are not fixed and it is not necessary that they should coincide perfectly or be precisely balanced. They are in dialectical interaction and unity, sometimes differing in their development and sometimes in their readiness for the country's transition to a new, non-capitalist path. The objective conditions for the transition to the non-capitalist path of socio-economic development are determined both by the fact that feudal and semi-capitalist development is leading or has led to a crisis in, or the isolation of, the present regime and by the whole totality of circumstances including the international situation in a given area.

We have frequently had occasion to mention that together with the working people the national bourgeoisie has also participated in the national liberation movement. In a number of countries it has led the struggle against colonialism. But the fundamental motive force of all national liberation movements without exception have been the popular masses—the peasantry, the workers, the artisans and the intellectuals. Even when they were under the ideological and political influence of the bourgeoisie they brought their own aspirations, usually anti-feudal, anti-imperialist and spontaneously anti-capitalist in character, to the national liberation struggle. In rising against the colonial yoke they frequently resorted to such specifically proletarian methods of struggle as the

general strike, armed uprising and civil war against reaction and counter-revolution.

Whereas the national bourgeoisie opposed colonial exploitation and this aim has been achieved, the popular masses oppose any kind of exploitation in general. This subjectively socialist trend in the contemporary national liberation movement arose and grew strong after the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. It has also continually appeared in the views and activity of the radical representatives of the national liberation movement, chiefly its left wing, which has been considerably influenced by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Such radical statesmen include Sun Yat-sen, Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Boumedienne, Ne Win, Nyerere, Nkrumah, Neto, Machel and others.

It must always be borne in mind that the national liberation movements, their nominal aim being to clear the path for bourgeois development, have now for half a century practically developed in conditions of the present general crisis of capitalism and simultaneously with the formation of the world's first socialist state, its victories over its enemies and the establishment of socialism as a world system of states. This has meant that socialism, which means abolition of all forms of the exploitation of man by man, is now a distinct possibility for national liberation movements all over the world. Even those liberated countries which are today governed by the national bourgeoisie, cannot avoid the issue of socialism as an alternative for their development in the near future. And even the national bourgeoisie is adapting socialist slogans to suit its own needs.

During the period in which the colonial countries were winning political independence there was a considerable increase in left-wing radical elements in the national liberation movement, reflecting not only the national but also the social aspirations of the people. The spread of the ideas of scientific socialism found fertile soil in the spontaneous, pro-socialist popular aspirations. Not only communist parties or separate communist groups but left-wing revolutionary anti-imperialist nationalistic factions began to advance socialism as the ideal social system.

The anti-capitalist trend, which has chiefly home a petty-bourgeois character, grew and strengthened with the ideology of the democratic national liberation movement. In a number of countries it became the leading trend, mobilising the people for social reconstruction and increasingly reflecting the spontaneous gravitation of the masses towards socialism.

Consideration must also be given to the special role played by

the intellectuals in the liberated countries. The overwhelming majority of this stratum are part of the army of hired labour and a significant proportion are employed in the civil service, the army, and the state and private sectors of the economy. Of course, the upper crust of the intelligentsia merges with the bourgeoisie, but its working sections suffer from mass unemployment and the pressure of big capital, monopolies, etc. By its very nature the intelligentsia feels keenly the infringements of national sovereignty and the attempts of the foreign monopolies to control economic development in their countries. It is in the interests of the democratic intelligentsia to complete the anti-feudal and anti-capitalist revolution by means of radical social transformations.

The working intellectuals in a number of liberated countries are able more quickly than the peasants or the artisans to support radical anti-capitalist transformations, for in the economically weak countries they are less affected by proprietary psychology. During the years of independence the democratic intelligentsia has grown politically, consolidated its ranks and many of its strata are now actively influenced by the successes of world socialism. Their growing social and political maturity gives the intellectuals the objective opportunity not only to participate in the revolutionary-democratic and anti-capitalist transformations, but to play a leading role in them.

There are far-reaching internal objective conditions for the growth of socialist tendencies in the national liberation movement. It is becoming increasingly clear that the present stage of social development is no longer limited to a transition from a colonial-feudal economy to a national-bourgeois economy. Of course, this tendency is present to a greater or lesser extent in all national liberation movements, but it is only one tendency and it has still not prevailed among the liberated countries. The people have not yet had their word. In a number of countries this tendency has been paralysed and gone into recession, being surpassed by the tendency for socialism. It is significant that today even in the countries where the tendency for transition to a national-bourgeois state prevails, it requires the implementation of such democratic socio-economic transformations, which though not socialist of themselves create the conditions for a transition to socialism. Without this the nation cannot develop economically, socially or politically.

A few examples. The development of the state sector of the economy and control over private enterprise, while not being

themselves socialist measures, undoubtedly tend in the direction of the socialisation of production and, under certain circumstances, to socialism. Extirpation of foreign monopoly ownership is usually carried out by means of nationalisation which strengthens the state and weakens the private sector. In other words it furthers the tendency to transition to a socialist-orientated economy. A rise in agricultural production under the conditions of enormous agrarian overpopulation and limited land and irrigation resources demands not only the eradication of the vestiges of feudalism and landownership by foreign interests and local gentry, but the implementation, alongside agrarian reform and the handing over of the land to the peasants, of cooperative farming, particularly of the landless peasants and those who have only minute plots, i.e. the implementation of socialist measures. In these conditions the question arises as to whether the public sector and the whole system of state control of the economy will be subject to the tendency for transition to capitalism and consequently be in the interests of the exploiting classes, or whether these economic and material resources will be put to the service of the people and correspondingly promote socialist orientation in the country. And this is a question which has not yet been decided even in those countries where the bourgeoisie is in power (India, Pakistan, Turkey, the Philippines, etc.), though in the countries with revolutionary-democratic governments the decision is coming down in favour of the second alternative.

All the liberated countries, and particularly the big ones with large populations, are now facing the complex problems of economic development during the transition to a free, independent existence.

One of the first characteristics that appears almost immediately after the achievement of state independence is the fact that the new forces that have come to power, whether they be composed of the national bourgeoisie or its elements, in so far as it does not yet constitute an independent class, or whether they be petty bourgeoisie, i.e. the middle classes, cannot live as they used to and what's more do not want to follow the old paths. They search for new ways of their own and new directions for their policy in all spheres. And though the productive forces of society continue to develop in basically the same way as before, they—the class bearers of productive forces—increasingly protest against the

old relations of production which fetter the country's development.

This contradiction between productive forces and production relations becomes more acute in proportion to the speed with which the new government is formed and its strength as the state system that is historically called upon to solve that contradiction. A new political line has to be found which under state direction would guarantee a more progressive form for, and higher development rates in, the productive forces and which would ultimately lead to greater economic independence and the improvement of living standards. All this should result in a sharp contrast between the new political orientation and the colonial past and put the country on the path to social progress.

The new ruling class must inevitably come up against urgent problems which require solution. First and foremost is the question of whether to pursue a foreign policy that is in opposition to imperialism or to seek a compromise with it and thereby run the danger of neo-colonialism in exchange for all the doubtful benefits that it promises the liberated countries. To the credit of the national liberation movement the overwhelming majority of liberated countries have adopted an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist peace-loving position and joined the non-alignment movement. It is hardly surprising that officials in Washington have considered the non-alignment movement immoral, since it has never been of any benefit to the United States, which never ceases to try to split the movement and blunt its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist edge.

Next on the agenda for the ruling classes in the liberated countries are questions of economic policy: industrial development, the formation of the state sector, restraining feudalism, agrarian reform, cooperation with the socialist world, attitudes to foreign aid, foreign capital, private capital and private enterprise, and social policy. The solution to these problems has in the past sometimes taken the form of compromise with imperialism and feudalism and an offensive against the interests of the people. This reactionary solution cannot, naturally, bring about national unity. It only serves to aggravate the internal struggle and put the state on the slippery slope to neo-colonialism with all the consequences that this entails.

But in the majority of liberated countries the radical contradictions between the bourgeoisie as a whole or its separate ruling strata, not to mention national democracy, on the one hand and

imperialism on the other still continue and not a single section of the national bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie has gone over to imperialism. This is characteristic of the present-day situation and remains valid even for such a country as India. At the same time there are liberated countries where power is in the hands of these same bourgeois strata or coalitions of bourgeois and feudals who are inclined to compromise with imperialism at the expense of the people. These include Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Indonesia, Egypt, Kenya, the Ivory Coast and some others.

What usually characterises the first stage of development in the liberated countries? The answer to this is a great deal of state intervention in the economy, the announcement of the principles of industrial and agrarian policy, intervention in the distribution of the national income and a budget that is designed to meet the needs of national economic reconstruction. All this is perfectly natural.

Considerable state intervention in the economy in the 19th century characterised young, still immature capitalism. After the Meiji Revolution (1867-1868) the Japanese state built a railway system, instituted the ship-building and metallurgical industries and started ocean-going shipping. In Germany during the second half of the 19th century the state introduced tax reforms, redistributing via the budget the national income to finance the railways, and the metallurgical and armaments factories. These were measures designed to strengthen and preserve the dominant position of the capitalist class and particularly support big business with the aim of exploiting the masses.

Big business needs the state to help it expand and intensify the exploitation of the working class, i.e. help raise the rate of relative surplus value and give it levers to control the middle and petty bourgeoisie. In these circumstances state subsidies to big business, guaranteed orders, special rewards for export, the introduction of anti-labour legislation, the imposition of tariffs on foreign goods, capitalist nationalisation of the mining and subsidiary industries and finally the launching of aggressive colonial wars (in respect of the European countries, the United States and Japan) are all means by which the state furthers the interests of big capital.

Meanwhile the petty and middle entrepreneur suffers ruin. Lenin summed up the situation when he said: 'Is the state really something inert? the small producer asks in despair, when he sees that as regards *his* interests it really is remarkably inert.'

'No, we might answer him, the state can on no account be

something inert, it always acts and acts very energetically, it is always active and never passive.'¹

It is legitimate to ask in this connection whether the active state intervention in the economies of the liberated countries, even the bourgeois countries (like India) before monopoly capital has gained domination is in any way principally different from state intervention in the economy of the capitalist states in 19th century Europe. Has the state in the liberated countries become a means of enriching big business at the expense of the people? Has it become a means for strengthening class and national oppression, a source of aggressive wars and political reaction? Has it become the tool of the foreign monopolies?

It is common knowledge that the majority of liberated countries in Africa and Asia pursue an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-racist and peace-loving policy. Therefore their identification with the monopoly capitalist states has no foundation.

As for the local and foreign monopolies, the petty and middle bourgeoisie in the liberated Afro-Asian countries stands for their nationalisation and, as a minimum, a strict state control over them, believing that this will open the path to free competition on the market. At the same time it is a well-known fact that no state control can touch private property of the capitalist. But it should be borne in mind that state control accelerates the centralisation of capital and the separation of capital as property from capital as a function. Furthermore if we take India or other countries approaching medium-level capitalist development (Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, etc.) there the separation of capital as property from capital as used in production has achieved a fairly high level.

While state control over the economy in a developed bourgeois state is an expression of the subordination of the state apparatus to the interests of monopolies, of their merger and fusion, state control over the economy in the majority of liberated states is more or less adequate to the common national interests. Obviously the degree of consideration given to general national interests and their correlation with the class interests of the ruling circles is different in each country.

But at the same time there are definite monopolist tendencies exerting their influence on the state in a number of liberated countries. In almost all of them that are passing through the stage

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr.司徒's Book', *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 355.

of transition to bourgeois society, consisting in primitive accumulation of capital,¹ the functioning of merchant's and usury capital, industrial capitalism and the development of local monopolies in trade and industry, entrepreneurial confederations, corporations and chambers of commerce are formed which have considerable economic and political influence.

Their task is to influence the authorities. And this can be seen primarily in the unusual growth of corruption in the administrative and economic apparatus. Corruption on this scale becomes a national danger. The corrupted apparatus, particularly in its higher echelons, becomes a projection of the bourgeois class in the state apparatus and one of the strata of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which has fully merged with this class and participates in capitalist accumulation. This is one of the most dangerous reactionary forces opposed to both socialism and progress and the general national interests of the state. Then the influence of these entrepreneurial organisations (the chambers of commerce and industry in India) affects policy on such matters as wages, prices, profits, income and other taxes as well as the centralisation of capital, the implementation of credit policy, the setting of discount rates, the receipt of convertible currency and licences, etc.

The entrepreneurial organisations set up chambers of commerce, confederations and associations and show a tendency to centralise their influence on the economy and on state economic policy in the interests of big business. Being back-stage centres of economic influence they try to participate in the preparation and implementation of state legislative measures in the interests, of course, of their own class and frequently from reactionary positions.

The main tactic of the entrepreneurial organisations is subversive activity, including covert sabotage, against the state sector, and penetration into the state sector with the aim of either undermining it or turning the state enterprises to their own personal profit. The parasitic role of private capital in this sphere reaches a

¹ Primitive accumulation of capital—an historical process preceding the formation of large-scale capitalist production by separation of the producer from the means of production. Primitive accumulation of capital is accompanied by: 1) ruination of the mass of commodity producers (chiefly peasants) and their conversion into peoniless, but legally free individuals deprived of the means of existence and therefore forced to sell their labour to the capitalists; 2) the accumulation by certain individuals of wealth that is necessary for the creation of capitalist enterprises.—*Ed.*

high level when it is accompanied by an 'open doors' policy as is the case today in Egypt.

The accumulation of merchant's and usury capital in the hands of numerous landlords who receive rent for their land is still a significant phenomenon in the liberated countries. Here too the well-to-do farmers are growing in numbers. These strata together with the local bourgeoisie use their income for investment in state securities, trying to turn part of the state budget into a source of profit. They use their capital in discounting commercial bills for purchased, pawned and re-pawned securities, bonds issued by joint-stock companies and the government. They receive direct and indirect state subsidies, which are an important means for the growth of the private sector of the economy.

Big business in the liberated countries where it has already emerged or is emerging does everything it can to extract maximum profit at the cost of the tax-payers. For this purpose it takes advantage of state taxation policies, government expenditure on goods and services at increased prices, the system of contracts and subcontracts, its priority positions in material and technical supplies and in the receipt of convertible currency and guaranteed internal and export prices, and a monopoly on state orders by a small number of firms.

Extensive road and rail construction programmes are being implemented in the liberated countries at state expense. In the capitalist-orientated countries this has given a powerful boost to the development of capitalism, creating a huge market for equipment, construction materials and labour, bringing the food and light industries closer to the countryside and the sources of raw materials, promoting the growth of commerce and specialisation in agriculture, increasing purchases of raw materials and foodstuffs, speeding up the commodity turnover and making the links between the domestic and the foreign markets more stable.

These are roughly the kind of economic problems that face the new national states in their early years. They are of course tackled by each state according to the character of its government, its social and class composition and its social purpose.

The developing countries are a heterogeneous category and their goals are diverse. Their political typology can be determined by the only real criterion—class. According to this they are socialist, national-democratic, bourgeois-democratic, bourgeois-landowner or feudal (semi-feudal).

Each of the developing countries approaches the major economic issues outlined above in its own way according to its poten-

tial, internal orientation, foreign policy, traditions and other factors. But the two last types of developing countries are frequently prone to neo-colonialism.

The most important progressive, anti-imperialist characteristic of all types is the trend to state control of all or at least the fundamental spheres of economic life. This trend is against foreign capital and, partly, against big national capital where it exists.

The establishment of the state sector and the implementation of the principles of economic control is accompanied by an internal struggle between the bourgeoisie and the state. The bourgeoisie is vitally concerned as to who has control of the production of the most important commodities, which industries are state-owned, which industries are open for private capital and to what extent. In a number of countries—India, Pakistan, Egypt (under Nasser), Bangladesh (under Mujibur Rahman)—this struggle has been dramatic. Many developing countries have taken measures to check a small number of capitalists (usually those in big business) who have not shown sufficient patriotism.

State control of part of the economy in the developed industrial countries is proof that a transition to socialism has become a definite historical necessity and that their productive forces have long outgrown the framework of private enterprise and monopoly capital. The increasing size and importance of state ownership in these countries is an expression of the intensive process of capitalist socialisation of production and the development of private-monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism and transnational corporate capitalism.

It is different in the developing countries. The backwardness of productive forces, particularly of industry and the infrastructure, makes it necessary to speed up development towards state control of the commanding heights of the economy and the building up of its foundations within the framework of the state sector, while also drawing into the economy under state control private capital, both local and foreign.

In the countries of mature capitalism nationalisation is carried out by the bourgeois state in the interests of the monopolies, and only rarely is democratic nationalisation carried out under popular pressure in the interests of the nation. In the economically backward countries nationalisation of industry and the infrastructure and the concentration of new capital investment in the state sector are primarily forms of protection against foreign capital and the transnational monopolies and barriers against the plundering of natural resources.

An important characteristic of the state enterprises in the developing countries is the fact that they are organised as public joint-stock companies. Their shares as a rule are not quoted on the stock-exchanges and they are not in the hands of private capitalists. Therefore the enterprises cannot be made private again either as a whole or in part. Thus, whereas in the developed capitalist countries nationalisation takes place via a merger between state and private capital, resulting in the formation of mixed companies, in the developing countries this is comparatively rare.

State control of the economy in the developed countries shows that the productive forces are broad, but the forms of ownership narrow and therefore in a certain historical period the bourgeois state has come to offer the broadest national form of ownership for the productive forces, a form best suited for the present society. The transition to state ownership in the economically backward countries objectively amounts to the intentional creation of the most suitable form for the development of productive forces and does away with the historical necessity for a poorly developed economy to pass through all the various preceding types of production relations and forms of ownership which are part of private commodity capitalism, private capitalist enterprise and monopoly capitalism.

The colonialist states set up capitalist monopolies in the colonies which usually controlled entire branches of the economy (tea, coffee, rubber and cotton plantations, railways, the primary processing of agricultural produce, the extractive industries, etc.). They were the continuation of the economic domination of state-monopoly capitalism in the metropolises. Their nationalisation by the new sovereign states removes the colonialist and monopolist features from these enterprises and from whole branches of the economy, and irrespective of the type and character of the state turns them into the commanding heights of the new economy which the developing countries are in the process of building. This is why anti-imperialism in the widest sense of the word, including economic anti-imperialism, is an important criterion for determining the character of the foreign and domestic policy of the new state.

It would be a simplification to assume that the developing states which have taken the capitalist path (non-socialist or non-national-democratic) are, economically speaking, a special type of national entrepreneur, opposed to private capital and acting not in the interests of the national bourgeoisie, but exclusively in the interests of the nation as a whole. In exploiting the most

extensive forms of collective bourgeois ownership and its nationalised state form and thereby overstepping the phases of historical continuity in the development of private and monopoly-capitalist ownership, the new bourgeois-democratic, bourgeois-landowner and other states are accelerating the process of capitalist industrialisation. In this sense they are able to create the illusion that they are building a common national economy of 'democratic socialism' that has none of the 'excesses of the class struggle'. They present the class interests of the bourgeoisie as those of the whole nation, taking advantage of their temporary coincidence in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

It would be wrong to suggest that the bourgeois developing states control, regulate, guide or plan their economies in the interests of society as a whole, irrespective of the class interests of the bourgeoisie, and that they are therefore supra-class entities. Yet at the same time we should not draw the conclusion that all types of state intervention in the economic affairs of the bourgeois developing countries are merely self-interested utilisation of the bourgeois state and its economic policies. Extreme viewpoints on this question, in so far as we are dealing with anti-imperialist bourgeois states, will not produce the correct conclusions.

In presenting anti-imperialist state capitalism as 'democratic socialism' certain leaders of the developing countries turn to the theory of a mixed economy, which in their opinion is characterised by the simultaneous existence of socialist and capitalist structures within the bourgeois state and the bourgeois economy. Thus capitalism is supposed to merge with socialism, planning with competition, and private and state ownership with cooperative ownership so as to form 'nests of socialism' in bourgeois society. Such are the usual arguments of those who propound this 'theory' and vainly try to prove that this kind of economic policy will lead to 'true' socialism.

The progressive role of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries, if we can call it such in a limited sense, consists in the fact that it is trying to organise, under conditions of the vast predominance of a small-commodity peasant economy, larger socialised production forms through state and private capitalism on a national, anti-colonial basis. The negative aspect of this process consists in the fact that it is taking place at a time when all developing countries are historically ready for socialist-orientated development of their productive forces along the non-capitalist path. Only the weakness of the working class and the insufficient organisation of the working people, i. e. subjective un-

preparedness, make the productive forces continue to develop on a capitalist basis by means of exploitation of the workers.

If the social system and character of the state determine the role and aims of state capitalism in the developing countries—and the latter indisputably strengthens capitalism in the developing countries at the present stage of their development—then with a change of power and a change in the character of the state it is possible that the state sector which it inherits will provide a consistently socialist or revolutionary-democratic support for the economic life of the country. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility that the new state with the support of the old state sector will begin to set up new types of state capitalism in the form of mixed state and private enterprises which will employ private capital under the control of the revolutionary-democratic, anti-capitalist state so as to transform what remains of capitalist ownership and abolish the bourgeoisie as a class.

Thus it follows that each new form of state capitalism or stage in its development and the proportions of state and private capital in a mixed economy when power is in the hands of the working people reflect a definite level of development in production relations, the degree to which they are 'socialist', and thus the change in the nature of state capitalism reflects the change in the nature of production relations. The experience of Soviet Russia during the NEP¹ period fully affirms this.

The history of the last few decades has seen the evolution of the state sector in various socio-economic directions. Thus, as a result of national-democratic revolutions in Burma, Syria, South Yemen, Algeria and a number of other countries, the state-capitalist sector has been transformed into a state national-democratic sector of socialist orientation. This is a progressive evolution. But there have also been a small number of examples of regressive evolution (Egypt, Sudan and Indonesia). But one way or another they all go to confirm the thesis that the social nature of the state sector is derived from the social nature of state power, from the class basis of the state, and from its domestic and foreign policy. In other words, it derives from who, what class or what coalition of class forces possesses state power in a given country.

It must be noted that big business and its ideologists in the developing countries and elsewhere on the one hand try to conceal

¹ NEP—the New Economic Policy—was adopted by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in 1921. It was called new to distinguish it from the economic policy pursued during the Civil War. The NEP was designed to overcome the destruction wrought by that war and to create the foundations for a socialist economy.—*Ed.*

the mixed economy with socialist slogans, while on the other, should the state capitalist sector be transformed and a social change take place in the nature of the state so that it changes its orientation and adopts the non-capitalist path of development, they vilify it, launching a bitter campaign to discredit socialism and praising private capital as the basis of democracy, political freedom and economic development.

Private capital in the bourgeois developing countries is very active (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Tunisia, Morocco, Kenya, etc.). Colonialist pressure having been removed, for the last 20 or 30 years there has been a drive for profit and accumulation and this is now the motive force behind the economy and the source of the capitalist development of productive forces. The growth of the productive forces of national capitalism has taken place on an antagonistic class basis and frequently amid bitter manifestations of the class struggle. Nevertheless, it has gone on 3-4 times as fast as it did in the colonial period.

It is natural that the development of productive forces on this basis from the point of view of the need to rapidly overcome age-old backwardness has, in the final analysis, a limited character. This is due to:

- the general crisis of capitalism, the shortage of time for the whole world capitalist system which no longer has any historical perspective for reconstructing the developing world in its own image and likeness;

- the huge enclaves of feudalism, semi-feudalism and tribalism which require radical social transformations the national bourgeoisie is not as a rule prepared to implement, being content to limit itself to half-way reforms;

- the anti-capitalist trends among the proletarian and non-proletarian working people, which intensify the struggle for socialist orientation;

- the historical necessity for close economic cooperation with the socialist world, which has a growing influence on the course of development;

- the continued pressure by and penetration of new forms of neo-colonialism and the transnational monopolies which continue to plunder the developing countries economically.

Thus from the above we can draw the following main conclusion: transition to socialist public ownership has now become the objective necessity and imperative demand of the struggle for independence and social progress by the liberated nations.

PERSONALITIES

MAHATMA GANDHI

More than three decades have passed since the assassination of the leader of the anti-imperialist movement in India, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, and the years of intense struggle for the liberation of this great and ancient country from the colonial yoke recede further and further into the past. There has been a certain abatement in the passions which once raged in any attempt to assess the contradictory and, in European eyes, unusual life of this 'rebellious fakir', as Winston Churchill, that arch-opponent of decolonisation, once called Gandhi. But this important, and—for all his enforced deviations from his ideal—remarkably integrated personality continues to be of enormous interest as regards his ideological and political legacy, his role in the history of India, and his links with the country's past and future. The arguments about Gandhi, though not so vehement as during his lifetime, will go on for a long time, for he personifies a whole epoch in Indian history, a relatively recent epoch at that, and one which saw the formation of modern India and of the people who to this day determine the country's image. This is why all the political forces and all the socio-political trends in India today have expressed some attitude towards Gandhi. The interpretation of his legacy is an important reference-point of any political platform.

It is well-established that history is created by the popular masses. But it becomes symbolised by individuals. One such symbol was Gandhi, as was Jawaharlal Nehru after him, and these symbols have become part of the political consciousness and political life of India. They have even overstepped the borders of

the country, since the lives and thoughts of Gandhi and Nehru embody much that is characteristic of the struggle of many other peoples to free themselves from colonial dependence and oppression.

Gandhism—the sum of all the political, moral and philosophical ideas put forward by Gandhi in the course of the Indian people's struggle for national independence—is not only something bound up in the national consciousness of the Indians with the years of struggle against British imperialist rule. It is also a factor in the present-day political and class struggle, and is resorted to by almost all political parties as a means of influencing the masses.

Hence it is both important and topical to analyse Gandhism and to distinguish its real content and historical role from the symbols used in the political struggle.

Gandhi began to develop as a thinker and public figure at the turn of the century, when, while maintaining close links with his own country, he led the tenacious and courageous struggle of the Indians in Southern Africa against racial discrimination. It was at this time that the national liberation movement was born in India, under the seemingly indestructible British colonial rule. Even then there were two main trends within the movement—the liberal faction, linked mainly with the top crust of the propertied classes, supported a bourgeois line of development, while the democratic radical-nationalist trend reflected the protest against national enslavement which had developed in the Indian people, including wide sections of the then emerging national bourgeoisie.

Gandhism is deeply rooted in the ancient popular traditions of India, and its social ideals are to a large extent peasant, petty-bourgeois in nature. The most important features of Gandhism, resulting from its close link with the chiefly peasant traditions of Indian society, are its social ideal—*sarvodaya*, or the welfare of all—and the method of achieving this ideal—*satyagraha*, or non-violent struggle.

Gandhi's social ideal is a petty-bourgeois, peasant utopia, the realisation of God's kingdom on Earth. The establishment of social justice was seen by Gandhi as a return to the 'golden age' of self-contained peasant communities, and as the non-acceptance of the European machine civilisation he hated and of the market economy which was harmful to the patriarchal village and doomed the peasant-artisan community to destruction.

The Gandhian doctrine of universal welfare—*sarvodaya*—is above all the longing of the peasant and village artisan, of the urban pauper and lower officials, crushed by foreign rulers and their own feudal lords, merchants and usurers, for that society, full of supposedly just human relations, which is described so beautifully, alluringly, profoundly and penetratingly in the sacred books of Hinduism. The description of this society is sought in the cultural and historical monuments and in the vestiges of tribal and patriarchal traditions of various Indian peoples. These traditions are part and parcel of the way of thinking, based on Hinduism, which to this day lies at the root of the social psychology of tens of millions of Indian peasants, tradesmen and petty townspeople.

But at the same time *sarvodaya* is a quite natural, open and sincere protest against capitalism, the protest of social strata not yet aware of real, scientifically founded ways of transforming society, strata which seek, but have not yet found, a way out of the intolerable social and material conditions in which they live. This protest reflects the enormous suffering of tens of millions of people oppressed by an inhuman caste system and by tyranny of landlords and usurers, people who have not understood their position and who therefore still do not realise that the solution lies in the establishment of a firm union with the revolutionary working class born of the 'European', capitalist civilisation they hate. The inevitability and—compared to all societies hitherto—progressiveness of this civilisation are denied in Gandhism, which dooms the Indian peasant and artisan to sad memories of forms of society gone forever and deliberately idealised.

But despite its clearly utopian and archaic character, the Gandhian ideal of *sarvodaya* has played a positive role in the Indian national liberation movement. It inspired broad sections of the rural and urban population with the belief that the struggle for independence from British rule was of vital importance, for it was at the same time the struggle for social justice, for a new society based on principles which they longed to see realised. Of course, Gandhi in no way wished to deceive the people, but honestly and sincerely linked the struggle against the colonialists with the achievement of *sarvodaya*.

The gaining of independence and elimination of imperialist rule was a great achievement of the Indian people, and it is linked with the name of Gandhi, who rightly commands enormous respect. But the independence gained in 1947 did not lead to *sarvodaya* or

give the working people of India the chance to establish a society of social justice.

The method of non-violent resistance to colonial oppression was founded on the oldest tradition of India, on the psychology of the Indian peasantry. Like Gandhi's social ideal, it is marked by a combination of enormous patience and protest, of conservatism and spontaneous revolutionary feeling—features characteristic of the Indian peasant, brought up for centuries on a fatalistic religious view of the world.

These features of Gandhism found their expression in the Swadeshi doctrine. Three aspects of Swadeshi—the religious, political and economic—are permeated with the idea of retaining the institutions and customs inherited from the past, while gradually and non-violently transforming them, by giving them new meaning. In this we see a deep dissatisfaction with the present and a belief in the stability of the past, the rejection of all possibilities other than a return to the past and at the same time a fear of radical change. All these are classic features of mass peasant psychology in the face of the still powerful survivals of traditional society, not so much, it is true, in real economic life as in the consciousness of the average Indian.

As an ideology and practical policy, Gandhism is strongly marked by its fidelity to national, cultural, historical and religious traditions, by its ability to find in them a message which is close to the peasant and artisan, and to link their spiritual lives directly and persuasively with the need for independent national development and the transformation of society. In this fidelity to popular traditions and concepts of justice lies the secret of the enormous influence exerted by Gandhi's ideas and personality on the Indian people.

For the reasons outlined above, Gandhism can be seen as a deeply national and principally petty-bourgeois ideology.

This, perhaps controversial, understanding of Gandhism by no means minimises the achievements of Marxist students of the problem, who point to the close link between Gandhism and the interests of the Indian national bourgeoisie, and to the effective use made by the latter, for its own class purposes, of the theory and practice of Gandhism. What should be stressed, however, is that the link between the national bourgeoisie and Gandhism was more complex than is usually claimed, or at any rate less direct.

The great paradox of Gandhism lies in the fact that while sharing patriarchal peasant's dream of a 'golden age', Gandhi not only did nothing to bring it about, but insisted on the need to put

off settling the land question until after independence was gained, and thanks to his exceptional influence on the popular masses rendered enormous assistance to the bourgeois leadership of the national liberation movement in achieving this. In practice, this end was also served by the dream of *sarvodaya* and the principle of non-violence.

An analysis of the liberation struggle of the Indian people in the period 1918-48, when Gandhism exerted almost undivided political and organisational influence, reveals one extremely important and curious feature of the revolutionary process in India. Throughout the thirty-year period, the Indian bourgeoisie managed to divide and isolate the national independence movement and the peasants' struggle for a land reform. Such a division would have seemed impossible, even unnatural, for the colonial-feudal system and exploitation were based on a long-standing political union between the powerful foreign occupants and big capitalists on the one hand, and the major Indian feudal and semi-feudal landowners on the other, and it is precisely this symbiosis of ruling forces—foreign rulers and their internal reactionary support—that should be swept away by the national liberation, peasant, bourgeois-democratic revolution.

This, however, did not happen. The agrarian revolution did not become an axis of the anti-imperialist revolution. The two revolutions did not merge together, never reaching the state of unity and interpenetration where the necessary premise is created for the national liberation revolution to be at the same time a peasant revolution, for two streams gradually to combine. Why did the Indian bourgeoisie strive to prevent such development in the revolutionary process?

A considerable part of the Indian bourgeoisie, including the petty bourgeoisie, was 'territorialised'. As a result of constant slowing-down of India's independent industrial development by British capital, the emergent Indian bourgeoisie settled to a greater or lesser degree on the land, making land its property. Investment in land as property, rather than in modern large-scale agriculture, often proved more profitable, and certainly secure, throughout the period of British rule.

This does not mean, of course, that the diverse bourgeoisie of India restricted itself only to this kind of capital investment. With the development of national capital, investments were directed more and more towards industry, trade, the banks, various spheres of the infra-structure, and large plantations. But absolutely all forms of India's national capital, from that involved in

commerce and money-lending (which were in many ways medieval, primary forms of capital) to industrial, banking and even monopoly capital, were (and still are) linked to landownership and to the exploitation of the poor, enslaved peasantry—exploitation supported and guaranteed by the state power of the colonialists, by their mighty apparatus of coercion and by the *de facto* military occupation of the country.

This peculiarity of the Indian national bourgeoisie as a class brought forth a particular tactical line given the preponderance of feudal vestiges in the countryside. The specific political development of the oppressed nation, and above all the role of bourgeois nationalism, which obscured the contradictions both between classes and within the propertied classes themselves, had an effect on the alignment of political forces in the struggle against imperialism, leaving the bourgeoisie plenty of room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the peasantry. It made use of this in the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation, not allowing itself to be bound by the necessity to simultaneously develop the anti-feudal peasant movement.

All this allowed it to abdicate from active struggle against the feudal landowners who were ruining the Indian countryside, and forced it to compromise with the landlord class and to adopt the reformist course—even after it had come to power—of gradually and, for the peasantry, painfully getting rid of the vestiges of feudalism. And how could the Indian bourgeoisie revolt against the feudal landowning system, when, even before the First World War, but more so after it, it saw the rise of the Indian proletariat, and with time came face to face with the working class, who, led by class-conscious and organised party, were beginning to challenge the bourgeoisie (albeit from a great distance, as yet) for hegemony in the liberation movement?

Who then was the leader who, having the necessary political influence and a mass political organisation, could take upon himself the leadership of the peasantry and lead them into an anti-imperialist, but not anti-feudal, struggle?

This was Gandhi. There was no leader who was closer to the peasantry or who was better acquainted with the life in 500,000 Indian villages. The peasants called him Mahatma—the great soul, or, simply, the saint. But, while expressing in his own way both the maturing social protest and social hopes of the peasantry, and what Lenin called the ‘flabbiness of the patriarchal countryside’, Gandhi remained the leader of a liberation movement which was national-bourgeois in its class orientation. Gan-

dhi and the Indian National Congress were able to direct the ‘awakening’ of the peasantry and use its revolutionary potential in such a way as to achieve national independence without allowing the anti-imperialist struggle to develop into an agrarian social revolution.

And yet this was a country in which 80 per cent of the population lived in rural areas. The bourgeoisie wished to see a change in the semi-medieval social system only when it came to power itself and could do it in its own way, and mainly in its own interests, rather than in the interests of the majority of the peasants. It realised that only then could it start gradually restructuring the village to suit itself, by means of embourgeoisement of the landowners and by quickly developing the entrepreneurial minority of the peasantry at the expense of its toiling majority. How and to what extent it succeeded in this after independence is another matter, and one which has already been widely written about. Let us say merely that although capitalism has considerably developed in Indian agriculture, bourgeois reform has not resolved the agrarian question entirely. The poor peasant—whether he owns or rents his property—is still the chief figure of the Indian countryside, but the agricultural proletariat has also considerably grown, changing the character of village life.

The example of India confirmed the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the existence of two trends in any national liberation movement—one revolutionary and democratic, the other bourgeois-nationalist and reformist—and of the dual political role of the national bourgeoisie itself. Both trends aim to get rid of a foreign rule, and in this sense there is a natural union between them. A united anti-imperialist front has always been an important premise for the achievement and consolidation of national independence. But whereas the revolutionary-democratic trend aims to accomplish an agrarian revolution in the course of the struggle for national liberation, and then also to put through other social changes for the good of the people, the bourgeois-nationalist, reformist trend postpones these measures, and tries to separate the question of power from agrarian and social problems.

The Indian bourgeoisie would not have armed itself with the ideology of Gandhism if this ideology had not corresponded to its basic class, political interests, which were to get rid of British political rule and establish itself in power by peaceful means, supported by the mass movement led by Gandhi and using this movement for general national, and above all its class aims. Gandhism and the national bourgeoisie had much in com-

mon—not only the anti-colonialist struggle for Indian independence, but also the class and ideological unity which in the final analysis determines the objectively bourgeois character of a utopian 'peasant socialism' in a country developing along capitalist lines.

Of course, the Gandhian ideal of non-violence, firmly linked with the religious views of the peasantry, encouraged the development of the mass liberation struggle and helped draw the peasantry and petty urban bourgeoisie to the side of the national bourgeoisie, which found in the principle of non-violence a means of using the popular masses against the colonialists forcing them to leave India, while maintaining its class control over the people. Nor should one forget that the petty-bourgeois features of Gandhi's ideology and politics were to a large extent obscured by his political union with the bourgeois Indian National Congress and by his long term as its accepted leader.

The combination of the utopian thinker, rooted in the Indian village, with the sober, far-sighted politician, acting in the interests of the national bourgeoisie (which naturally had general national aspirations) prevented the peasant aspects of Gandhi's ideology from fully asserting themselves. This combination often led Gandhi to make compromises, behind which could be seen the contradictions characteristic of the various classes and social groups taking part in the national anti-imperialist struggle. For this reason it would be wrong to see Gandhism merely as the objective expression of the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie in the liberation movement. It is broader than this, and includes many elements which contradict such an interpretation. Gandhism has its roots in the complex interplay of social phenomena and forces in the Indian national liberation movement. It reflects both their common interests and their differences and contradictions. Gandhism came about in an agrarian country and therefore, let us stress once more, could not fail to express, in a distinctive form, the natural aspiration of the Indian working people for social justice—an aspiration which went beyond the class interests of the bourgeoisie.

Only if this feature of Gandhism is taken into account can one fully understand Gandhi's historical role, which was conditioned by his deep affinity with the Indian people. It is in this affinity that the secret of his influence lies. Even when collaborating closely with the bourgeoisie in ideological and political terms, Gandhi always strove sincerely to maintain his affinity with the popular masses. Moreover, it was this affinity which determined his

leading position and important role in the Indian National Congress. The following words of Lenin may shed more light on Gandhi's role and on the nature of his relationship with the national bourgeoisie and the peasantry: 'The chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause, is the peasant.'¹ Gandhi's ideology was a strong link between the national bourgeoisie and the broad peasant masses.

Research published before the war sometimes showed a lack of understanding of the difference between national and historical forms of mass struggle, and of the link between them, and in many cases a single method of struggle was proclaimed and absolutised. Sectarians and dogmatists in the national liberation movement today absolutise the method of armed struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racialism, rejecting all other, including peaceful, non-violent forms of struggle.

A one-sided approach in evaluating and using tactical methods of the masses' struggle and an attraction to the more radical of them, led people to forget the dialectical nature of this important question. Gandhi also held a one-sided approach: he proclaimed non-violent resistance to the colonialists and racialists as the only universal form of struggle. Many of his opponents at various stages of the liberation movement in India were inclined to deny, and just as vehemently and one-sidedly, the positive aspects of non-violent struggle. Non-violence was frequently seen by them as passivity, hording on reconciliation with reaction and colonialism. Such criticism was built on the denial in principle of Gandhi's philosophical credo of mass non-violent resistance, and this was both understandable and correct, but his opponents also applied this criticism indiscriminately to the method of political struggle against imperialism—and this was clearly wrong.

Scientific socialism in no way absolutises any one form of struggle, be it peaceful or violent. On the contrary, it recognises the necessity of the comprehensive use, combination and dialectical interpenetration of various forms of struggle, and the expediency of constantly renewing and enriching the arsenal of revolutionary methods, of testing, checking and selecting new effective forms of struggle. Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics do not require blind adherence to established forms and methods of struggle. They are not hound to any single form of mass struggle,

¹ V. I. Lenin, 'Democracy and Narodism in China', *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Moscow, 1968, p. 165.

even though it may be effective, but constantly strive to maintain a correspondence between the selected forms and methods of struggle and the nature, stage and aims of that struggle. Finally, they demand the readiness and ability of the leading political party to change the forms and methods of struggle quickly and decisively to suit the concrete historical conditions.

Communists have always made use of all the methods of struggle available, including, of course, non-violent methods. But Marxists certainly have a negative attitude to the Gandhian principle of *ahimsa*—non-violence—if it is made absolute. It is impossible not to see that in relation to the colonialists and racialists, the Gandhian principle of non-violence is very contradictory, combining active protest with tolerance of the enemy. It was in this combination that Gandhi saw non-violence as the only acceptable and possible form of resistance to the colonial-racist oppression. There is a purely metaphysical side to Gandhi's non-violence, connected to his religious dogmatism and to his ascetic approach to life. But it also undoubtedly includes the perfectly realistic idea of tactical use of peaceful forms of mass and individual anti-imperialist, anti-racist and in principle even anti-feudal and anti-capitalist struggle, although Gandhi never called for this.

It is quite clear that in Gandhi's specific interpretation of it during the years of struggle against British colonial rule in India and racialism in Southern Africa, the idea of *ahimsa* possessed considerable revolutionary potential. Gandhi undoubtedly did much to work out and put into practice his distinctive methods and forms of peaceful struggle against the colonialists. He lifted *ahimsa* out of the sphere of mere individual actions and made it a means of prolonged and purposeful mass struggle, linking it to the anti-imperialist and social demands of the people. He elaborated methods of mass non-violent action of the whole people against the order and legality enforced by the colonialists, against the constitution imposed by them on the oppressed people, and against the tyranny and despotism of the foreign rulers. The mass non-violent campaigns against British imperialism held in the twenties, thirties and forties under Gandhi's leadership demanded great courage of their participants and put the colonialists in an extremely embarrassing position. These campaigns quickly revolutionised the situation all over India.

It must be said that Gandhi was a brilliant leader of the mass non-violent movement, expertly aware of when the movement should be started, and when it would have the real support of tens

of millions of simple people all over the country. While noting Gandhi's qualities as leader and organiser of the specifically Indian form of the liberation movement, it should also be pointed out that no one in India knew better when the mass non-violent movement should be stopped, in order to prevent it from becoming its opposite, and, ultimately, from becoming a social revolution against the ruling classes and foreign conquerors. It follows that Gandhi never exhausted, and did not wish to exhaust, all the possibilities of mass non-violent resistance. For quite understandable reasons, these possibilities were hushed up by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress; they might have prepared the ground for the movement's transition to a higher level of decisive, uncompromising and unrestrained struggle against the colonialists, to the struggle of rural and urban working people against foreign and national exploitation. It was precisely this that Gandhi and the Congress strove to avoid by advocating 'pure' anti-imperialist struggle on the basis of national unity and by always holding the door open for negotiations with Britain.

Consequently, the left-wing criticism of Gandhi's great tendency to compromise was correct, but it would have been more convincing if it had been based not on a denial of the opportunities of non-violent anti-imperialist resistance, as was often the case in the twenties, thirties and forties, but on the inadmissibility of absolutising it with the help of religious dogmas and abstract moral categories, unrelated to the social and class nature of the forces taking part in the movement.

Let us look briefly at the application of Gandhi's principle of non-violence in international life. Because of the specific nature of international relations, this principle proves to be more realistic in relations between states than in the sphere of class relations. In the international sphere, *ahimsa*—its metaphysical essence aside—means none other than the refusal to use force or to declare war outside of the law, i. e., it affirms the principle of peaceful interstate relations. Gandhi's religious, utopian conception of refusal to apply force, as an absolute duty, did not prevent his arriving at fruitful conclusions about the need to strengthen friendship between nations, and to establish just interstate relations based on mutual respect, non-interference and the resolution of all contradictions by means of negotiation. In this respect Gandhi's ideas had a considerable influence on the foreign policy of the government of the Republic of India, created by Jawaharlal Nehru.

At the same time the Indians themselves rightly renounce the extremes of *ahimsa*, which often led Gandhi to adopt a defeatist attitude in international affairs to support the idea of self-sacrifice and to neglect the interests of the nation in the face of enemy aggression in the name of the principle of non-violence. An abstract, unhistorical interpretation of the problem of ensuring peace, regardless of the enemy's aggressive plans or actions, does not hold water.

The leaders of the national movement called for a decisive struggle against the colonial power, and expressed the mounting indignation of the popular masses at the medieval social oppression, landlord despotism and barbarous exploitation resulting from the capitalist industry which was springing up. But their democratism tended to go no further than the basically bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nation, which inevitably obscured class differences or, at best, gave rise to the desire for social compromise.

Certain social processes, however—the awakening of national self-awareness and intensification of social contradictions in the course of the development of bourgeois relations, the break-up of the patriarchal order of life and the ruin of the peasantry under the pressure of foreign capital and the ubiquitous penetration of 'local' capitalism, popular discontent with national and medieval social oppression, and finally the fact that many Indian intellectuals were now aware not only of liberal-bourgeois social thought but also of the criticism of bourgeois society—determined the democratic nature of the national leaders' ideological search, and gave birth to the dream of a society free of exploitation and oppression, although their conceptions of this were still purely utopian. Their social views had something in common with Russian Narodism and with the ideas of Lev Tolstoy. Our socio-historical interpretation of the ideological affinity between Tolstoy and Gandhi is based on Lenin's analysis of the great Russian writer's philosophy, and allows one to appreciate the serious difference between the basically bourgeois nationalist political views of Gandhi and the world-outlook of Tolstoy.

Gandhi's aspirations for national liberation and democracy conditioned the important fact that his development as leader of India's anti-imperialist movement was substantially influenced by the first Russian revolution, which roused the whole of Asia, including India. Among the most important ways in which this revolution affected India was Gandhi's perception of Tolstoy's

criticism and of the experience (limited by Gandhi's own views) of an organised mass liberation struggle; he considered the all-Russia political strike in October 1905 a great lesson for the Indian patriots, and called on them to show the same power as the Russians.

As far as Gandhi's attitude to the national bourgeoisie is concerned, one should bear in mind the peculiarities of that historical period, when they worked in close collaboration, when Gandhi became ideological leader of the Indian National Congress and the Congress acted as organiser and executor of Gandhi's plans, especially the mass non-violent campaigns under his leadership. It was a time when the objective need existed for a bloc comprising all anti-imperialist forces, including the national bourgeoisie. The period was characterised by the existence of a national anti-imperialist front which not only affected the relations between different—including opposite—classes, bringing them together on the common ground of the struggle against colonial rule, but also to a certain extent determined the political line adopted by these classes over a fairly long period.

Gandhi was closely linked to the national bourgeoisie, which stood at the head of the national liberation movement. The Indian National Congress's idea of achieving complete political independence, and its call for a relentless struggle against the colonialists, brought the bourgeoisie closer to the whole nation. It was this common aspiration of various classes for political independence that led to the thirty-year political union between the essentially petty-bourgeois democrat and utopian Gandhi and the bourgeois representatives of the National Congress, whose aim was to get rid of foreign rule in order to concentrate state power in their own hands.

Both sides—Gandhi and the National Congress—were aware of the temporary (though it lasted for a long time) nature of their concurrence of interests, and each side, of course, needed the other. In Gandhi, the Congress found a popular national leader, a brilliant tactician, and a determined politician capable of rallying round himself an active, vigorous, young generation of fighters, and with their help of stirring and winning the support of tens of millions of oppressed people. In the Congress, Gandhi found a powerful and experienced political organisation, unrivalled in India. Without going into the history of the relationship between Gandhi and the National Congress in detail, let us merely note that in the final period of the struggle against British imperialism, when the goal of political independence was in sight,

the conflicts between Gandhi and the bourgeois leadership of the Congress—conflicts which, covertly, had always existed—began to intensify dramatically.

Having attained power, many of the Congressmen forgot the democratic, humanistic ideals of Gandhi. He had fulfilled his mission by successfully concluding the long independence struggle he had led.

Gandhi had in mind a new phase in the struggle, involving campaigns of non-violent action with the aim of realising his broader social ideals. He was deeply disappointed with the results of decades of effort: the partition of India and the flaring up of Hindu-Muslim strife, accompanied by a horrible bloodbath. He was sickened by the almost universal flourishing of bourgeois money-grubbing, careerism and egoism. Once political independence was gained, Gandhi consistently advocated the struggle for economic, social and moral independence, i. e., for the establishment of social justice, for the triumph of *sarvodaya*.

Gandhi's attitude to the caste system, whose influence is still very substantial today, deserves some attention here. His views on the caste system and on the question of the Untouchables were influenced, on the one hand, by his natural peasant democratism, by his sympathy for the common people and by the need, of which he was deeply aware, to rally as wide strata of the population as possible to the anti-imperialist cause. On the other hand, these views were affected by a certain conservatism in Gandhi's views, by his attachment to religious traditions and his reformist theory of social evolution.

Gandhi repudiated the spirit of inequality and superiority which permeated caste customs, he could not accept the existence of castes, their rigid isolation and the prohibition of inter-caste association. But the bad aspects of the caste system were regarded by Gandhi not as the essence of the system, but merely as a perversion of it. Gandhi criticised these customs, considering the ideal form of social organisation to be the ancient system of the four *varnas*: Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (nobles and warriors), Vaisyas (traders and artisans) and Sudras (servants and land-tillers). He was convinced that a man's place in society was to a large extent predetermined by his hereditary abilities. And his basic sociological views were a reflection of this unhistorical and unscientific concept of the *varnas*. In this concept, the analysis of the social relations of a given class society gives way to abstract arguments about heredity, which lies at the root of Gandhi's theory of guardianship and paternalism. According to this theory,

landowners exist in order to act as fathers to the peasants, while capitalists are exclusively endowed with the gift of business management, so that the workers, intended by nature for physical labour, cannot, of course, have any claim to the running of a business.

On the question of the Untouchables, Gandhi was more consistent. He rightly considered the institution of untouchability to be a slur on India, and devoted much effort to the struggle to achieve equality before law for almost a third of the population. Gandhi's noble, democratic views on this question had an appreciable effect on Indian public opinion, and led both to legislation granting the Untouchables civic rights and to increased efforts aimed at improving their intolerable conditions of life.

However petty-bourgeois, peasant and therefore inconsistent the idea of a society of the 'welfare of all' might have been, an open, all-out struggle for it after political independence was gained, even using specifically Gandhian methods, would have been a great step forward. But this was prevented by the bourgeois-capitalist elite, whose egoism Gandhi condemned, but against whom he did not, and would hardly have been able to, raise a mass movement.

India's gaining of political independence brought considerable changes in the alignment of forces in the country and qualitative progress in national unity. Gandhism gradually ceased to function as the only ideological and political means for unifying different classes. This happened both as a result of objective conditions—the country's transition to independent bourgeois development, with all the consequences resulting from this—and as a result of the fact that this turning-point in the recent history of India almost coincided chronologically¹ with the death of the man whose personal qualities no less, perhaps, than his philosophical and political doctrine and activities helped to consolidate the national forces of the country. In the thirty odd years since the declaration of India's independence, there has been much progress in the ideological isolation and independent political organisation of opposing class forces. These tendencies have gone so far that there is now neither the former basis nor the former stability of the united national front, although the historical inertia of its

¹ India's independence was declared on 15 August 1947, and Gandhi was killed on 30 January 1948.

influence still tells on many classes and social strata in modern Indian society.

It should be borne in mind that since even today India is often the object of imperialist pressure, national unity continues to play a historically positive role in resisting this pressure, and in this respect the interests of all anti-imperialist, national-revolutionary, national-reformist and proletarian forces continue to coincide. As things stand today, the initiative for such resistance comes more and more often from left democratic and progressive circles, which, though still uncoordinated, are strengthening and pose a serious obstacle to the powerful monopolies and the reactionary forces of feudalism and Hinduism.

The above-mentioned realignment of class forces in India did not, of course, result in the disappearance of Gandhism from the political arena. Gandhi's authority was too great, and his influence, especially among the peasantry and petty urban bourgeoisie, too powerful for his ideas to stop being used in the political struggle, far less in political vocabulary. The concepts of Gandhism are widely used in the propaganda of all shades of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties. To a certain extent Gandhism has suffered the same fate as the former national anti-imperialist union formed in the course of the struggle for independence. Just as that union disintegrated and revealed more and more class contradictions, so there has been an ideological weakening of Gandhism. This process has been furthered by parties both to the right and to the left of the Indian National Congress and the latter also contributed to it. Bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movements, many of them vying with one another, use only certain of Gandhi's ideas, according to their own interests, giving them as a rule a tendentious, dogmatic interpretation, so that Gandhi's moral, political, economic and social doctrines are now distorted.

With its eternal, abstract, utopian categories, devoid of dialectical logic, Gandhism always tended to proclaim religious and moral postulates as the universal truths of political struggle. Now it has become a kind of holy scripture, and has suffered the same sad fate of all holy scriptures, in that people look to it for confirmation of the most diverse and mutually exclusive ideas, sometimes having nothing in common with the spirit of the original source or with the historical activities of its creator.

If we look at the literary sources of the period of Indian independence, it becomes apparent that the Indian reactionaries tried to make maximum use of Gandhi's authority and popularity. This

was seen in the way the right-wing forces within the National Congress, and also the reactionary Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties, tried to use the social and economic concepts of Gandhi as a basis for criticism of the at times inconsistent, but historically progressive, socio-economic changes brought about by the Congress, and for opposing state planning, the state sector, the industrialisation policy, the partial restrictions on the monopolies, and even the essentially bourgeois, limited, land reform.

The reactionary circles misuse Gandhi's name for the sake of undermining any feeling of trust between the peoples of India, and even for the sake of justifying the essentially harmful centrifugal forces cultivated in individual states by irresponsible elements, interested in weakening and destroying the unified, multinational India, and not in strengthening its unity and power. The reactionaries strive to undermine the friendly relations between the Republic of India and the socialist countries, and to whip up antagonism towards Indian democrats, progressive forces, the working class and the Communist Party.

The centrist circles in the Indian National Congress resorted to the Gandhian idea of non-violence to justify its inconsistency and sluggishness in working out and realising democratic reforms, as a result of which Gandhi's idea—which during the struggle against imperialism was marked by its vigour, mass appeal and mobility—was transformed into an unjustifiably prolonged acceptance of neglected and quite overt social evil.

In the thirty odd years of Indian independence, Gandhism has been a constant factor of political life. But after the defeat in the Indian National Congress elections which led to the fall of Indira Gandhi's government and the advent to power of the Janata Party, led by Morarji Desai, Gandhism, as the Indian press noted, became particularly fashionable. Circles close to the ruling party noticed a deviation of the Indian National Congress away from Gandhism, and basic differences in the approaches of Gandhi and Nehru to social and political problems. The slogan 'Back to Gandhi' was sounded, contrasting Gandhism with a number of progressive aspects of the Indian National Congress policy.

We are speaking here of a peculiar, selective approach to Gandhism. The supporters of a return to Gandhism call for accelerated development of domestic production and agriculture. In themselves these are correct proposals, suited to the needs of the national economy and drawn, indeed, from Gandhi's arsenal. But sometimes they are interpreted rather one-sidedly, contrasted with the policy of industrialisation, and linked to calls for

decentralisation of the economy and for priority to be given to agriculture at the expense of the state sector and major projects in heavy industry. The attention paid to domestic crafts and agriculture, which provide millions of Indians with work and a means of subsistence, are perfectly justified. But how could this be held up against the development of heavy industry, without which the country's sovereignty could not be guaranteed either in the economic or in the military sphere? Could the leading role of the state sector in creating a modern industrial base really be doubted? What developing country today is conceivable without a strong state sector?

The 'Back to Gandhi' call is often used to contrast the positions of Gandhi and Nehru. That the views of the two greatest leaders of the Indian liberation movement were strongly at variance, is self-evident, and both Gandhi and Nehru spoke a great deal of this, but they both also saw the common foundation which made them comrades-in-arms in the struggle for independence. Moreover, after the war Nehru grew closer to Gandhism (which, from our point of view, was not always for the better), as Gandhi himself had foreseen when, in 1942, he named Nehru as his political successor. If the Indian National Congress publications tended to exaggerate the affinities between Gandhi and Nehru, then the political opponents of the modern Indian National Congress strive to absolutise their differences. The 'return to Gandhi' thereby presupposes the rejection of Nehru. Both approaches are one-sided: a comparative study of their views shows the mutual influence of the two leaders. All his life Nehru found himself under the influence of Gandhi's principles and personality. Gandhi also accepted some of his younger friend's ideas, and acknowledged that they enriched the Congress's ideological platform, as is seen, for example, in his approval of the resolution on basic rights and an economic programme introduced by Nehru at the Congress session in Karachi in 1931.

To compare these two names is hardly justifiable. But something else is important: it appears that neither Gandhi nor Nehru could provide a solution to many of the problems of contemporary India. And yet it would be impossible to solve these problems without taking the legacy and influence of Gandhi and Nehru into account. Both have become part of the national consciousness, culture and life, although in Gandhi, perhaps, traditions and national sources prevailed, while in Nehru it was the orientation towards the future and the conviction that the whole

of mankind was united in its movement towards progress.

India will not choose between Gandhi and Nehru, but synthesise them. The question is what to take, and what to reject, from their legacies. This will be determined by the country's class-political situation.

Nowadays Gandhism is used in criticising various aspects of the Indian National Congress's economic policy, especially the correlation of industry and agriculture, the role of the state sector, domestic crafts and centralisation. As far as Gandhi's social ideal is concerned, his condemnation of capitalism as such, in industry and agriculture, and his aspiration for a society without classes and exploitation, these ideas remain outside of the interests of those who call for a return to Gandhi. The same can be said of Gandhi's methods of social transformation and pressure—*satyagraha* and guardianship. Guardianship meant more than just good will for Gandhi; he did not exclude legislative settlement, nor government intervention, nor resorting to the tested weapon of *satyagraha*.

Unfortunately the slogan of 'Back to Gandhi' does not imply actual efforts to realise the principles of *sarvodaya* and guardianship, or to revive Gandhi's utopian socialism.

As before, all shades of bourgeois politicians use Gandhi's ideas of guardianship and *sarvodaya*, which were to some extent understandable in a colonial society fighting against a foreign power, only to dull the working people's class consciousness in the new historical conditions of today, when the working class and peasantry are opposed above all by big monopoly capital, by the national bourgeoisie, with its pockets well-lined and heels dug in politically, and by the capitalist landowners.

The sincere and honest people, and there are many of them, who have remained faithful to Gandhi's anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and democratic ideals, have severely criticised the hypocritical attempts of the bourgeoisie to use his authority as a cover for their own selfish class aims. Even the most faithful of Gandhi's disciples, however, for example Vinobha Bhave, are now revising Gandhi's ideas. On the one hand, they tend to narrow down the social aspects of Gandhism, and on the other, they cannot bring themselves to use the well-tried method of non-violent resistance against the present-day propertied exploiting classes, so that they constantly slide from the principle of non-violent resistance to any social evil to calls for non-resistance in general. The active social character of Gandhi's ideas, his intervention in social and political affairs on the side of the

masses—even in the specific forms used by him—are forgotten by Indian bourgeois politicians and ideologists. The epigones of Gandhism tend to represent it purely as a road to personal moral perfection and as a categorical demand for conciliation between all classes.

It should be remembered that not all that masquerades under the name of Gandhism these days is in fact Gandhism. There are now widespread attempts in India to use Gandhi for ends which run entirely counter to the very essence of his doctrine.

A one-sided view of Gandhism as the ideology of the Indian national bourgeoisie cannot serve as a reliable basis with which to oppose these trends, since it does not expose the true meaning of these trends that aim to take control of popular ideology and put it at the service of capitalism and reaction.

The time which has elapsed since the Indian people gained independence allows us to take a more objective look at Gandhism. It is now clear that as an ideological and political doctrine created and practised by Gandhi himself, despite his tendency to compromise with the British government, Gandhism was nonetheless the sworn enemy of colonialism, bent on achieving the ultimate goal—national independence. Gandhi's compromises caused temporary recessions in the mass movement, but each time, under his leadership, the liberation movement was reborn on a higher level, putting forward more precise demands. Gandhi's life and work show beyond any shadow of doubt that he always remained faithful to the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-racist struggle and to a humanistic, though not always realistic, ideal of social justice which was close to the people, especially the peasants.

In many ways, the words of Nehru about Gandhi's social significance are very true.

'It should be remembered,' wrote Nehru, 'that the nationalist movement in India, like all nationalist movements, was essentially a bourgeois movement. It represented the natural historical stage of development, and to consider it or criticize it as a working-class movement is wrong. Gandhi represented that movement and the Indian masses in relation to that movement to a supreme degree, and he became the voice of the Indian people to that extent. He functioned inevitably within the orbit of nationalist ideology, but the dominating passion that consumed him was a desire to raise the masses. In this respect he was always ahead of the nationalist movement, and he gradually made it, within the limits of its own ideology, turn in this direction.'

'...It is perfectly true that Gandhi, functioning in the nationalist plane, does not think in terms of the conflict of classes, and tries to compose their differences. But the action he has indulged in and taught the people has inevitably raised mass consciousness tremendously and made social issues vital. And his insistence on the raising of the masses at the cost, wherever necessary, of vested interests has given a strong orientation to the national movement in favour of the masses.'¹

It is in the interests of progressive circles in India to undermine attempts to emasculate the democratic content of Gandhi's doctrine. Gandhi's name and ideas should not be used by the Indian bourgeois and landowner reactionaries, who, counter to the interests of the masses, ignore his anti-imperialism and democratic humanism.

Consistent Indian revolutionaries and supporters of scientific socialism have always had basic ideological and tactical differences of opinion with Gandhism. But they do treat Gandhi's work and noble aims with sincere respect. In their struggle for a better future for the Indian people, they use Gandhi's democratic and social ideal, making it more realistic and scientific. And they employ his methods of struggle, his mass movement tactics, realising that the Gandhian type of movement is a constituent part of the universal forms of mass national liberation and class struggle, elaborated by the world revolutionary movement.

It is imperative that all the democratic left forces in India be united. There should also be room in this unity for those who remain faithful to the ideals of that great fighter for Indian independence and to all the best aspects of his contribution to the national liberation movement.

Soviet researchers have often investigated Gandhism. In the past, they sometimes made mistakes, due to a certain one-sidedness in their approach, but this has been justly and firmly exposed. These mistakes were due to various reasons, including the long isolation of India from the Soviet Union and the international workers' movement, insufficient knowledge of India and of its specific conditions and highly original national traditions, which were reflected very strongly in Gandhism. Soviet research on India during the thirties and forties was also considerably

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *India and the World*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1936, pp. 172-73, 174-75.

influenced by a sectarian interpretation of various important matters at the general democratic stage of the Indian national liberation revolution, including the underestimation of the anti-imperialist role of the Indian national bourgeoisie. The evaluation of Gandhism in Soviet Marxist literature was bound also to be affected by the disparateness of the Indian national liberation movement itself, which occasionally led to political forces, which objectively should have been fighting together against imperialism, waging an uncoordinated struggle, or even fighting against each other. Finally, one should not forget the objective difficulties of studying such a complex and contradictory subject as Gandhism. In the heat of the anti-imperialist struggle and ideological debate between Marxists and national reformists, it was not always possible to grasp the subject in all its complexity.

All the attempts of Marxists to evaluate Gandhi's ideological platform and historical role are basically attempts to establish the place of scientific socialism and Gandhism in the conditions of the national liberation movement and the existence of a comparatively young national state, recently rid of colonial dependence. It is not a question of comparing the two ideologies, if only because they are incompatible and as different as science and utopia. It is a question of trends of development in the country's ideology and politics.

Although the ideas of Gandhism have always held sway over those of scientific socialism, it is between these two ideological trends that the main struggle for influence over the masses has always been waged. This was well understood by the Indian bourgeoisie, who in the years of the struggle for independence rated Gandhism highly as an ideology which could be used against scientific socialism, which was quickly gaining a foothold in India, especially in educated urban revolutionary circles, among left-wing democratic young people. The bourgeoisie and its party, the Indian National Congress, strove to find in Gandhism a kind of guarantee against the spread of scientific socialism among the workers, while at the same time expressing through Gandhism national anti-imperialist interests.

Today, too, Gandhism and scientific socialism represent the two main ideological trends in Indian society.

What, then, is the attitude to Gandhism in modern India? There are two main attitudes: on the one hand, Gandhism is understood as the system of Gandhi's views on anti-imperialism and peasant socialism, and on the other, there is the interpretation of Gandhism by the numerous bourgeois schools of thought, often

contradicting each other and the basic concepts of Gandhism itself, which take only certain of Gandhi's ideas and adapt them to suit their distinct class interests. In the first interpretation—as an offshoot of the Indian people's struggle for national liberation—Gandhism contains certain substantial elements of a general democratic nature. And because of this, one can speak of its affinity with any truly democratic, progressive movement. It is not difficult here to envisage the possibility in the future of a joint anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-racist, anti-war, anti-feudal and anti-monopoly struggle, waged by all democratic and progressive forces in India and defending the interests of the broad popular masses. Together, the supporters of scientific socialism and Gandhism could form a powerful united national-democratic front in the struggle for peace, for the consolidation of national independence, and for democracy and social progress in the interests of the Indian people. At the present time, all democratic and progressive social movements, including those in India, are united by certain common goals. One of these goals, proposed by Indian Marxists, is to limit, and then liquidate, foreign and national monopoly capitalism and to prepare the way for the gradual departure of the country from the road of capitalist development. This wonderful prospect demands joint efforts and calls for further differentiation amongst Gandhians and the consolidation of all honest supporters of social progress.

As regards the other interpretation of Gandhism, whereby it is used for the narrow class interests of the Indian big bourgeoisie and the reactionary forces which try to use Gandhi's social ideals against the democratic movement, in order to emasculate their anti-capitalist content—any attempt to find common ground with scientific socialism is simply pointless; the two are poles apart.

Even in the proper, politically untampered with, interpretation of Gandhism, however, there are elements which allowed the Indian bourgeoisie and reactionaries to turn it to their own advantage. Otherwise the bourgeoisie could never have taken it into their arsenal.

An analysis of Gandhism from the point of view of scientific socialism shows not only a certain kinship between it and bourgeois interests and ideas—something quite natural and inevitable in any national reformism and utopian socialism—but also a certain acceptability of Gandhism from the point of view of the bourgeoisie's class interests. The point is that the combination in Gandhism of ruthless exposure of capitalist society from moral

and religious positions with the putting forward of methods of changing this society that are anti-revolutionary in essence won the sympathy of the Indian bourgeoisie, in spite of Gandhi's critical attitude to bourgeois morality and the bourgeois way of life.

Gandhism has affinities with scientific socialism not only in the struggle for national independence. The utopian and archaic ideal of *sarvodaya* reflects a sincere concern for the welfare of the masses and the desire to improve the working people's position and bring about a society of social justice. Like all versions of utopian or national socialism, it reflects many principles advanced more than a century ago by scientific socialism: labour as a must for all, the abolition of exploitation of man by man and of the division of society into classes, public ownership of the basic means of production, and the distribution of material wealth according to one's work. That would appear to account for most of the similarities in the approaches of Gandhism and scientific socialism to the most important problems facing the Indian people. In all other respects they disagree. The differences are everywhere: in their criticism of capitalist society, in the ideal of socialism, in the methods for achieving it, and in their concepts of classes and class struggle, of the future state, and of those social and party political forces which are historically destined to bring about, and which are really capable of bringing about, social justice on Earth. In all these basic questions of the theory and practice of changing modern society, scientific socialism and Gandhism are in opposition, like science and utopia, or materialism and idealism, or dialectics and metaphysics.

Sometimes Gandhi gave vivid exposures of capitalist and feudal oppression. Here is one example.

Asked how, in his opinion, the Indian princes, landlords, mill-owners, money-lenders and other profiteers were enriched Gandhi replied: 'At the present moment by exploiting the masses.' He stressed that these classes had no social justification for living in greater comfort than the common workers and peasants, whose labour created the wealth.¹ But these motives were not crucial in Gandhi's criticism of modern exploiting society. His condemnation of 'European' civilisation was characterised by the absence of a clear social orientation and by ignorance of the real ways and methods to overcome the vices in society he was aware of. These qualities were apparent in the fact that he determined the object

¹ M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-Violent Socialism*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1957, p. 161.

of criticism not as bourgeois civilisation, but as 'European', machine civilisation. 'It was not,' wrote Gandhi, 'that we did not know how to invent machinery, but our forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fibre. They, therefore, after due deliberation decided that we should only do what we could with our hands and feet.'² Hence, it is not the capitalist mode of production which lies at the centre of Gandhi's criticism, but machine production in general which, it appears, was vetoed by the forefathers of today's Indians. It is in machinery that Gandhi saw the source of social evils—unemployment, exploitation, the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few, etc. He does not say that all these results of the development of big business are transient and class-determined; it is not the exploiting classes that are seen as the enemy, but the machinery.

As far as the relations between classes in the process of machine production are concerned, Gandhi did not perceive them as the objective basis for the appearance of those vices which he castigated. He was aware of the existence of class contradictions, but did not attach vital importance to them, seeing them as a superstructure built on essentially healthy human relations. 'Class war is foreign to the essential genius of India,' he said.² Contradictions emerged and intensified as a result of greed, egoism, moral degradation and delusion. The normal state of relations between zamindars (landowners) and ryots (peasants), and between capitalists and workers, ought to have been peaceful collaboration. Gandhi ignored the class and economic laws of social development. His philosophy of history was idealist, based on lack of knowledge of the political and economic laws governing the historical process. Therefore, his ideas about the very best and most just social transformations were marked by subjectivism and voluntarism. According to Gandhi, people had to imbue their minds with high morality and then, with time, social justice would inevitably come about. The class peace, and the paternalism of the propertied classes over the propertyless, were part and parcel of Gandhism. And if a class war were to break out, then only because the capitalists and landowners grew insensitive to their responsibility, forgetting that they were supposed to be fathers of

¹ *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. X, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1963, p. 37.

² M. K. Gandhi, *Sarvodaya (The Welfare of All)*, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1954, p. 89.

the 'family', a part of it. Gandhi wrote: 'In the West an eternal conflict has set up between capital and labour. Each party considers the other as its natural enemy. That spirit seems to have entered India also, and if it finds a permanent lodgement, it would be the end of our industry and of our peace. If both the parties were to realize that each is dependent upon the other, there will be little cause for quarrel.'¹

Gandhi did not take into account the fact that the social and economic conditions of people's social and personal lives, and the bourgeois or feudal mode of production of material and cultural commodities, are an insurmountable obstacle to the universal spread of high moral principles. Gandhi's non-violent method of changing the world is an old, honest and sincere (but, as has been shown over the centuries, and in Indian history in particular fruitless) call on the exploited not to use violence against the exploiters, a call on the exploiters to be kind towards those they exploit. Nehru's approach to the problem, during the years of the independence struggle, was much closer to reality. In his Autobiography, he wrote: 'If there is one thing that history shows it is this: that economic interests shape the political views of groups and classes.... It [non-violence] can, I think, carry us a long way, but I doubt if it can take us to the final goal.... The present conflicts in society, national as well as class conflicts, can never be resolved except by coercion.'²

We have outlined Gandhi's criticism of 'European' civilisation, and the concepts developed by him almost a century after the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* and Marx's *Capital*. After the rise of the first socialist country in the world, in an age when the machine civilisation which Gandhi hated, i.e., capitalism, was being overthrown by revolution, such doctrines seemed utopian, and against the background of the scientific theories of Marxism Gandhi's criticism of capitalism was simply helpless.

Marx was also a passionate—and profound—exposer of the vices of 'European' civilisation. But he spoke not of European, but of capitalist civilisation. With scientific irrefutability, Marx demonstrated the catastrophe which befell the working masses because of the introduction of machine production, but for him the trouble lay not in the machinery but in the capitalist methods of industrialisation. Disclosing these methods, he also showed the historical inevitability of the colonialist annexations made by

capitalism, including the British subjugation of India, with all the horrors committed there by the bearers of European civilisation. Marx revealed the class nature of bourgeois civilisation and of the utilisation of machinery.

It was the scientific nature of Marx's critique of capitalist society that led him to such a well-founded and convincing definition of socialism as the society which would resolve all the contradictions of the capitalist system. But nonetheless, this society arises on the material basis of capitalism and makes use of all its valuable technological progress, particularly its heavy industry and machine production. Gandhi's emotional, romantic approach to bourgeois civilisation, on the other hand, naturally led to his illusory, utopian conceptions of socialism.

Gandhi continued the tradition of the first utopians who saw the triumph of their abstract ideals of justice in the form of a return to the 'golden' age. *Sarvodaya*, or the welfare of all, as described by Gandhi, is an idealised image of the Indian peasant community with its closed, self-contained economy, the unification of trade and agriculture and extremely primitive implements. This was a community which never protected its members from oppression by Asiatic despots, conquerors or tribal lords, turning feudal, which was always based on the cruel laws of the caste system and which, for centuries, isolated the country and its people from the outside world. This idyllic community ceased to exist long ago, first under the influence of the commodity economy, which undermined the ancient community principles, then under capitalism, led by the British colonialists, and now under the national bourgeoisie, landowners, capitalists and the growing class of wealthy peasants.

Gandhi's *sarvodaya* is not so much a reflection of Indian reality, in which there are, of course, no elements of *sarvodaya*, as the result of yearning for the past. Only Gandhi's indistinct conception of the onward march of history, and of the irreversible evolution of mankind from a lower to a higher stage, could allow the archaic picture of *sarvodaya* to appear as an ideal for the future. For Gandhi, since the movement forward and modern machine civilisation entail social evils and moral suffering for the people, there was no alternative but to return by force of will to patriarchal moral simplicity. Gandhi appealed not to the future but to the past, looking for the basis of the new society not in the elements of social progress which capitalism, despite itself, brings about, but in the surviving remnants of doomed forms of production and social life.

¹ M. K. Gandhi, *Towards Non-Violent Socialism*, p. 42.

² J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, pp. 544, 551.

Even if the impossible were to be done, and the artificial creation of a *sarvodaya* type of society succeeded, then this certainly would not lead to the implementation of socialist principles. On the one hand, the extreme technological backwardness of this society would obstruct economic, cultural and moral progress and deprive the calls for universal plenty and cultural growth of real meaning. On the other hand, even in this artificially recreated and isolated cell of society, due to the inexorable inner laws of social development, there would be a resurgence of those elements of decay and decadence which in the course of long historical change had already once led to the degeneration of the Indian community into an archaic institution, sanctifying feudal and capitalist exploitation (and usually a mixture of the two) with ancient customs of a pseudo-democratic character.

In analysing Gandhism from the point of view of scientific socialism, particular attention is usually paid—and rightly so—to the problem of the means and methods of social change. Gandhism made its banner non-resistance to evil, i.e., non-violence, and Gandhi is ascribed having discovered and applied this method. Marxism, on the other hand, is portrayed by many of its critics (including some of Gandhi's followers), whose knowledge of Marxism stems from secondary, and often distorted, sources, as the unconditional denial of the principle of non-violence, as a synonym for bloody armed struggle and an armed violent movement. Of course, such an interpretation of the relationship between Gandhism and scientific socialism on the question of violence and non-violence suits the ideological opponents of scientific socialism down to the ground. But such ideas have nothing in common with reality, or with the real attitude of scientific socialism towards the ways and means of struggle for national and social liberation.

It would be difficult to convince anyone today that the supporters of scientific socialism—true revolutionaries, not dogmatists or adventurers—always stand for armed violent struggle if only it is revolutionary. Such views run entirely counter to historical facts, to the theory and revolutionary practice of Marxism. Marxists-Leninists have always been ready to use even the smallest possibilities of peaceful development of the national liberation movement and social revolution, and have always considered that from the point of view of the workers' and all the working people's real interests, peaceful means are preferable to armed struggle. Gandhi's non-violent methods, if one ignores their metaphysical and religious basis, represent in practice none other

than peaceful, unarmed methods of struggle. Gandhi did not discover them, though it is quite clear that he was outstandingly successful in elaborating and applying these methods against the power of the British colonialists and South African racialists, and in lending them a true mass character and thus making them effective. Long before Gandhi appeared on the Indian political stage, all or almost all of the means included in the arsenal of *satyagraha*—hunger-strikes, demonstrations, local and general strikes, non-payment of taxes, and the boycotting of colonial and racialist powers—had been widely used by the international workers' and national liberation movements. The peasant movement in Western Europe, Russia, Latin America and many countries of Asia, which developed from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, and the workers' movement since the eighteenth century, are all well acquainted with these forms and methods of mass struggle. The innovation of Gandhism was not the invention and use of these methods, but above all their application against the British colonialists, and also the upholding of them as the only moral methods, sanctified by religious traditions.

The history of the national liberation struggle in India has seen huge anti-colonialist demonstrations, general workers' strikes, mass peasant movements and a wide student and youth movement. It has seen armed uprisings by workers, peasants, seamen of the Indian fleet and soldiers of the Anglo-Indian army. The movement knows many examples of courage and self-sacrifice. Specifically proletarian, revolutionary methods of struggle played an important part in the movement, sometimes exerting a decisive influence on it, though the backbone of the movement, of course, was the peasantry and petty urban bourgeoisie, who followed Gandhi.

Gandhism proclaimed non-violence as the sole and universal method of struggle, capable of resolving all the national and social contradictions in a class society or oppressed country by the most painless means. Life has shown this not to be true. Scientific socialism justly, in full accordance with life, with the age-old experience of mankind and above all with the experience of the struggle waged by the working class and peasantry in all countries, refuses to absolutise or dogmatise any single method of struggle and force it uncritically on the people, without consideration of the current political situation, and the historical and national conditions.

When peaceful methods prove ineffective because of the fierce

resistance of foreign colonisers or the indigenous bourgeoisie and landowners, when they unleash an armed struggle, i.e., a civil war, against the people, Marxists—in view of the actual situation—propose a transition to more decisive methods of struggle, including the highest form of class struggle—armed uprising and civil war. When Gandhians are forced to admit the impossibility of satisfying their demands and ideals by non-violent means because of the violence of the colonisers, they emphasise the moral unpreparedness of the people for victory in view of their not observing the religious and ethical principles of the non-violent movement and in view of the masses' justly replying to the colonialists' violence with violence, and call on the masses to forget the final aims of the movement, demanding that they reconcile themselves with the impracticability of the goals of their struggle and take comfort in the awareness that they had performed their moral and religious duty. This is where the real difference between Gandhism and socialism on the question of the methods of mass struggle lies.

Nehru's attitude to the question was interesting. With the greatest respect for Gandhi, he declared: 'For us and for the National Congress as a whole the non-violent method was not, and could not be, a religion or an unchallengeable creed or dogma. It could only be a policy and a method promising certain results, and by those results it would have to be finally judged. Individuals might make of it a religion or incontrovertible creed. But no political organisation as long as it remained political, could do so.'¹

This is fairly exhaustive and clear. Methods of mass struggle are not given once and for all, they depend on the political climate, on the aims and results of the struggle, and, we would add, on the behaviour of the enemy. If the enemy does not yield, and oppresses the people, then it must be forced to yield, with arms being used, if political organisation is of immense importance for the forces of democracy and progress. Therefore the question of the leading political party and of the socialist state and of the relation to them of the fighters for national liberation and social justice is central. And in this question Gandhism cannot serve as a reliable guide for the working people, although Gandhi often rightly criticised the bourgeois state, bourgeois democracy and particularly the colonial and racialist state.

Scientific socialism sees in the socialist state the main weapon for the reorganisation of society, and in the party it sees the most

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Mahatma Gandhi*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, Calcutta, 1966, pp. 49-50.

reliable and only possible political organisation capable of preparing and carrying through revolutionary changes. Scientific socialism poses the working people with a complex task—to organise themselves politically, basing themselves on the party, to solve, under its guidance and in their own interests, the question of state power—the cardinal question of all revolutions—and thus to take possession of this mighty lever of influence on their lives and on the transformation of society for the benefit of the working and exploited people.

Gandhism proceeds from anarchistic conceptions of the state as unconditional evil, and even when Gandhi was forced to admit that the independent national state could and should be used in the interests of progress, his position was still to have nothing to do with power, for in his opinion all power corrupts. Some of Gandhi's contemporary followers appeal to the workers from the same position, suggesting they should reconcile with the fact that representatives of the privileged classes are in power. Gandhism does not propose that the workers create their own political parties, but it is not against their having lower forms of organisation. Thus the political arena is placed at the disposal of representatives of the educated class, the bourgeois intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie itself. This leads to the working people being defenceless in face of the class enemy, who is in full possession of state power and party organisation.

Gandhi's greatest service was that he always called for the masses to be drawn into the social movement. It can be said without exaggeration that Gandhi's name, his anti-imperialist policy and tactics and bold appeal to the people, are at the root of the Indian liberation movement transition from the bourgeois loyalty towards the colonialists and respectful attitude towards the British authorities which characterised the National Congress prior to Gandhi, from the petty-bourgeois terrorism of the national extremists, to a truly mass, popular movement for independence. And yet the role of the masses is understood differently by Gandhism and scientific socialism. The adherents of scientific socialism aim to awaken, develop and exploit the revolutionary potential of the working classes, to spark off their initiative, and to give their revolutionary energy an outlet in diverse and purposeful forms of struggle. They believe in the masses, in their revolutionary creativity, and in their ability not only to destroy the old society and do away with its vestiges which hold up progress, but also to build a new, better society. The Gandhians, on the other hand, always hold the masses within the limits of non-violence.

They need the masses as executors of the leadership's will, and the masses must act within the strictly defined limits of peaceful resistance. Gandhism always contained an element of deep mistrust towards the independent revolutionary creativity of the masses in the liberation movement. Hence, one can understand why the attitude of Gandhism to the popular masses is defined by the formula of guardianship.

Gandhi, like no other, could raise the Indian people against the colonialists, but at the same time he could, like no other, hold the masses back from open revolution, ensuring for himself the possibility of holding talks with the colonial powers. It is self-evident that these tactics of Gandhi's made him the most outstanding leader of the liberation movement under the guidance of the bourgeoisie.

This is also the starting point of two approaches to the working class. For Marxism-Leninism, this is the leading class, destined in the course of historical development to play a major role in the struggle for a society of social justice. For Gandhi, it was a product of European civilisation, a class supposedly not yet fit for political life, not understanding its place in it, or the needs of the nation.¹ Scientific socialism counts above all on the industrial proletariat. Gandhism sees it as a potential opponent of the principles of non-violence, is afraid of its political activity and strives to limit it by a reformist struggle for an improvement in the material standard of living. 'I don't deny,' said Gandhi, 'that such strikes can serve political ends. But they do not fall within the plan of non-violent non-cooperation. It does not require much effort of the intellect to perceive that it is a most dangerous thing to make political use of labour until labourers understand the political condition of the country and are prepared to work for the common good. This is hardly to be expected of them all of a sudden and until they have bettered their own condition so as to enable them to keep body and soul together in a decent manner. The greatest political contribution, therefore, that labourers can make is to improve their own condition.'² This is the source of Gandhi's negative attitude towards the idea of forming a leading political party of the proletariat.

The basic features of scientific socialism and Gandhism noted above determine the attitudes of the ruling classes in India to them.

The attitude of these classes to scientific socialism is irreconcilable. They have always seen it as an uncompromising enemy of the very base of capitalism. The ideologists of the ruling classes have always related to Gandhism with extreme sympathy. Many Indian bourgeois ideologists try to establish it as the national world-view—in spite of the sincere, subjective anti-capitalism of Gandhi and his true followers. Why should this be? The fact is that for all its anti-capitalism, Gandhism proved practically harmless to the capitalist development of India, precisely because of the basic features discussed above. It has become, as it were, a constituent part of the bourgeois order in contemporary India, which in many spheres of the economy has reached the stage of monopoly capitalism. Bourgeois ideologists are trying to find a new application for Gandhism—the defence of the present social system from infringements by the exploited classes.

Gandhi's non-violent methods were effective enough in the struggle against the colonialists for national independence and, combined with the non-Gandhian, sometimes quite extreme, violent methods employed by the masses despite Gandhi, led to the creation of an independent Indian state. But since then the Gandhian doctrine has proved powerless to bring about any substantial change in the position of hundreds of millions of working people.

The task of the ruling classes in contemporary Indian society is to split the workers' movement and weaken the influence of left-wing circles and of scientific socialism. This has led to a combination of diverse methods of class struggle, from political manoeuvring to cruel repression, from propaganda of the utopian ideas of Gandhism, 'Indian socialism', to the terror of Shiv Sena, a fascist organisation created by Bombay monopolists to intimidate the working people. In reality, then, the methods of Gandhism are used today in the interests of the working people, and against those of the bourgeoisie, only when they are used by left-wingers in the mass *satyagraha* campaigns, held in support of the socio-economic and socio-political demands of the working people.

Modern Gandhism still retains some general democratic traits which have not lost their importance. With American capital and its ideology advancing in India, with the growth of Indian monopolies and the resultant intensification of anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly movement, broad collaboration between all democratic progressive forces is still possible. Since the war, and especially in the last few years, a number of non-Marxist ide-

¹ *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. X, Chapter VI, pp. 6-63.

² Mahatma Gandhi, *Young India*, 1919-1922, Madras, 1922, pp. 737-39.

logical trends in the national liberation movement have grown closer to scientific socialism (national democracy). Gandhism has not developed in this way. While emphasising the democratic content of Gandhism, one must bear in mind that with the majority of its adherents it has tended to grow away from scientific socialism.

One may not agree with Gandhism, but it is essential to know, study and respect it as an important and—despite the enormous influence of Gandhi's striking personality—a largely objective phenomenon in Indian history.

Difference of opinion does not preclude respect. Gandhi himself was a fine example of this. He could not share all the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he reproached the Communists for their atheism and support of class struggle, but he did acknowledge the justice and grandeur of the Bolsheviks' ultimate goals and the magnificence of Lenin, the leader of the revolution.

Gandhi continues to enjoy great respect among the Indian people. For this reason Gandhism must be studied in detail and in all its aspects, and a scientific approach must be taken to criticising and overcoming it, and to the complex socio-economic and political problems of modern India.

The Soviet people all express profound respect to Mahatma Gandhi for his enormous contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle against colonialism, to the cause of ridding his country of foreign rulers.

The Soviet people are well aware that Gandhi was always in the midst of the Indian people, sharing their lives, reflecting their hopes and aspirations. He always found inspiration in the people's difficult struggle against the British rulers, in their selflessness and courage, and strove honestly and sincerely to lighten their destinies, to avert disaster and to inspire them in their search for a new, more perfect society.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Jawaharlal Nehru has gone down in history as an outstanding politician, one of the greatest leaders of the national liberation movement, a fighter for peace, democracy and social progress, a sworn enemy of social injustice and national oppression, and a sincere friend of the Soviet Union.

For several decades his name was inseparably linked with the struggle for the liberation of India from colonial enslavement, for its rebirth and development as a sovereign state. From 15 August 1947, when Nehru raised the national tricolour flag above the historic Red Fort in Delhi, he led the independent country for almost 17 years, helping it come to life again and abolish colonialism, the legacy of feudalism and age-old backwardness.

Under Nehru's guidance, India was reorganised into states according to national, ethnic and language factors, thus putting an end to the British administrative system, based on the principle of 'divide and rule'. The feudal division of the country was abolished and initial agrarian reforms were implemented, undermining the power of the big landowners. Nehru led the restructuring of the economy along the lines of a planned economy, and started the policy of industrialisation which was decisive for the country's economic growth. Nehru's initiative led to the creation of a powerful, and strengthening, state sector. He was a thorough-going democrat, a fighter for equality, an opponent of caste vestiges and religious-tribal reaction and supporter of lasting national unity in India, based on a combination of the principles of democracy and centralism.

Nehru's activities were not confined to politics. He was a man of great spiritual culture, encyclopaedic erudition and a deeply philosophical frame of mind. His writings combine universal education, breadth of interests, originality and sharp-wittedness with the warm, temperamental, dramatic, lively approach of a man who sought, fought and sometimes doubted and retreated, but who always retained his belief in progress. He was a thinker and a poet. And even without his outstanding political work, resting on his works alone, he would, it seems, have earned the attention and interest of future generations. But Nehru's literary work cannot be separated from his political biography. 'The more action and thought are allied and integrated, the more effective they become and the happier you grow,' he wrote.¹ His historical and philosophical deliberations were not an end in themselves, but a search for the answer to the most important problems troubling his country and the world. He turned to the past in order to understand the present and foresee the future. History was for him a school of life, experience and struggle, a source for developing a world outlook. And Nehru approached it as an active politician, forced to study by practical needs. 'My fascination for history,' he wrote, 'was not in reading about odd events that happened in the past but rather in its relation to the things that led up to the present. Only then did it become alive to me. Otherwise it would have been an odd thing unconnected with my life or the world.'²

He approached history as a rationalist, without *a priori*, unhistorical categories, looking for its inner meaning and logic. Nehru also looked at his own country's past in this way. His attitude shows no trace of uncritical admiration of the past, of any idea that India's history was exceptional and isolated, or subject to a spiritual law inherent in that country alone. His views were free of religious or moral mysticism of a type fairly common in India. The traditions of European rationalism and culture—critically absorbed by Nehru, who was educated in Europe—influenced his ideas on history, particularly as they affected India, and helped him to avoid prejudiced idealisation and see his country as it was in relation to other countries. 'India was in my blood and there was much in her that instinctively thrilled me. And yet I approached her almost as an alien critic, full of dislike for the present as well as for many of the relics of the past that I

saw. To some extent I came to her via the West, and looked at her as a friendly westerner might have done.'¹

Having refused to look for the meaning of history outside of itself, Nehru came to acknowledge the inner laws of historical development and thus took an important step towards a realistic, one might almost say materialist, understanding of the historical process. 'In Asia,' he said, 'many historical forces have been at work for many years past and many things have happened which are good and many things which are not so good, as always happens when impersonal historical forces are in action. They are still in action. We try to mould them a little, to divert them here and there, but essentially they will carry on till they fulfil their purpose and their historical destiny.'² Nehru's recognition of objective laws led him to realise the direction of the historical process upwards in a spiral, to understand it as an objective and progressive course of events proceeding from lower to higher. These elements of his world-outlook had a positive effect on his political work, which he approached not as a voluntarist or moralist, or from a religious point of view, but scientifically, trying to bring it into line with the general, objective course of history and subjugate it to progressive trends. It was in obeying the command of time, predetermined by the whole preceding development of mankind, that Nehru saw the justification and realism of the political course and political struggle. It was in this way that he tried to elaborate his policy course. He said that ideals and goals could not run counter to historical tendencies. He consistently adhered to the progressive scientific conception that the real agent of history is the people, and that the activities of political leaders should be subordinated to the struggle to satisfy the hopes and aspirations of the popular masses. Nehru stressed: 'The people were the principal actors, and behind them, pushing them on, were great historical urges.... But for that historical setting and political and social urges, no leaders or agitators could have inspired them to action.'³

Nehru's views on the laws governing the historical process and the role of the masses show the influence of the ideas of scientific socialism. His world-outlook took shape under the influence of many schools; it is not unique. But can he be considered an eclec-

¹ J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

² Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Selected Speeches, September 1946–August 1961. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1958, p. 472.

³ J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru's *Speeches*, Vol. 3, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi, 1958, p. 472.

² Jawaharlal Nehru's *Speeches*, Vol. 2, Delhi, 1957, p. 383.

tic? His views must not be studied simplistically. Nehru strove to know and assimilate as much as possible of the experience accumulated by mankind and to select the best of it. Sometimes in the political struggle he used isolated premises from various philosophical systems, and this, of course, prevented him from seeing their irreconcilability, their antagonism. And then he inevitably tended towards eclecticism, which he wanted at all costs to avoid. He preferred 'a mental or spiritual attitude which synthesises differences and contradictions, tries to understand and accommodate different religions, ideologies, political, social and economic systems'.¹

No one succeeded yet in creating a 'synthesis' of ideologies. And he knew it. The contradictory elements in his world-outlook were not unified or reconciled. It is impossible to unite that which is irreconcilable, antagonistic and class-opposed. Being an honest researcher, Nehru often self-critically reviewed his original ideas, trying to move forward and perfect them. The direction of his political and social searches, the trends of their development, were fruitful and are still important today. In seeking an answer to the problems of the anti-imperialist struggle and the future of former colonies, Nehru strove to keep in step with the times.

Nehru imbibed the traditions of ancient Indian culture and the rich history of the national liberation movement, especially the philosophy and practice of Gandhism. He assimilated all that West European bourgeois liberalism had to offer, receiving his education in its cradle, Great Britain, and turned in his disappointment to socialist ideas, at first in their Fabian version. But having once turned to the ideals of equality and social justice, Nehru was bound to perceive, by force of his critical, searching mind, many of the premises of scientific socialism. Nehru did not resist this process. On the contrary, he eagerly studied the theory and practice of scientific socialism and found much there that was applicable in India. Nehru was one of the first national liberation leaders unafraid of speaking of the importance of Marxism-Leninism, seeing in it the logic of historical development, the call of times.

Nehru repeatedly underlined the positive influence of the ideas of scientific socialism on his own world-outlook. He wrote: 'The theory and philosophy of Marxism lightened up many a dark corner in my mind. History came to have a new meaning for me. The Marxist interpretation threw a flood of light on it, and it

became an unfolding drama with some order and purpose, howsoever unconscious, behind it. In spite of the appalling waste and misery of the past and the present, the future was bright with hope, though many dangers intervened. It was the essential freedom from dogma and the scientific outlook of Marxism that appealed to me.'² Elsewhere, he wrote: 'A study of Marx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on my mind and helped me to see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social development appeared to have some meaning, some sequence, and the future lost some of its obscurity.'²

Scientific socialism attracted Nehru not only as a theory. The reason for its appeal was that Nehru was delighted and attracted by the colossal and unprecedented experiment in revolutionary change which took place before his eyes in Soviet Russia. 'While the rest of the world was in the grip of the depression and going backward in some ways, in the Soviet country a great new world was being built up before our eyes. Russia, following the great Lenin, looked into the future and thought only of what was to be, while other countries lay numbed under the dead hand of the past and spent their energy in preserving the useless relics of a bygone age. In particular, I was impressed by the reports of the great progress made by the backward regions of Central Asia under the Soviet regime. In the balance, therefore, I was all in favour of Russia, and the presence and example of the Soviets was a bright and heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world.'³

Nehru followed the social changes in Soviet Russia with great interest. He made his first trip to the country with his father Motilal Nehru, an important figure in the Indian National Congress, in 1927, during celebrations to mark a decade of Soviet power. What he saw brought him to the conclusion 'that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new civilisation towards which the world could advance'.⁴

Nehru showed great interest in Lenin, in his personality, theories and practical work. Evaluating his role in history, Nehru wrote that 'millions have considered him as a saviour and the greatest man of the age'.⁵ He called Lenin 'a master mind and a

¹ J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, op. cit., pp. 262-63.

² J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, op. cit., p. 14.

³ J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, op. cit., pp. 361-62.

⁴ J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

¹ *The Mind of Mr. Nehru. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, p. 89.

genius in revolution'.¹

Nehru's ideal was the unity of thought and action, of theory and practice. The influence of scientific socialism and his high appraisal of the historical merits of the USSR naturally led him to recognise the necessity of bringing about radical socio-economic changes in India, and to proclaim socialism first as the ideal social system and later as the ultimate goal of political activity.

In his presidential address to the INC at Lucknow in 1936, Nehru said: 'I am convinced that the only key to the solution of the world's problems and of India's problems lies in Socialism, and when I use this word I do so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific, economic sense.... I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation, and the subjection of the Indian people except through Socialism. That involves vast and revolutionary changes in our political and social structure, the ending of vested interests in land and industry.... That means the ending of private property, except in a restricted sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a higher ideal of co-operative service.... In short, it means a new civilisation, radically different from the present capitalist order.'²

Nehru saw the socialist transformation of society as the natural result of the world's historical development. He stressed that capitalism 'is no longer suited to the present age', that the world had outgrown it. He noted that the scientific and technical revolution made the need for socialism particularly clear, and that the modern scientific approach was also a socialist approach.³

At the same time, Nehru was one of the first leaders of the anti-colonialist movement to make quite clear that the movement towards socialism was a specific need for developing countries, an objectively predetermined road of progress for states liberated from imperialist rule, including India. In this thesis, Nehru anticipated many arguments later put forward by other politicians in Africa and Asia. He clearly stated the unacceptability of capitalism for the developing countries, as they had no time to achieve progress by the same methods, or at the same rate, as the Western world once used. 'Are we to follow the English, French and the American way?' he asked. 'Have we time of 100 to 150 years to reach our destination? This is impossible. We will perish in the

process.'¹ The idea that only socialism could allow the former colonial peoples to wrench themselves out of their backwardness was also put forward in his well-known article 'The Basic Approach': 'It has to be remembered that it is not by some magic adoption of socialist or capitalist method that poverty suddenly leads to riches. The only way is through hard work and increasing productivity of the nation and organising an equitable distribution of its products. It is a lengthy and difficult process. In a poorly developed country, the capitalist method offers no chance. It is only through a planned approach on socialistic lines that steady progress can be attained, though even that will take time.'²

Nehru's sympathetic attitude towards socialism reflected an important shift which took place in Indian democratic social thought first under the influence of the Russian Revolution and the achievements of socialism in the USSR, and then under the influence of the defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism in the Second World War, which opened the way to India's success in the national liberation struggle.

In his speeches regarding the social and economic policies of the ruling party of the Indian National Congress after independence, Nehru laid the main stress on the need for industrialisation and planning in order to ensure independent national development and an improvement in the economy and in the welfare of the people. He said, 'Broadly our objective is to establish a Welfare State with a socialist pattern of society, with no great disparities of income and offering an equal opportunity to all.'³

Nehru recognised the objective need for the reorganisation of Indian society along socialist lines, although his understanding of the actual process, of the forms and methods of reorganisation, betrayed his own specific, mainly subjectivistic, idealist notions that came about as the result of the complex interplay of the class contradictions in modern India, as a result of the plurality of social structures and, most important, of Nehru's underestimation of the special historic role of the working class as the bearer of the ideology of scientific socialism. The alignment of class forces in the national liberation movement against British rule, and in independent India afterwards, restricted Nehru's chances of realising his subjective ideals in practice.

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 661.

² J. Nehru, *India's Freedom*, Unwin Books, London, 1962, p. 35.

³ Cf. Nehru, *India Today and Tomorrow*, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1959, p. 28.

¹ J. Nehru, *Towards a Socialistic Order*, All India Congress Committee, New Delhi, 1956, p. 64.

² J. Nehru, *Congressmen's Primer for Socialism*, A Socialist Congressman Publication, New Delhi, 1963, p. 197.

³ Jawaharlal Nehru's *Speeches. September 1957-April 1963*, Vol. 4, Delhi, 1964, p. 151.

His ideas, and especially his practical politics, were inevitably affected by the enormous number of unresolved democratic tasks which faced India and created the basis for the broad unification of national forces. Nehru tended to absolutise the temporary alignment of classes, which was determined by the particular level of the democratic movement and corresponded to the aims of a particular stage, but which could not be retained if there was to be socialist transformation. In his analysis of Indian society, he was unwilling to go beyond the general democratic stage of the revolution, unwilling to admit that the struggle for socialism required a radically different class orientation and that in passing from general democratic to socialist goals the content, make-up and correlation of the components of the united national front of the period of the anti-imperialist movement must change radically.

Nehru recognised the existence of classes and class struggle, but proceeded from the thesis that class contradictions could be resolved through compromises and reforms based on class cooperation. He considered that conviction was enough to prevent the growth of influence of the propertied and exploiting classes in the country's economic and political life.

One is bound to notice in this a certain amount of liberal bourgeois ideology, plus traces of Gandhi's utopian moralistic ideas.

It was these ideas which served as the basis for Nehru's unfounded subjective criticism of certain moments of Soviet history, of some of the propositions of scientific socialism and of the communist movement in India. Here we see the profound contradiction in Nehru's world-outlook, a contradiction which he never overcame, despite his efforts. The long relative isolation of India, its social thought and Nehru himself, from the achievements of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of building socialism in the USSR and other countries, also limited his chances of fully understanding the development of the new socialist world, which Nehru approached gradually and with many reservations, especially as regards the concepts of class struggle and the leading role of the working class.

On the one hand, Nehru acknowledged the scientific accuracy of Marx's interpretation of history, based on the idea of class antagonism. 'Marx constantly talks of exploitation and class struggles,' wrote Nehru. 'But, according to Marx, this is not a matter for anger or good virtuous advice. The exploitation is not the fault of the person exploiting. The dominance of one class over another has been the natural result of historical progress....

Marx did not preach class conflict. He showed that in fact it existed, and had always existed in some form or other.'¹ In his *Autobiography*, Nehru criticises Gandhi's over-reliance on non-violence: 'If there is one thing that history shows it is this: that economic interests shape the political views of groups and classes. Neither reason nor moral considerations override these interests. Individuals may be converted, they may surrender their special privileges, although this is rare enough, but classes and groups do not do so. The attempt to convert a governing and privileged class into forsaking power and giving up its unjust privileges has therefore always so far failed, and there seems to be no reason whatever to hold that it will succeed in the future.'²

But on the other hand, in the fifties and sixties, Nehru tried in vain to reconcile his recognition of class struggle with the Gandhian concept of class harmony, thus contradicting his own realistic evaluations of previous years. '*So while not denying or repudiating class contradictions, we want to deal with the problem in a peaceful and co-operative way by lessening rather than increasing these conflicts and trying to win over people instead of threatening to fight them or destroy them.... The concept of class struggle or wars has been outdated as too dangerous....*'³

Leaving aside the confusion of class struggle and war, and the absolute opposition of non-violence and violence, of peaceful and non-peaceful ways of resolving class contradictions, it would appear that these words reflect not so much the evolution of Nehru's convictions towards the end of his life, as a pragmatic requirement resulting from a political course largely determined by the conservative forces in the leadership of the multiclass and extremely heterogeneous ruling party—the Indian National Congress—forces that were consolidating their influence at that time, which subsequently led to the division of the Congress.

But the facts of the political struggle and the country's socio-economic development constantly affected Nehru's views. These facts belied the concept of class collaboration and the possibility of 're-educating' Indian landowners and capitalists, indeed they abounded in social conflicts in which the privileged classes, the landowners, money-lenders and monopolists, resorted to every means of quelling the protest of the working people, including

¹ J. Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, op. cit., p. 565.

² J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, op. cit., p. 544.

³ *The Mind of Mr. Nehru*. An Interview by R. K. Karanjia, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

open violence to protect their own interests.

The heat of the class struggle, Nehru's sincere sympathy with the oppressed, his desire to improve their lot and constant subjective devotion to socialist ideals forced him once again to take a sober look at the depth and objective character of the class contradictions in Indian society.

Finally, Nehru recognised the existence in India of privileged groups and classes who opposed any change. He indicated that to protect their own selfish interests these social strata (and Nehru had in mind not only the semi-feudal landowners but above all the monopoly bosses) might go against the country's social progress. The Indian National Congress's bandying of socialist slogans did not bring Nehru to a superficial idealisation of Indian society. Always a realist, he said that the Indian economic system could be defined as a capitalist economy with considerable state control, or a capitalist economy plus a social sector directly run by the state. But in essence it was a capitalist economy.

Nehru saw that the country's socialist course, its progress and democracy, was threatened not only by the traditional forces of feudal landowners and religious disparities, but also by the growing monopolies. Shortly before his death, in the autumn of 1963, Nehru wrote: 'Monopoly is the enemy of socialism. To the extent it has grown during the last few years, we have drifted away from the goal of socialism.'¹

The years since Nehru's death have fully borne out his fears about the role of the Indian monopolies, feudal and semi-feudal landowners. Left-wing and democratic forces in India, all supporters of 'Nehru's course' are fighting against the ambitions of the monopolies and their allies.

Nehru's views on foreign policy were consistently progressive; in this area his views were not marked by the same conflict as his ideas of socialism and internal policy. Both as a thinker and as a statesman, he made an outstanding contribution to the cause of fighting imperialism, ensuring world peace, and turning the balance of forces on the world arena since the war in favour of national liberation, progress and socialism.

Jawaharlal Nehru was a thoroughgoing fighter for peace and international security. A supporter of peaceful coexistence, he spoke in favour of detente, curtailment of the arms race, and universal disarmament. He was one of the founders of the policy of non-alignment, which by no means signified passive neutrality.

¹ *Congress Bulletin*, No. 9-11, New Delhi, September-November 1963, p. 55.

He said that when freedom and justice were under threat, when aggression was committed, then the country could not be neutral.

Nehru combined positive neutralism with the fight against colonialism, the urgency of which he always stressed. 'Imperialism or colonialism suppressed the progressive groups or classes because it is interested in preserving the social and economic status quo. Even after a country has become independent, it may continue to be economically dependent on other countries.'¹ Nehru's warning about economic dependence on imperialism is still entirely relevant to India and other developing countries.

Nehru was one of those who proposed the five foundations of peaceful coexistence (the doctrine of Panch Sheel), widely recognised as the basis of relations between Asian countries. He was involved in convoking the historic Bandung Conference, a watershed in the process of unifying the liberated states of Africa and Asia in the struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, racialism, for peace, freedom and socio-economic progress.

One of Nehru's great merits was his constant desire to unite with all progressive forces on the world stage. In 1927 he took part in the anti-imperialist Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels. He wrote: 'Ideas of some common action between oppressed nations *unter se*, as well as between them and the Labour left wing, were very much in the air. It was felt more and more that the struggle for freedom was a common one against the thing that was imperialism, and joint deliberation and, where possible, joint action were desirable.'² This was an important step towards recognising the unity between the national liberation struggle and the revolutionary, workers' movement. Nehru's revolutionary nationalism was consonant with the appeal made by the leader of the proletarian revolution, Lenin, for collaboration and joint efforts in the fight against imperialism. Nehru wrote: 'Socialism in the west and the rising nationalisms of the Eastern and other dependent countries opposed this combination of fascism and imperialism.... Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the world which are ranged against fascism and imperialism.'³

One of the most vivid and fruitful manifestations of this line was Nehru's unceasing aspiration for mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. The establishment and successful development

¹ J. Nehru, *Congressmen's Primer for Socialism*, op. cit., p. 196.

² J. Nehru, *An Autobiography*, op. cit., p. 161.

³ J. Nehru, *The First Sixty Years*, Vol. 1, The John Day Company, New York, 1965, p. 427.

of Indo-Soviet collaboration is inseparably linked with the policies pursued by Nehru. The friendly relations between the two countries, based on his policies, have long been, in the words of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, 'a most convincing manifestation of the great alliance between the world of socialism and the world born of the national liberation movement'.¹ These relations are an example of peaceful coexistence and fruitful cooperation of states with different socio-economic systems, linked by common interests in the struggle for peace and international security.

The favourable development of Indo-Soviet relations since India gained independence was reflected in the joint Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971. Brezhnev's official visit to India in 1973 consolidated all the positive things achieved over the preceding years and made a new contribution to the development of friendly bilateral relations and to the strengthening of international detente, peace and security in Asia and the world. The joint declaration and other documents signed during this visit, which developed the basic principles of relations between the USSR and India and determined the general direction of their cooperation, was greeted with great approval in the Soviet Union and India and valued highly by democrats throughout the world.

Looking at all the facets of Nehru's work as a political and public figure, as a philosopher and historian, it should be stressed that all that is best in his legacy—and we are deeply convinced of this—was due to his attraction to socialism and progress, and his interest in scientific socialist theory, which considerably influenced his world-outlook and politics.

His attraction to socialism gave him the idea of joining forces with the international workers' movement and of collaborating with the USSR.

It was his attraction to socialism that determined the Indian National Congress's declaring its aim to be the construction of a society along socialist lines.

Despite the haziness of Nehru's socialist ideal, it is undeniable that he was one of the first leaders of the national liberation movement who understood the narrowness of anti-imperialist nationalism and the need to give it a socialist orientation. It is for this that he will always be remembered. And it is this that explains the great sympathy and respect felt by the Soviet people for him.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 336.

KWAME NKRUMAH

Kwame Nkrumah was one of the leading figures of the anti-colonial movement in Africa in the 1940s-1960s. His contribution to the post-war development of the continent went far beyond his own country. As a politician, Nkrumah became a symbol of the freedom and unity of Africa, and of the relentless struggle against colonial and neocolonial exploitation. He was a statesman who enjoyed international respect and an outstanding ideologist and political thinker. He strove to achieve a philosophical understanding of the processes of national and social emancipation of the colonial countries. He aimed to fathom and uncover the inner contradictions of the national liberation movement and its powerful latent forces, which contributed to the progress and crises of the movement. Slowly but surely, he came to the recognition of the decisive role of class and anti-imperialist struggle in Africa today.

Nkrumah's fate was tragic. After the triumphant culmination of the liberation struggle by peaceful means in the British colony, the Gold Coast, and after many years of apparently lasting government in the Republic of Ghana, he ended his days in solitude and in exile. In this difficult moral and political climate, when his activities were restricted against his will, Nkrumah took to his literary, or investigatory, work with redoubled energy, trying to examine critically the history and outline the perspectives of the African revolution. It must be said that the end of Nkrumah's life was not a tragedy of despondency and despair. It was the tragedy of a great fighter for a better future in Africa, who did not find

adequate support for his plans either in his own country or in the continent.

Nkrumah's activities reflected many diverse tendencies existing in the national liberation movement: an aspiration for social progress, combined with the effects of inconceivable backwardness, the democratism of a leader of the masses in the period of the liberation movement and power devices handed down from the medieval traditions of the African tribal system, attraction to socialism and crude nationalist prejudices, the desire to honestly serve the interests of the people and extreme personal ambition, reformist illusions and leftist radicalism. All this was not characteristic of Nkrumah alone. They reflected the acute and very real contradictions which characterised the intermediate, petty-bourgeois strata in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, strata which came to the forefront in the struggle for independence and became the most active force after the Second World War in the young national states which emerged in the continents fighting for liberation in the 1950s-1970s. It is precisely for this reason that the whole of Nkrumah's political life, with all its ups and downs, and the whole of his theoretical legacy, with all its correct ideas and mistakes, represent a major experimental school for African revolutionaries.

Kwame Nkrumah became widely known after the war, when the pan-African movement was entering a new stage—the organisation of the national liberation movement in various countries in the continent. At the Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester in October 1945, he was the main speaker on the problem of the struggle of the peoples of Western Africa for independence. Even then Nkrumah was a militant anti-imperialist, who rejected the conciliation and reformism of the first pan-African congresses and the false assertions of bourgeois and right-wing socialist propaganda about the civilising mission of colonialism. It is indicative that Nkrumah, like the majority of the participants at the Fifth Pan-African Congress, shared the view that the aims of the national liberation movement did not come down merely to the attainment of independence, but presupposed the establishment of a democratic system and the raising of the people's welfare on the basis of socialism. This demonstrated that Nkrumah's political views had really evolved in a progressive direction, which many of the African leaders at that time could neither understand nor foresee.

True, Nkrumah's ideas about socialism were not entirely class-oriented at that time. In this sphere he had not yet got rid of his

reformist illusions. Some aspects of his ideas on socialism in the forties and early fifties were tinged with European social-democratic and nationalist conceptions. He was influenced by George Padmore, an authoritative figure in the pan-African movement in the forties, who became Nkrumah's advisor after the declaration of Ghana's independence. Padmore's falsely formulated dilemma—pan-Africanism or communism—was not repudiated by Nkrumah at that time.

In the early years of Nkrumah's government, Padmore saw the difference between Ghana and Russia in the fact that the Convention People's Party had supposedly laid a solid basis for political democracy based on parliamentary government. As President of Ghana, Nkrumah passed through a rough stage during which he was strongly influenced by national reformism with its illusions about the eternal harmony of national interests and its repudiation of class struggle in African society, etc.

Among Nkrumah's positive qualities is the fact that he did not get stuck at that stage, where the convinced African national reformists, flirting with the Socialist International, have been for the last twenty or thirty years. This type of political evolution is again advocated by some renegades from the revolutionary wing of the anti-colonial movement. All their evolution amounts to is shifting the balance from the ideas of the exceptional, unique historical development of the African peoples to the typical conceptions of right-wing European social-democracy. This modification of African national reformism in the second half of the seventies is reflected in the work of Léopold Senghor, in the orientation towards the Socialist International and in the desire to consolidate on this basis on a continental scale by creating a so-called Confederation of African Socialist Parties. There can hardly be any doubt that this type of evolution is linked, directly or indirectly, with the growing influence of neocolonialism.

At the end of the fifties, various ideological and political trends began to precipitate out of the eclectic ideology of African nationalism, which combined, as the Fifth Pan-African Congress showed, revolutionary and reformist tendencies. Right-wing nationalists firmly took up bourgeois reformist positions, applying these reformist ideas not only to home policies but also to foreign policies, often resorting to collaboration with the imperialist powers. The left wing turned to the idea of non-capitalist development and worked out policies and ideological principles of national democracy. Nkrumah was one of the initiators and best

representatives of the latter movement, which sought to strengthen the revolutionary potential and deepen the social content of the national liberation struggle. He came to the Marxist conclusion that both the socialist orientation and the consolidation of true national independence in the economic and political spheres demanded the continuation of the consistent struggle against imperialist exploitation and the curbing of the egoistic aspirations of bourgeois elements. It was in this way that he gradually overcame the national reformist hostility towards the theory and practice of scientific socialism. And it was with Nkrumah that the national liberation movement in Africa began to grow closer to the socialist countries and that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism actively affected its ideology. Both these processes were reflected in the policies of the Republic of Ghana and in Nkrumah's theoretical works.

At a time when the national reformists urged for conflicts with the former colonial powers to be forgotten, Nkrumah insisted on the need to maintain vigilance in the face of imperialist intrigues and to unite all revolutionary forces to oppose them. This goal was served by his ardent agitation in favour of African unity. Here, Nkrumah was prone to exaggeration. He saw all regional unions as a threat to broader unification and strove for the immediate formation of a continental government and army, forgetting that the necessary conditions did not exist for this, that extra—and large—obstacles were created by the deepening disparities in African political trends and by the diverse social orientation of the emerging states. But Nkrumah did undoubtedly play a leading role in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, and was guided in his aspiration for unity not only by his desire to lead a pan-African continental government, which he was accused of by his mainly neocolonialist, often corrupt opponents, but also by his awareness of the need to unite the political, economic and military resources of the African countries to repulse the still grave threat posed by imperialism. He was convinced of this by the tragedy of the Congo.

Nkrumah spoke tirelessly of the great danger of imperialism and opened African peoples' eyes to new forms of imperialist expansion and oppression. This is dealt with, for example, in his book *Neo-Colonialism. The Last Stage of Imperialism*, published in London in 1965, in which he analysed such neo-colonialist methods as the imposition of 'defence' treaties and the building of military bases, the support of puppet governments, economic control in the form of aid and loans, unequal trade and the

smothering of local economies by international corporations, penetration into the social environment through the indigenous bourgeoisie, and ideological propaganda. Nkrumah's book is still topical today.

The recognition of the class struggle was the most important and fundamental, qualitatively new ideological and political achievement of Nkrumah, and of national democrats in general, in the analysis of the internal situation in African countries. It was Nkrumah's book *Consciencism* which best expressed the general, approximate, more political than socio-economic approach to class contradictions in African society, which was typical of the whole of the national democratic movement at the first stage of its development. In this book, Nkrumah spoke of the conflict between 'positive action' and 'negative forces', i.e., of the struggle of the forces of progress to establish social justice, abolish oligarchic exploitation and suppress the forces of reaction, trying to prolong their colonial rule. Nkrumah took into account the mobility and conditionality of this division. He foresaw the possibility of disintegration in the framework of the positive revolutionary process and of some of its forces going over to the side of reaction.¹

Undoubtedly, this way of looking at things does not yet betray a Marxist understanding of class or a scientific analysis of the socio-economic and political structure of society. But it does contain a kind of basis for the objectively necessary tactics of a united anti-imperialist front, which, while not rising to a Marxist understanding of the issue, does not fundamentally contradict it. This position may, in the course of the struggle and with the accumulation of experience, take on Marxist content. True, in his *Consciencism*, Nkrumah called on the progressive forces ('positive action') to anticipate disintegration at its seminal stage and 'discover a way of containing the future schismatic tendencies'.² It is hard to say what is greater in this proposal: the desire to preserve by all means the union of progressive forces, or the illusory hope of quelling the class struggle—a hope sometimes expressed by Nkrumah, as is evidenced by various issues of the Ghanaian newspaper *The Spark*, which reflect his contradictory evolution.

The publication of *Consciencism* was seen by official Ghanaian

¹ Cf. Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, Heinemann, London, 1964, pp. 104-05.

² *Ibid.*

propaganda as the culmination of 'the theory of Nkrumahism'. The strong influence on this theory of the ideas of scientific socialism was noted all round. It was seen in the recognition of general laws governing historical development, in the clear influence of Marxist dialectical materialism, and in his understanding of imperialism. As early as 1963, Fennor Brockway spoke of Nkrumah as a representative of 'African Marxism'. Nonetheless, in the early sixties, Nkrumah felt it necessary to voice his disagreements with Marxism on matters of materialism, dialectics, ethics and the state. But, as Engels said, 'to the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions corresponded crude theories.'¹

Though considering Nkrumahism a materialist philosophy, the Ghanaian press underlined that it was not atheistic. While recognising in principle the law-governed nature of revolution, Nkrumah supposed that the preservation of traditional conditions in Africa allowed socialism to be attained by evolutionary means. *The Spark* characterised the identification of Nkrumahism with Marxism as an attack on Nkrumahism from the right, meaning that it would lead in Ghana to the awakening of those who, under the influence of imperialist propaganda, considered communism as brigandage and immorality. Thus, basically tactical and not entirely unfounded considerations were put forward for drawing a line between Marxism and Nkrumahism.

Of course, it would be wrong to identify the two also from the point of view of scientific objectivity. Nkrumahism did not overcome reformist and nationalist ideas. But it did undoubtedly approach Marxism rather than moving away from it. Moreover, there were no basic contradictions in the philosophies in their recognition of the possibility of successful non-capitalist development and of a united front of anti-imperialist forces on this basis, though they understood these phenomena differently. The constant evolution of Nkrumahism which did indeed take place and was presupposed by his theory of 'positive action' and 'negative forces', gave hope for its future rapprochement with scientific socialism on the basis of the gradual deepening of socialist trends in the framework of non-capitalist development. Such a rapprochement did come about. Several issues of *The Spark*, around which were grouped representatives of 'left Nkrumahism', and

statements made by its editor-in-chief, Kofi Batsa, gave evidence of certain shifts in the concept of 'positive action', emphasising the special role of the working people in the union of progressive forces, pointing out the duality and contradictoriness of the views of national capital and its hostility towards socialist tendencies, and stressing the fundamental divergencies between Nkrumahism, characterised as scientific socialism in Africa, and national reformist 'African socialism'.

Nkrumahism was prevented from growing any closer to scientific socialism, however, by the reactionary coup in Ghana in February 1966, which led to the fall of Nkrumah's government. This political defeat, which interrupted the non-capitalist development of the country, was bound to force Nkrumah to take fresh stock of things. He gradually came to the realisation that the counter-revolutionary coup could not have happened with such ease and success, had it not been for the mistakes committed by the leadership. His reconsideration of the past was made difficult by the demoralisation felt by the supporters of a socialist course and by their being uprooted from their native soil. In his many years of rule, the people got used to his personality cult, and he himself got used to governing single-handed and to settling issues by decree. Because of this, even afterwards, Nkrumah was unable to make a thorough analysis of the economic, social and political situation in Ghana or of his own misjudgements, or to outline ways of organising and mobilising the country's revolutionary forces. In emigration, Nkrumah wrote several books, two of which—*Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare* (1969) and *Class Struggle in Africa* (1970)—are of considerable interest in the context of the history of African socio-political thought. But he failed to write a book about the reasons for his own defeat, about the weaknesses and contradictions of the progressive regime in Ghana. He lacked the courage, the faculty of self-criticism and the ability to take an objective, fearless look at his own mistakes.

Nkrumah preferred the easier way out—an abstract, theoretical review of strategies and tactics. The abstract nature of his considerations was clearly seen in the fact that after the reactionary coup in Ghana, he dreamt of revolution not in his own country but on a continental scale, and addressed his new ideological and political platform to the whole of Africa, from north to south, and from east to west.

It would appear that the defeat of the revolutionary forces in Ghana could have led to their concentrating on a comparatively limited battlefield, to their stressing relatively modest immediate

¹ Frederick Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, in three volumes, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 119.

goals capable of gathering the remnants of the shattered forces and gradually preparing them for a fresh struggle. Having been defeated on the path of non-capitalist development in Ghana, Nkrumah began to speak of socialist revolution in the whole of Africa. It became apparent that he had to a large extent lost touch with reality. This was a paradoxical reaction to bitter defeat, certainly linked with his utopian socio-political ideas and his overestimation of the role of his own personality.

No one could doubt that the coup in Ghana testified to the social, economic and political troubles in the country. This was felt by Nkrumah too. He was also right in his tacit recognition of a certain incompleteness and contradictoriness in the ideological and political platform of Nkrumahism during the period of his rule. But unfortunately, as has been already said, Nkrumah did not choose to make a thorough critical analysis of the socio-political and economic development of Ghana in the first years of independence, of the development of the state apparatus and party, or of the alignment of classes in the country or of the state of the army, both officers and men. He did not notice the growth of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and did not wish to see the general corruption in the country.

Had he undertaken such an analysis, he would have seen many of the weaknesses resulting not so much from strategic aims as from the real, acute contradictions between intentions and actions. He would have realised that the country's economy was marked by disproportions and that the desire for immediate maximum industrialisation and the realisation of major projects neither suited the state of the country's economy nor satisfied its most urgent requirements. He would have also understood that the desire for socialism was not preventing the intensive growth of capitalist tendencies, that the popular masses had gained little from the new power, least of all a rise in the standard of living, that the state apparatus was divorced from them and had become a means of personal, and in essence primitive accumulation of capital. He would have seen that the Convention People's Party was not broadening or strengthening, but was losing its ties with the masses which had brought it to power, that the genuine revolutionary enthusiasm of the period of the struggle for independence had given way to ponderous official pomposity and to impetuous eulogies to the 'osajevo', the leader and teacher and that all this testified to the degeneration of power and its isolation from the people.

Though undoubtedly an intelligent man and experienced politi-

cian, Nkrumah missed all this. He limited himself to pointing out the undermining activities of imperialism and internal reaction, the heterogeneous class composition of society as a result of the mixed economy, and the readiness of certain groups of officers in the armed forces, civil servants and police to work for the reactionaries. All this he saw when he was in power, but he did not take the necessary measures to avert the unfavourable processes in his country.

After his defeat, Nkrumah's theoretical and methodological judgments became more mature. He took, as it were, a new step towards scientific socialism. Instead of putting up a barrier between Marxism and Nkrumahism, he asserted that 'there is only one true socialism and that is scientific socialism, the principles of which are abiding and universal'.¹ His illusions about quelling the class struggle were belatedly replaced by the clear statement: 'Socialism can only be achieved through class struggle'.² His analysis of the class structure of African society rose to a new level. His general argumentation about the political blocs of progressive and reactionary forces ('positive action' and 'negative forces') gave way to a concrete analysis of the structure of society, based on the presence of different social strata in the production process and their division into privileged and oppressed.

All these positive changes in Nkrumah's views could have taken place much earlier, before his defeat, for they were quite compatible with his political course in the first half of the sixties. They could have promoted greater consistency in his socialist tendencies. But in the Nkrumah of the late sixties and early seventies, who had suffered a great shock, they went hand in hand with a full, and perhaps sometimes too radical, review of his old course. He began with the declaration of armed struggle as the only method of bringing about the aims of the liberation movement. All Nkrumah's works from 1967 onwards speak of the approach of a new, decisive phase in the revolution, whose distinctive feature would be armed struggle against the forces of reaction.

It is characteristic that Nkrumah suggested revolutionary war not only as a means of gaining independence—which was justi-

¹ Kwame Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*. A Guide to the Armed Phase of the African Revolution, Panaf Books Limited, London, 1968, p. 29.

² Kwame Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa*, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 84.

fied in a way at the time, for the liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Africa had taken that course—but also as a means of fighting neo-colonialism and reaction. Despite the extreme diversity of conditions and tasks of the democratic, revolutionary movement in various countries and parts of Africa, Nkrumah recommended all to use his universal method—armed struggle, which was an exaggeration of the role of armed struggle and a reaction to his own defeat as a result of underrating the role of the class struggle in Ghana. Towards the end of his life, he understood its role, but then perceived it principally in one form—armed struggle—and applied it to the whole of the African continent, irrespective of the concrete historical situation and actual conditions.

This 'unification' of Africa reflected one aspect of Nkrumah's desires—to create a pan-African government—for it was not only of a methodological, but also of an organisational character. Nkrumah advocated the creation of a unified African revolutionary army and party, seeing in them a power capable of bringing about the national and social liberation of the African peoples. This aim was, and still is, quite unrealistic, ignoring completely both the total absence of the conditions for such an organisation and the essential heterogeneity of the African revolutionary movements as regards their tasks and class and political nature. Moreover, it was a harmful aim, for it came close to denying the independent importance of the struggle waged within national frontiers. This aim is still misguided today.

Nkrumah also unified the goals of the revolutionary movement in Africa. In his *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, he spoke of three interrelated objectives—nationalism, pan-Africanism and socialism—underlining that none of these objectives could be achieved fully without the others.¹ Here Nkrumah was let down by his sense of national specific features, which bring one main aim to the forefront in each country, and by his sense of history. Contradictory elements—nationalism and socialism—are brought together; there is no convincing evidence of the stages of the revolutionary process. In his last book, *Class Struggle in Africa*, Nkrumah somewhat changed his definition of the objectives of the movement and removed logical contradictions, but at the same time took a new step in working out a revolutionary platform. He replaced 'nationalism' by the 'achievement of national independ-

ence', which was certainly correct from the point of view of socialist tendencies, and declared that true independence and pan-Africanism were only possible on the basis of socialism—which could also be welcomed.¹ But the evident growth of Nkrumah's subjective socialist ideas led him to declare socialism the immediate task of the liberation movement in Africa today.

This was followed by a complete review of strategy, again not on the basis of a scientific analysis of reality, but getting rid of the logical mistakes contained in the *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*. Nkrumah offered the African liberation movement a strategy of socialist revolution. He declared that 'it is only peasantry and proletariat working together who are wholly able to subscribe to policies of all-out socialism'.² But this basically true declaration led him to reject the tactics of a united anti-imperialist front even at the present stage, although he had supported it before, in the *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*. He called the whole of the African bourgeoisie a counter-revolutionary force which had finally linked fates with international monopoly capital, and opposed not only union with it but also with petty-bourgeois circles at the current stage of the liberation movement.

Thus culminated the hook version of his voluntarist programme of leftist radicalism, begun in 1967 with the enunciation of armed struggle as the sole means of struggle.

The profound contradictoriness of Nkrumah's ideological development after 1966 is self-evident. On the one hand, there was his noble intolerance of reformism and the egoistic policies of national capital, his belief in socialism, and his assimilation of many theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism; on the other, there was his inability to apply these principles to reality, which led him to hold views which basically coincided with many of the trends of petty-bourgeois radicalism in Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America. The very instability of Nkrumah's views, and his sudden transitions from reformist illusions to extreme radicalism, also testify to his affinity with these trends. Nationalist views were also present in the platform which Nkrumah considered consistently socialist.

But these errors should not obscure the main achievement of his life. Having covered the complex path of a progressive revolutionary nationalist, he came to the conclusion that only scientific socialism was capable of guaranteeing freedom, prosperity and

¹ Cf. Kwame Nkrumah, *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare*, op. cit., p. 24.

¹ Cf. Kwame Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa*, op. cit., p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

social justice for the peoples of Africa. He played an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism in Africa, and was one of the first leaders of the liberation movement in that continent to appeal to his people to be guided by the principles of scientific socialism and create a vanguard party of working people. Nkrumah never consciously contrasted his own understanding of socialism with the Marxist-Leninist interpretation—and this sets him apart from most representatives of contemporary leftist radicalism. In spite of the inaccuracy of his understanding of socialism and of the ways to bring it about, his views were an important step forward in the development of ideas of liberation in the African continent.

Nkrumah frequently changed his views and repudiated his past mistakes. Death prevented him from correcting his last theoretical works. To review them critically is the task of the African revolutionary movement. It is to Nkrumah's credit that African revolutionaries can to some extent be considered his successors: they arm themselves with all the best aspects of his theoretical and political experience; they continue the process of rapprochement with scientific socialism, not confusing it with the pseudo-revolutionary platforms of petty-bourgeois radicals.

Many of the peoples of Africa are today starting on a new road, the road of socialist orientation based on scientific socialism. This road may hold defeats for them, should the old mistakes be repeated, or new ones made, and this should be taken into account in shaping their policy line.

AMILCAR CABRAL

Guinea-Bissau is a small country on the south-west coast of Africa. It is not rich in natural resources and does not lie in the centre of international politics. But it is well-known because of the long selfless armed struggle waged by its people for more than ten years against the Portuguese colonialists. This struggle was led by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), whose creation in 1956 was termed by its founder and leader Amílcar Cabral a major event in the history of the Guinean people.

Amílcar Cabral was a leader of the liberation movement who enjoyed great authority not only in the PAIGC and among the population of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, but all over Africa and throughout the democratic movement of the world. Yet he was devoid of any personal ambitions and made no claims to the role of ruler of men's minds or ideologist of the contemporary national liberation movement. Cabral was marked by exceptional modesty, and complete concentration on the task of liberating the two countries and peoples linked by a common fate. He understood that the colonial yoke could be thrown off above all as a result of their joint efforts, their political, ideological and armed struggle, and that the organisation of this struggle required deep knowledge of the conditions of life, the history and the traditions of the people. At the same time he would have nothing to do with isolationism, national seclusion, ignoring the decisive role of solidarity among progressive forces, and neglecting the international experience of revolutionary struggle. Cabral was convinced

that all the achievements of leading revolutionary thought and practice should be taken into account in the course of the liberation struggle and adapted and applied to the concrete conditions.

This synthesis of a wide mental horizon and a thorough knowledge of his own people ensured great success in bringing about social change in the areas liberated as a result of the armed struggle against the colonialists, and in mobilising the population, and also gained international recognition for the activities of the PAIGC. Cabral's work was vital in helping the two young republics (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands) to take up a worthy place among the leading African states. He left a rich theoretical legacy, using the example of these two countries to examine important socio-economic and political problems arising in states liberated from colonial dependence.

Cabral's father came from Cape Verde, but he himself was born in Guinea-Bissau, in 1924, and lived there almost all his life. He thus personifies the unity which is the aim of the peoples of the two countries. Cabral was one of the few Guineans who received their education in Lisbon. There, together with natives of other Portuguese colonies, he organised a Centre d'Etudes Africaines, whose activities combined scientific and educative aims with the political aim of amalgamating the then still rather modest forces of the liberation movement in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Having trained as an engineer-agronomist, he returned to his country and carried out a census of the rural population, which gave him a deep knowledge of his country and people. His account of the census is an invaluable source for the study of the agrarian economy and social structure of Guinea. Later, Cabral used the document to analyse the actual alignment of class forces at various stages of the liberation movement.

Meanwhile, work went on to create a revolutionary organisation in Guinea. The anti-colonialist African white-collar workers drew the workers of Guinea into the underground Movement for the National Independence of Guinea (MING). In September 1956, with the active help of Cabral, the PAIGC was founded, also aiming for national independence. For two years the underground organisation grew, under the extremely difficult conditions created by the fascist colonial regime. In 1958 the PAIGC stepped up its activities among industrial and professional workers, laying stress on traditional methods of legal economic and political struggle—demonstrations and strikes. The brutal shooting down of strikers at Pijiguiti in August 1959 convinced the leadership of the PAIGC of the insufficiency of

such tactics, however. Legal methods of struggle proved to be not only ineffective, but often turned the best members of the organisation into targets for repression.

In September 1959, a PAIGC conference took the historic decision to mobilise the rural masses, prepare for armed struggle, and continue and extend conspiratorial work in the towns. The conference called for all ethnic groups and social sections to rally round the PAIGC and for ties with other national liberation movements in Africa to be strengthened. The aim was now to turn the PAIGC into an efficient fighting organisation covering the whole country. Party activists were sent into various regions to mobilise the population. The conference also devoted much attention to the question of political and technical cadres.

From then on there was careful preparation for armed struggle against colonial rule. The Party leadership was moved to Conakry, where cadres were trained. After a short course, the patriots immediately returned to Guinea-Bissau to organise the resistance movement.

Widespread armed activity broke out in 1963, since when the history of the PAIGC's armed struggle has been an unbroken chain of difficult experiences, partial defeats, and ultimately—growing success. Beginning with acts of sabotage and diversion, and then widespread activities by partisan detachments, and subsequently turning them into a truly popular liberation war, the PAIGC demonstrated to the world the ability of a people, full of determination to fight and defend their freedom and honour, to come out on top of a well-trained and armed colonial army.

In 1964 the PAIGC held its first congress on liberated territory. The congress reorganised the Party, making it more democratic and effective. The country was divided into zones and districts, each with its own party committee. The congress emphasised the political nature of the armed struggle and the direct responsibility of the party committees for the course of the partisan activities. It was decided to set up a regular insurgent army—the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP)—which signified the start of a new stage in the struggle. The congress called for organs of popular power to be organised, for the economy to be improved, for education and health care to be developed in the liberated areas, for the all-out development of political work among the masses to explain the aims of the PAIGC and mobilise the people against colonialism, and to step up economic activities.

Even before the First Congress of the PAIGC, armed resistance was well under way over the country. Fighting had begun in the

south, and now new fronts were opened in the east and west. The patriots attacked the colonialists' fortified bases.

The successes of the liberation movement were largely due to the reforms of 1964. In 1964-65, the new political and administrative structure, based on the initiative of the population and the PAIGC leadership, was put into action in the liberated areas. In these areas a new social system took shape, proclaiming the abolition of inequality and exploitation, the establishment of comradely relations and the strengthening of discipline—a system based on collective work for the common cause. The enthusiasm and trust with which the people responded to the socio-political transformations were no less an achievement for the PAIGC than the military victories. In the final analysis it was they that decided the outcome of the war. Feeling themselves to be the masters of their country, the people could no longer come to terms with the colonial yoke. The popular trust won by the PAIGC also ensured it victory in the struggle against the dissenting pseudo-nationalist organisations which tried to contest the PAIGC's right to represent the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It was precisely the support of the broad masses and the PAIGC's close links with them that cut the ground from under the dissenters' feet, depriving them, to their detriment, of the chance of exerting any kind of serious influence, after the fall of fascism in Portugal, on the course of decolonisation, as happened in other countries.

The PAIGC gained more military successes every year, and by the end of 1972 controlled two-thirds of the country. All that remained in the hands of the colonialists were the towns of Bissau, Bafatá and Bulama, and some military bases. The state had been reached where the PAIGC had sovereignty in a country occupied in part by a foreign power. To bring the political superstructure into line with the existing state of affairs, the PAIGC organised elections to the National Popular Assembly in 1972, which would declare the birth of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

Cabral was not destined to see this day. In January 1973 he was treacherously assassinated by henchmen of the Portuguese colonialists. The death of the leader of the liberation movement was a grave loss for the PAIGC, for the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and for the whole of Africa, in its hour of wakening. But this bloody crime did not achieve its main purpose—it did not lead to a crisis in the PAIGC nor stop the advance of the patriotic forces. As though foreseeing his own

death, Cabral once said that a man could not consider his business complete if there was no one to carry it on after his death. Cabral was survived by hundreds and thousands of faithful followers, rallied in the PAIGC, morally and politically united by years of hard struggle.

After a short hitch, caused by the death of their leader, the liberation movement surged on with new strength. In September 1973 the first National Popular Assembly in the history of the country declared the creation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It was clear that the complete and final military defeat of the Portuguese colonialists was not far off. The fall of fascism in Portugal sped up the course of events and allowed the PAIGC over the negotiating table to consolidate recognition of itself as the sole and rightful representative of the peoples of Guinea and Cape Verde. This was achieved by the Party at the cost of many years of selfless struggle for freedom, independence and social progress.

The leaders of the Republics of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde repeatedly declared that their policies would be based on the ideas of Amílcar Cabral. The Third Congress of the PAIGC in November 1977 again confirmed their faith in the principles and theories of the Party's founder and acknowledged leader.

The national liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau was faced with conditions of extreme backwardness (even by Tropical African standards). The task of mobilising the people in such conditions, and of arming them with an understanding of the aims and methods of struggle, required careful preparation of the political vanguard, devotion and selflessness on its part, its affinity with the people and knowledge of their lives and moods, skill in organisation and propaganda, and unity of word and action.

That the PAIGC honourably coped with this difficult role was in many ways due to the clarity of the ideological and political doctrines which Cabral gave the Party, to the attention he paid to political work, to his theories, his gift of foresight, his thorough analysis of the laws of the revolutionary process and his ability to affect this process purposefully. For Cabral, theory was an indivisible part of revolutionary work, and the most important means of knowing and changing the world. He opposed in principle a voluntarist, empirical and pragmatic approach to the national liberation movement.

At the beginning of the sixties, when one African country after the other was gaining independence (1960 was declared the Year of Africa) and the prospects for universal decolonisation seemed

more favourable than ever before, Cabral spoke of the crisis in the African revolution. 'It seems to us,' he said at the Third Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Cairo in March 1961, 'that far from being a crisis of growth, it is principally a crisis of consciousness. In many cases, the practice of the liberation struggle and the prospects for the future are not only devoid of a theoretical basis, but also more or less cut off from reality. Local experience, and that of other countries, concerning the achievement of national independence, national unity and the basis for future progress, has either been forgotten or is still forgotten.'¹ The successful development of the anti-imperialist struggle required, in Cabral's view, concrete knowledge of the actual conditions in each country and in Africa as a whole, and also of the experience of other peoples, plus the scientific elaboration of strategic principles.

He saw the essence of the crisis in the African liberation movement in the fact that in many countries it had not taken a revolutionary course, and the hopes of the popular masses had been deceived by an illusory independence which merely concealed new forms of neo-colonialist exploitation. Cabral's ideal was the transformation of the national liberation movement into a revolution, both in the sense of total liquidation of all forms of imperialist oppression and in the sense of the abolition of inequality and exploitation of local origin.

In defining the nature of colonialism and imperialism, and of the tasks of national liberation, Cabral—like all the best representatives of the anti-imperialist movement in the sixties and seventies—used the experience accumulated in Africa as his starting point. He did not reduce colonialism to political dependence on the metropolis, and, of course, did not suggest that the formal ending of such dependence and the achievement of external signs of sovereignty would make colonialism a thing of the past. Lenin's theory of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism was used by Cabral and many other fighters for genuine independence. Cabral saw colonialism as the natural consequence of the capitalist economy, as the result of the policies of state-monopoly capitalism and the aspiration of the super-monopolies for guaranteed and high profits. The obvious conclusion was: so long as the capitalist economic system persists, its expansion into backward countries will continue, and only the forms of exploitation will

change. The developed capitalist countries move from 'classical' colonialism to neo-colonialism.

Cabral contributed to the study of the forms of neo-colonialist exploitation. He stressed that under the new conditions the imperialist strategy is to pursue a policy of 'aid' towards the former colonies which serves 'to create a false bourgeoisie to put a brake on the revolution and to enlarge the possibilities of the petty bourgeoisie as a neutraliser of the revolution'.¹ In other words, in an age when direct political dictates are becoming impossible, the aim of imperialism is to encourage, as a counterweight to revolution, the local exploiter elements in the developing countries, elements which pursue a policy of national reformism and conciliation with international capital. For this reason, Cabral saw the anti-colonialist movement as the liberation of the national productive forces from all forms of direct and indirect exploitation. In particular, he underlined that 'the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism'.²

Cabral preferred not to use the term socialism, considering it inopportune for the historical stage at which the country found itself, but he admitted that the goals of the Guinean revolutionaries were akin to those of the political vanguard of the working class in the developed countries. Yet he did not base this view on the ideas (which were widespread in the former colonies) of the exceptional development of the peoples of Asia and Africa, and of the stability and primordial socialist character of their way of life, but on a scientific study of the course of history. He shared the historical materialist conceptions of the development of mankind from the primitive communal system, through the slaveowning, feudal and capitalist systems, to socialism and communism, and supported the Marxist conclusion that in our age the general social progress of the world offered backward peoples the unique chance to avoid capitalism. Cabral pointed to two factors which allowed the peoples of Africa and Asia to omit the stage of developed capitalism on the way to socialism: 1) the power of modern technology to tame nature, and 2) the emergence of socialist states which have radically changed the face of the world and the historical process.

Cabral was in no doubt that the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and of Africa in general, had no prospect of

¹ Amílcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte*, t. 1. *L'arme de la théorie*, François Maspero, Paris, 1975, p. 270.

¹ *Selected Texts by Amílcar Cabral*. 'Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle. Stage 1', London, 1969, p. 60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

progress, freedom and prosperity other than socialism. The whole of Cabral's theoretical and practical work was, in the final analysis, aimed at transforming the anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist struggle into a social revolution, taking into account the country's lack of direct economic, social, political, material and spiritual prerequisites of socialism. This was his great theoretical contribution. He understood the contradictoriness of the development of the former colonies, knew how to combine faith in the socialist ideal with an awareness of the need for interim stages in the revolution, and planned them so as to make them a means, not a hindrance, in the pursuit of the ultimate goal.

Cabral found the key to these problems in his deep knowledge of historical laws and of the specific situation in Africa, particularly Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

He made a truly scientific political analysis of the social structure of the two countries. He was a firm believer in the need to unite all the patriotic forces of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde to combat Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in general. Given the weak class differentiation, this union of national forces should, in his view, have embraced all social strata, almost the whole population of the two territories, and the PAIGC's slogan was 'Unity and Struggle'. At the same time, Cabral considered it essential to make a thorough study of the economic positions of all social groups, in an attempt to find an explanation there for their political behaviour, while realising that this could not be identical at different stages of the revolution. The economic foundation, the position in material production and the development of the revolutionary process, which passes through two stages—the struggle for independence and the struggle for the liquidation of exploitation—these are the two main coordinates in Cabral's definition of his attitude to various social strata.¹

Of particular interest in his analysis is his examination of the specific features of the social structure and revolutionary strategy in the most backward colonies and dependent countries. He rejects several of the conceptions rife in liberated countries as a result of the exaggeration of national peculiarities, and takes up a position basically compatible with scientific socialism.

This was particularly so in his definition of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and working class. Cabral did not accept Frantz Fanon's idea that the peasantry was the main revolutionary force in the colonial world. He insisted on drawing

a clear line between physical and revolutionary strength. Cabral knew better than anyone else that the peasantry constituted the main contingent of armed resistance to the colonialists, and that without drawing it into the struggle there was no hope of toppling colonialism. But he did not idealise the peasantry like Fanon, seeing that its backwardness hindered the spread of national and social political consciousness and knowing how difficult it sometimes was to raise the peasantry for action.

Cabral was convinced that the peasants' position prevented them from fully understanding the revolutionary prospect, and that to revolutionise them a catalyst was needed, in the form of guidance by townsmen, bearing the progressive ideology. Cabral considered Fanon's assertion that the peasantry was the main revolutionary force—the colonial proletariat—mistaken for his country. This conclusion undoubtedly has methodological importance. It is particularly weighty and symbolical as it was made by a revolutionary, theorist and practical man from a purely peasant country, whose views were confirmed by the successes of the liberation movement.

Together with the idealisation of the peasantry, he rejected the associated nihilistic attitude of Fanon to the 'embryonic proletariat', which had supposedly become an adjunct of the colonial system and benefited from it. Proclaiming the weakness of the colonial proletariat, Fanon counted it out as a revolutionary force. Cabral proposed raising the level of consciousness of the working class, bearing in mind its special historic mission. 'This working class,' he said, 'whatever the level of its political consciousness (given a certain minimum, namely *the awareness of its own needs*), seems to constitute the true popular vanguard of the national liberation struggle in the neo-colonial case.'¹ At the same time he called on the working class to close ranks with the other exploited strata—the peasants and nationalist petty bourgeoisie.

The latter, given the weakness of the working class, had a special function. It should, according to Cabral, compensate for its lack of experience and revolutionary activity, and take on itself the mission of the 'ideal proletariat'. He supposed that the revolutionary part of the petty bourgeoisie (the rest being the conciliatory and vacillating elements) was capable of playing this role and merging its interests with those of the workers and peasants.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹ *Selected Texts by Amílcar Cabral. 'Revolution in Guinea. An African People's Struggle. Stage 1', p. 86.*

But he did not ignore its natural tendency to embourgeoisement, and realised how difficult and contradictory the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries' path to socialism was. Seeing no alternative at that stage, Cabral understood that 'this specific inevitability [the leadership of petty-bourgeois groups] in our situation constitutes one of the weaknesses of the national liberation movement'.¹

This weakness, and in general the lack of socio-economic and political premises for social progress, had to be, in Cabral's opinion, compensated by increased ideological, political and organisational work. His concentration on this work was a distinctive feature of Cabral's activities at the head of the PAIGC. He constantly emphasised the political character of all the tasks carried out in the course of national liberation, including in particular in the armed struggle. It was precisely the combination of military activities with clearly defined long-term goals and ideological and political preparation that ensured complete success for the patriots of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, and laid the basis for social progress in the two countries.

Cabral never called himself a supporter of scientific socialism or Marxism-Leninism. But fidelity to the ideals of socialism is by no means always measured by declarations. In his theoretical and practical work, he was guided by the principles of scientific socialism, and all his work for the happiness of his people was undoubtedly in accord with Marxism-Leninism.

'Whether one is a Marxist or not, a Leninist or not, it is difficult not to recognise the validity, not to see the brilliance of Lenin's analysis and conclusions. They are of historical importance because they illuminate with a life-giving light the thorny path of peoples fighting for their total liberation from imperialist domination.'²

The life and work of Amílcar Cabral are vivid examples of the beneficial influence of scientific socialism on the national liberation movement. They show that the future belongs to those champions of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America who honestly and consistently unite the national liberation movement with socialism.

From 1963, I had occasion to meet Amílcar Cabral fairly often at international forums, conferences and seminars held by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation in various countries of both continents. This was the period when the armed liberation

struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies was at its height. This was a peak of the national revolutionary war against the colonisers. Cabral devoted all his heart, all his designs and all his uncommon abilities to this struggle. He was a frequent and welcome guest in our country, and he had very close relations with various mass Soviet organisations, especially the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. He made a deep study of the activities of the CPSU. Both publicly, and privately with his Soviet friends, he often expressed deep gratitude for the extensive help of the great Soviet people to his small but heroic people, who for more than ten years fought against the Portuguese colonialists, supported by the imperialist countries of NATO.

It was wonderful to see how boundless was his belief in the victory of his people and how often he dreamt of how after this victory, he, an agronomist, would fervently set about changing the countryside and educating the peasants. Cabral awakened their consciousness and led them in a struggle which went far beyond the limits of the tropical jungles of Western Africa, and tens of thousands of peasants and poor people from the towns of Guinea joined the ranks of the liberation army, rightly declaring him to be their supreme commander. He himself was not to see the victory which he had passionately awaited, for whose sake he had lived.

Cabral was approaching scientific socialism, and would have got there completely without any reservations, had not the intelligence agency of the Portuguese colonialists ended his life with a treacherous bullet. In the pantheon of fighters who died for national and social liberation, stands the figure of Amílcar Cabral, a man with the head of a thinker and the heart of a passionate revolutionary, a convinced fighter for justice and socialism.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

² Amílcar Cabral, *Unité et lutte*, t. 1, *L'Arme de la théorie*, op. cit., p. 315.

FRANTZ FANON

The influence of the great ideologist of the national liberation movement, Frantz Fanon, was felt not only in Algeria, for whose independence he fought all his life, but in the whole of Africa. To some extent this can be explained by Fanon's personal charisma, by his selfless service to the cause of liberating the colonial peoples and by his brilliant and passionate literary work, to which no one can be indifferent. Reading his most important work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, it is difficult not to feel sympathy towards this popular tribune of the anti-colonial struggle, even if one is basically in disagreement with some of his ideas. But the main secret of Fanon's popularity and the ongoing effect of his ideas, lies in the fact that his works reflect historical reality, that he examined the most urgent problems of the anti-imperialist movement and tried, by interpreting the experience of Algeria and other African countries, to resolve these problems to the advantage of the working masses.

He was not equally successful in everything he undertook, but on balance his activities were undoubtedly positive. Fanon was firmly on the side of the oppressed peoples, determined to get rid of colonialism. He was one of the earliest representatives of national democracy in Africa and the Arab world, i. e., of that ideological and political trend in the anti-imperialist movement which combined militant anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism. But Fanon's legacy clearly shows not only the positive sides of national democracy as a revolutionary trend within anti-imperialist nationalism, but also the contradictions inherent in it (even in

its left-wing, revolutionary factions), especially at the early stages of the development of national democracy.

Personal liking and respect for Fanon should not get in the way of a critical, objective evaluation of his work. Such is the fate of all historical figures. We cannot restrict ourselves to judging them only in the moral sphere; we must examine the real role played by Fanon's ideas in the liberation movement.

Among his greatest merits, mention should above all be made of his militant and consistent anti-imperialism. Fanon vividly exposed the essence of colonial supremacy as the systematic suppression of the masses in all areas of life: political, economic, cultural, etc. He proved the need for complete destruction of the system of imperialist exploitation, and the lawfulness of using force against the violence of the oppressors. He called for armed struggle as the most decisive method of struggle against colonialism.

Fanon was one of the first ideologists of the African national liberation movement to realise the historical narrowness of nationalism as a banner in the anti-imperialist struggle. He rejected the path which up to the end of the Second World War was seen by bourgeois ideologists as infallible and absolute, the path whereby the anti-imperialist struggle would bring the national bourgeoisie to power and the declaration of political independence would mean the creation of conditions for the fast, smooth development of local capitalism. Fanon declared the capitalist path of development not only unnecessary, but even impossible for the countries of Africa. He advocated that the development of African capitalism should be avoided and that the hegemony of national capital, and the creation by its representatives of a political party claiming to lead the nation, should not be allowed. Fanon took the road foreseen by Lenin when he said that, having begun with anti-imperialism, the colonial peoples would then turn to the struggle against capitalism. Fanon realised the danger of selfishly narrow bourgeois nationalism and saw the guarantee of success for the anti-colonial struggle in its becoming enriched by social content, the ideas of social justice and equality, in its democratisation and internationalisation. He fought for a national consciousness that did not slip into nationalism and chauvinism, which he opposed.

Characteristically, Fanon did not use socialist terminology, and this was evidently his weak point. In this, he was guided by various considerations: perhaps he was not enraptured by what was already beginning to take place under the banner of socialism

in several other African countries; he also wrongly assumed that recognition of socialism meant adopting ideas and experience supposedly foreign to Africa, believing that the continent should work out its own ideals. But behind all this lay a vague awareness that most African peoples were not ready to set about building socialism directly, an awareness of the need for some intermediate stage, when bourgeois nationalism would be rusted by a national consciousness dominated by the interests of the working people, and a limit would be set to the selfish claims of the exploiting elements.

One of Fanon's merits was his criticism, from a revolutionary-democratic point of view, of bourgeois and bureaucratic trends in the young African states. In certain cases Fanon approached this question one-sidedly and too categorically (a characteristic tendency of his). For example, he objected in principle to a one-party system in Africa, considering it the simplest and most overt form of bourgeois dictatorship, and thereby excluded the possibility of using the one-party system in the interests of the revolutionary forces. But on the whole, his criticism of bureaucratic degeneration, of the use of mass organisations as a screen for personal power, of corruption, of bourgeois accumulation, money-grubbing, hypocrisy, etc., and his negation of the theory of 'guardianship' over the popular masses, brought attention to the real vices in the government of the young African states, vices which flourished under the conditions of post-colonialism and which unfortunately affected not only reactionary and reformist regimes, but also, and sometimes to a substantial extent, progressive, revolutionary ones. Fanon's conception of democracy, whose task was to preserve and develop the political activity and independent action of the masses as it took shape during the anti-imperialist struggle, deserves to be studied closely and put into practice.

The weak points in Fanon's platform are inseparably linked to its merits. They are mainly the result of the lack of a dialectical approach to social phenomena. Fanon came very close to Marxism, but was not a Marxist; he was neither a materialist nor a dialectician, but a metaphysician.

Fanon warmly welcomed revolutionary violence by the oppressed in the form of armed struggle, and this would seem to be his strong point. But he absolutised armed methods, declaring them to be the only means of achieving true independence, and this led to significant miscalculations.

The aware revolutionary ends up choosing armed struggle after careful analysis of the political situation, of the correlation of

class and political forces, the moods of the masses and the possibilities of open resistance. For Fanon, however, violence was not the fruit of consideration and conscious choice, but was felt intuitively, conditioned not so much by socio-political factors as by socio-psychological, anthropological or even psycho-physiological factors. It was an instinctive, spontaneous act, rather than the result of carefully selecting the best means of revolutionary struggle in the given situation.

Fanon also absolutised violence in another sense. It was, for him, not only a method, not even the only method. Violence, taken in itself, was declared valuable and equated with revolution: Fanon expected it to bring about both the spiritual and political emancipation of the masses and guarantees against those bureaucratic distortions of the party and state system which he so perceptively noted in the young states. It need hardly be proved that in itself armed struggle, in any form and on any scale, cannot guarantee all that, and that its success in maintaining a revolutionary and democratic regime depends on the political situation and the level of political awareness, steadfastness and activity of the masses, even given the condition that they are waging an armed struggle. Armed struggle is not an aim in itself, far less a panacea against counter-revolution and reaction. It would seem that the experience of Algeria—which Fanon was not destined to observe—substantiates this.

Fanon did not contrast open armed methods with political methods, as certain ideologists of the partisan war in Latin America did after him, in the mid-sixties. But he too did underestimate political work, and was bound to, due to his overrating of violence.

Fanon's reduction of all revolutionary methods to armed action also left its mark on his conception of the motive forces of the revolutionary process and of the alignment of class forces in the struggle for independence.

When the anti-imperialist movement takes the form of partisan or civil war, it necessarily becomes concentrated in rural areas and relies on the peasantry. This must be the case since, according to the ideologists of guerilla warfare, towns are the fortified centres of colonial rule. It is there that its repressive power is concentrated, so that guerilla resistance cannot even start up in the towns. The liberation of the towns comes as the culmination of the war, as a rule. This was the case in Algeria, Vietnam, the former Portuguese colonies, and everywhere where the guerilla movement turned into a popular liberation war and won. In all

cases, the guerilla war gathered momentum in rural areas, and the main contingent of insurgent detachments consisted of peasants. This was bound to be. The guerilla movement would be doomed to failure if it had not the support of the peasantry. This is precisely what happened in the second half of the sixties in several Latin American countries.

The peasantry constitutes by far the largest share of the population in colonial countries. And Fanon was undoubtedly right in saying that a great deal depends on the peasantry's position. But this still does not solve the problem of the peasantry's revolutionary potential, of what it is that activates them, or of what can guarantee that they behave in a consistently revolutionary fashion; whether this guarantee lies in the actual position and psychology of the peasantry, or it should be introduced from without and backed up by a firm union with the consistently revolutionary forces of the town, above all with the working class.

In solving these questions, Fanon did not rise above the level of narrow empiricism. The class support given to the resistance war by millions of metayers, Algerian peasants and labourers led him to make the conclusion about the revolutionary character of the whole peasantry, and in every country at that.

Fanon's evaluation of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry contains three basic faults.

1. His recognition of the revolutionariness of the peasantry goes hand in hand with his repudiation of the revolutionary potential of the colonial working class. In Fanon's opinion, the view of the European proletariat as the main revolutionary force is not applicable to colonial society, where the working class belongs to the privileged strata, profiting from the colonial regime. The true proletariat in the colonies, that class which according to Fanon has nothing to lose, is the peasantry alone. The colonial working class is neither a revolutionary nor a national force—these qualities are possessed only by the peasantry.

To a certain extent this position was determined by the trade-unionist tendencies in the top crust of the colonial proletariat and by the scornful attitude towards the role of the peasantry in the revolutionary process which was prevalent among many intellectuals in the colonial countries who had yielded to the temptation of modelling their scheme of the revolutionary movement in the colonies on that in the developed industrial nations. But whatever Fanon's motives may have been, nothing can justify his nihilistic approach to the working class in the colonies as a whole. He

proposed an artificial, illusory alternative—either the proletariat or the peasantry—whereas the interests of the revolution and progress demanded the combination of the revolutionary nature of both, and demanded not only the union of the proletariat and peasantry, but also recognition of the guiding importance of the ideology of the proletariat.

Fanon's ideas were fraught with contradictions. He sometimes noted the danger of 'opposing' town and country, but many of his own ideas were objectively directed against any union between the working class and the peasantry—which is the mainstay of socialist development in the former colonies.

Fanon did not assert that the peasantry should create a fighting vanguard from its own numbers. He proposed that this role should be assumed by the 'revolutionary minority' at the head of the peasantry. What would be the class character of this minority? Fanon answers this by process of elimination. He is categorically against the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but neither does he hide his disapproval of the hegemony of the working class. So what is left? The petty-bourgeois positions of the intermediate strata? But how long can such a position hold out between the poles of bourgeoisie and proletariat, against imperialism and capitalism?

When Fanon speaks of the 'revolutionary minority', he shows his understanding of the fact that the essential characteristic of this minority is not its class affinity or class origin, but its class essence. And this is true. But if this is the case, why does he exclude the possibility that this minority can take up the position of the proletariat—not that proletariat which picks up the crumbs from the table of the colonial lords, but that which is conscious of its historical role? Surely the vanguard of the peasantry—as in Russia—could accept its platform? Was this not what happened in Vietnam, where both the Party and army were mainly made up of peasants, but were proletarian in ideology? Was it not this path which was proposed and successfully realised by Amílcar Cabral, from whom we have the term 'ideal proletariat', whose functions, in his opinion, were to be performed by intellectuals? Fanon did not pose these questions and rejected the very possibility of such solution.

2. Fanon's approach to the motive forces of the revolution was anti-historical. He disengaged himself from its stages, defining its motive forces once and for all. Yet Fanon was aware of the restricted nature of nationalism and advocated an anti-capitalist future. Can the driving forces be exactly the same during the struggle for independence as during the stage of anti-capitalist

development? Will not certain changes and regroupings take place in them, will the positions of the working class and peasantry not alter? Fanon did not consider this. After him, this was done by other ideologists of national democracy. As early as 1964, in *Consciencism*, Nkrumah spoke of the constant changes within the framework of the 'positive action', and Cabral in the sixties raised the question of the revolutionary potential of each class in relation, first, to national independence, and, second, to socialism.

3. Fanon's third mistake in defining the driving forces of the revolution is linked to the question of the stages of the revolutionary movement. He did not discern the class differentiation of the peasantry, regarding it as a homogeneous social group with a unified position. Cabral analysed the stratification of rural society in the extremely backward 'Portuguese' Guinea and emphasised that it affected the attitude of the peasantry to the struggle for independence. In the Algerian countryside the processes of differentiation were certainly more mature, and absolutely essential for defining the revolutionary potential of the peasantry both at the stage of the independence struggle and—especially—at the stage of anti-capitalist development.

It has already been noted that Fanon was one of those ideologists who understand the narrowness of the nationalist platform and were attracted towards internationalism and anti-capitalism, but the 'birth-marks' of nationalism remain in his legacy. In both instances he shares the fate of national democracy as a whole. Nationalistic flaws can be seen in Fanon in two directions. He did not understand the class character of colonial supremacy. For him it was ethnic, not class, contradictions that were concentrated in colonialism. Hence every Frenchman in Algeria was an oppressor.

The second aspect of Fanon's nationalist tendencies is linked to this. He did not devote enough attention to the question of joining forces with the democratic forces, and the working class of the metropolis. In a wider sense, although Fanon appreciated the help rendered by the socialist countries, he did not consider the influence of real socialism, of the international communist movement, on the fates of the colonial peoples. To some extent this was encouraged by his conviction of the need to seek his own, unique paths, by his constant fear of adopting the ideas of others, and by the hopes he set on a union of the downtrodden.

Such in very general terms were the strong and weak points in Fanon's thinking. We have already said that during his lifetime

the strong points definitely predominated. Fanon has gone down in history as a convinced and uncompromising opponent of imperialism and fighter for a brighter future for the working people of Africa.

But his ideas continue to live, so that his ideas must now be approached from two stances—the position of his own time and that of today. That which may have been justified in the given conditions at the end of the fifties cannot be acceptable at the beginning of the eighties. The development of the revolutionary process puts a different accent on the evaluation of ideological trends when they do not keep in step with the times.

Fanon can be reproached for the fact that his historical horizons were not particularly broad, that he relied basically on the experience of Algeria, and his theoretical thinking could not rise above that experience. Looking back at the state of affairs in the fifties, much of Fanon's work can be understood and explained by the situation in the country or even by his personal experiences. Thus, as has been noted, his over-reliance on violence was to a certain extent conditioned by the desire of the intellectual and individualist, isolated from the people, to join his fate with theirs. From this point of view, the insurgent army as opposed to the city office seemed like an ideal place. But in politics, to understand everything is not to forgive everything, especially when there is the tendency to continue making the mistakes of the fifties and sixties in the seventies and eighties.

Today we must evaluate Fanon from the vantage of the experience of revolutionary struggle which we have witnessed, but which Fanon was not destined to see. At the new stage, the stage of socialist perspective, Fanon's mistakes take on more weight and are fraught with great dangers for the progressive forces. Not only the revolutionary practice but also the revolutionary theory in the countries of Africa has made great progress. The main corrective measures taken by the African national democrats in their analysis of the alignment of class forces, have already been mentioned. Basic changes have taken place in the attitude of revolutionary democrats to the universal laws of historical development, to Marxism-Leninism, to overcoming national prejudices. The absolute faith in armed struggle may also be considered to a considerable extent as a thing of the past, on an international scale. It was present neither in Vietnam nor in the former Portuguese colonies. In the mid-seventies, many supporters of guerrilla warfare as the only means were made, under the influence of history, to change their minds (R. Debray, Gerard

Chaliand). In some cases (Chaliand) this led to utter scepticism with regard to the possibility of revolutionary development in former colonies and dependencies, in others (Debray) to a more serious attitude towards several old, but eternal truths of Marxism-Leninism.

Fanon could not amend *The Wretched of the Earth* according to the dictates of time. But we must bear these dictates in mind when evaluating attempts to present Fanon's views as the ideal revolutionary theory for the present day, or to use the name and ideas of this great fighter and theoretician in order to maintain the prestige of essentially reactionary, pseudo-revolutionary, left-extremist groups.

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